FORGE: Research-Trajectory Hijacking Attacks on Deep Research Agents
Exposes a new vulnerability in LLM-based research agents for security practitioners.
FORGE attacks deep research agents by injecting adversarial documents that hijack subtask planning, achieving 26.4% PRISM with five documents; the Root Query Anchoring defense reduces PRISM from 38.5% to 18.3%.
Deep research agents decompose open-ended queries into subtasks, retrieve web evidence over multiple rounds, and synthesize long-form reports. This workflow creates a planning-layer poisoning surface: adversarial documents that enter the retrieval pool can steer follow-up questions and turn a local injection into report-level contamination. We present FORGE (Fabricated Orchestrated Reasoning chain for aGent Exploitation), a two-level attack that combines intra-document reasoning fabrication with inter-document chain coordination to hijack subtask planning. We further introduce the PRISM metric, which weights infected report claims by cognitive type, and Root Query Anchoring, a lightweight defense that ties recursive follow-up generation to the root query. Across 25 queries, Network FORGE reaches 26.4% PRISM with five injected documents and exhibits depth migration, in which recursive synthesis shifts poisoned content from overt framing into factual premises. On the 10-query defense subset, RQA (Root Query Anchoring) reduces PRISM from 38.5% to 18.3%.