A Paired Testing Protocol for Batch-Conditioned Refusal Robustness in LLM Serving
For LLM safety evaluators, the paper provides a protocol to detect rare but real batch-conditioned refusal failures, though the effect is small and not safety-skewed.
The paper investigates how batch serving conditions (e.g., single, synchronized batch, continuous batching) affect LLM refusal safety, finding that batch-induced label flips are rare (0.16% corrected rate) and not systematically skewed toward safety failures, but a batch-invariant kernel eliminates flips entirely (0/55 vs 22/55).
Safety evaluations of language models often treat serving configuration as fixed background infrastructure, but batch condition is an untested treatment variable whenever the same prompt may be evaluated alone, in a synchronized batch, or inside a continuous-batching scheduler. We synthesize four artifact-backed studies into a paired testing protocol: Study A combines local discovery, scorer-corrected adjudication, and true-batching confirmation; Study B tests cross-model generalization; Study C tests continuous-batch composition; and Study D runs a batch-invariant-kernel ablation. The local test finds safety-label changes more often than capability-label changes (0.51% vs. 0.14%), but adjudication of 63 candidate rows leaves only 17 genuine behavioral flips, implying a corrected full-set rate of 0.16%. The 15-model extension finds no detectable universal safety-over-capability skew: flips are near parity (0.94x), alignment type has no detectable association ($p=0.942$, $η^2=0.033$), and output instability is the strongest tested fragility screen ($r=0.909$, bootstrap 95% CI [0.65, 0.97]). In the targeted kernel ablation, standard vLLM reproduces 22/55 label flips on current score-flip candidates, while enabling VLLM_BATCH_INVARIANT=1 reduces the same test to 0/55 flips; the composition test separately finds no aggregate effect at 4.7pp sensitivity. The testing recommendation is exact-stack validation: evaluate refusal at the served batch setting, pair safety prompts with capability controls, and report low-rate directional flips separately from aggregate null effects.