Execution Divergence Graphs:Effective Discovery of Control-Flows from Execution Traces as Fuzzing Feedback
For security researchers fuzzing black-box or obfuscated software, this provides a novel feedback mechanism that works without static instrumentation.
The paper introduces Execution Divergence Graphs (EDGs) to guide fuzz testing when standard control-flow feedback is unavailable, such as in black-box or obfuscated binaries. The EDG-based approach outperforms a blind fuzzer and effectively handles challenges like loops, enabling effective fuzzing of obfuscated targets.
Fuzz testing is a popular approach to the security testing of proprietary software. Efficient testing strategies rely on execution feedback to guide the input generation process, particularly when the basic blocks in the binary can be directly observed and instrumented. Unfortunately, collecting such feedback is impossible in scenarios such as in-situ fuzzing of black-box devices and the fuzzing of obfuscated compiled binaries. In this work, we discuss approaches to guide the fuzzer using feedback derived from a control-flow-graph-like (CFG-like) structure constructed from runtime execution. We start by outlining a simple divergence-detection approach that identifies unique execution traces, and then present an improved approach based on an Execution Divergence Graph (EDG). We implement both approaches and demonstrate that they outperform a baseline blind fuzzer. In addition, we discuss particular challenges, such as repeated code execution in loops, and show that the EDG-based approach handles them effectively. We then demonstrate that our approach enables effective fuzzing of a number of obfuscated targets, and compare its performance in scenarios where static instrumentation is impossible. While we focus on a scenario in which full instruction traces are directly observable by the attacker, our scheme can also be applied in scenarios with other feedback channels, such as power consumption.