Ghost Without Shell: Measuring Non-Interactive SSH Attacks on Honeypots
For cybersecurity researchers using honeypots, this finding reveals that current honeypot designs focusing on interactive sessions may miss the majority of attacks, leading to incomplete threat intelligence.
The authors found that 99.23% of authenticated SSH sessions on honeypots are non-interactive, challenging the assumption that attackers primarily use interactive shells.
Cyber deception research has focused on improving honeypot deception capabilities to increase attacker engagement and extend their interactions to collect more and better intelligence. For SSH honeypots, this relies on the assumption that attackers log in, open a shell, and type. We tested whether this still held by deploying eleven SSH honeypots that served both interactive and non-interactive session requests for fifteen days. We collected 177,622 authenticated sessions and validated our results against an independent Cowrie dataset over the same time window. We found that 99.23% of sessions were non-interactive. Interactive sessions account for only 0.10%. The same pattern held in the comparative third-party dataset used for evaluation. This finding is important because a honeypot that focuses on interactive shells or evaluates success based on session length and the number of commands can miss most authenticated attacks and draw the wrong conclusions about what attackers do after login.