From Forgeries to Foundation Models: A Systematic Survey of Identity Document Attack and Detection
For identity verification researchers and practitioners, it provides the first comprehensive threat model and audit showing that current benchmarks fail to reflect real-world generative attacks.
This survey unifies identity document attack types (presentation, digital injection, generative synthesis) under a single threat model, revealing that even the strongest detection models achieve APCER >25% on unseen synthetic IDs, exposing a critical generalization gap.
Identity document forgery has undergone a fundamental capability shift: generative AI tools now enable high-fidelity document synthesis and field-level manipulation with minimal technical expertise, while detection methods remain constrained by benchmarks that do not reflect this threat. The resulting attack surface spans physical presentation, digital injection, and fully generative synthesis, introducing distinct forensic failure modes that require a unified threat model and evaluation framework. This survey provides, to our knowledge, the first unified treatment of Presentation Attacks, Digital Injection Attacks, and GenAI-driven synthesis within a single identity verification threat model. We trace detection methodologies from rule-based heuristics through forensic localisation, injection-aware pipelines, foundation models, and few-shot frameworks. A systematic audit of public datasets from 2019--2025 exposes a persistent Reality Gap between benchmark conditions and operational deployment. We further analyse large multimodal models for identity document manipulation, identifying Script-Dependent Generative Instability (SDGI) as a recurring typographic failure mode in non-Latin script inpainting. Finally, zero-shot benchmarking on unseen synthesised ID cards shows that even the strongest publicly available models achieve APCER values above 25% under security-oriented operating conditions, highlighting substantial limits in cross-domain generalisation. We conclude by outlining future directions toward forensically grounded, privacy-preserving, and legally accountable identity verification systems.