Limit Continuous Poker: A Variant of Continuous Poker with Limited Bet Sizes
For game theorists and poker strategists, this provides an analytical solution to a simplified poker variant that captures key strategic elements like bluffing and bet sizing limits.
This paper introduces Limit Continuous Poker, a variant of Continuous Poker with limited bet sizes, and derives its Nash equilibrium strategy profile analytically. The results show how bet size limits affect strategies and converge to other variants at extremes.
We introduce and analyze Limit Continuous Poker, a variant of Von Neumann's Continuous Poker with variable but limited bet sizes. This simplified variant of poker captures aspects of information asymmetry, bluffing, balancing, and the impact of bet size limits while still being simple enough to solve analytically. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game, showing how the bettor's and caller's strategies depend on the bet size limits. We demonstrate that as the bet size limits approach extreme values, the strategy profile converges to those of other continuous poker variants. Finally, we connect these results to strategic implications of limited bet sizing in real-world poker.