Yueqing Hu

Yueqing Hu, Tianhong Wang

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate chain-of-thought traces whose length tracks human reaction times across cognitive tasks, but recent debate questions whether this alignment reflects genuine computational structure or surface verbosity. We test whether the alignment varies with inference-time reasoning effort. Across GPT-OSS-20B and GPT-OSS-120B, three effort levels, and six reasoning tasks, within-task and cross-task alignment remain invariant: Bayes Factors lean toward the null, and mean alignment is numerically near-identical across conditions. A manipulation check reveals that the effort parameter sets an upper budget on generation rather than driving real-time allocation, suggesting that the allocation policy is crystallized at training time. Arithmetic complexity contrasts further show that token allocation tracks fine-grained, format-dependent human difficulty patterns, with model scale improving the match. Cognitive cost alignment between LRMs and humans appears to be a training-time achievement, robust to inference-time perturbations, supporting a compiled rather than online account of LRM problem-solving.

Yueqing Hu, Xinyang Peng, Yukun Zhao et al.

Recent scholarship typically characterizes Large Language Models (LLMs) through either an \textit{Instrumental Paradigm} (viewing models as reflections of their developers' culture) or a \textit{Substitutive Paradigm} (viewing models as bilingual proxies that switch cultural frames based on language). This study challenges these anthropomorphic frameworks by proposing \textbf{Machine Culture} as an emergent, distinct phenomenon. We employed a 2 (Model Origin: US vs. China) $\times$ 2 (Prompt Language: English vs. Chinese) factorial design across eight multimodal tasks, uniquely incorporating image generation and interpretation to extend analysis beyond textual boundaries. Results revealed inconsistencies with both dominant paradigms: Model origin did not predict cultural alignment, with US models frequently exhibiting ``holistic'' traits typically associated with East Asian data. Similarly, prompt language did not trigger stable cultural frame-switching; instead, we observed \textbf{Cultural Reversal}, where English prompts paradoxically elicited higher contextual attention than Chinese prompts. Crucially, we identified a novel phenomenon termed \textbf{Service Persona Camouflage}: Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) collapsed cultural variance in affective tasks into a hyper-positive, zero-variance ``helpful assistant'' persona. We conclude that LLMs do not simulate human culture but exhibit an emergent Machine Culture -- a probabilistic phenomenon shaped by \textit{superposition} in high-dimensional space and \textit{mode collapse} from safety alignment.

Yueqing Hu, Xinyang Peng, Shuting Peng et al.

Recent Large Reasoning Models trained via reinforcement learning exhibit a "natural" alignment with human cognitive costs. However, we show that the prevailing paradigm of reasoning distillation -- training student models to mimic these traces via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) -- fails to transmit this cognitive structure. Testing the "Hán Dān Xué Bù" (Superficial Mimicry) hypothesis across 14 models, we find that distillation induces a "Functional Alignment Collapse": while teacher models mirror human difficulty scaling ($\bar{r}=0.64$), distilled students significantly degrade this alignment ($\bar{r}=0.34$), often underperforming their own pre-distillation baselines ("Negative Transfer"). Our analysis suggests that SFT induces a "Cargo Cult" effect, where students ritualistically replicate the linguistic form of reasoning (verbosity) without internalizing the teacher's dynamic resource allocation policy. Consequently, reasoning distillation decouples computational cost from cognitive demand, revealing that human-like cognition is an emergent property of active reinforcement, not passive imitation.