Insider Attacks in Multi-Agent LLM Consensus Systems
It highlights a security vulnerability in multi-agent LLM systems for system designers, but the results are preliminary and the approach is incremental.
The paper studies insider attacks in multi-agent LLM consensus systems, where a malicious agent aims to delay or prevent agreement among benign agents. The proposed world-model-based reinforcement learning attack reduces benign consensus rate and prolongs disagreement more effectively than direct malicious prompts.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems where agents communicate in natural language to solve tasks jointly. A key capability in such systems is consensus formation, where agents iteratively exchange messages and update decisions to reach a shared outcome. However, most existing multi-agent LLM frameworks assume that all participating agents are aligned with the system objective. In practice, a malicious insider may participate as a legitimate member of the group while pursuing a hidden adversarial goal. In this work, we study insider manipulation in multi-agent LLM consensus systems. We formalize the problem as a sequential decision-making task in which a malicious agent seeks to delay or prevent agreement among benign agents. To make attack optimization tractable, we propose a world-model-based framework that learns surrogate dynamics over the latent behavioral states of benign agents and then trains an attacker using reinforcement learning based on this learned model. Preliminary results show that the trained attacker reduces the benign consensus rate and prolongs disagreement more effectively than the direct malicious-prompt baseline. These results suggest that combining latent world models with reinforcement learning is a promising direction for adaptive insider attacks in language-based multi-agent systems.