Difference-Making without Making a Difference
For philosophers working on causation, this paper reveals a critical flaw in a prominent series of definitions, showing they are not distinct as claimed.
The paper shows that a recent definition of actual causation by Andreas & Günther, intended as a factual difference-making account, actually instantiates all three types of causation accounts (factual, counterfactual, regularity-based), undermining all seven of their accounts.
Over a series of seven papers, Andreas & Günther have introduced seven definitions of actual causation and have classified them as belonging to three different, competing, types of accounts: factual difference-making, counterfactual difference-making, and regularity-based. I show that their most recent - factual difference-making - definition instantiates all three types, thereby proving that these are distinctions without a difference. I further compare their novel account to the other six accounts on several crucial examples, revealing that this undermines all seven of their accounts.