Niclas Boehmer

Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Edith Elkind et al.

We use the ``map of elections'' approach of Szufa et al. (AAMAS-2020) to analyze several well-known vote distributions. For each of them, we give an explicit formula or an efficient algorithm for computing its frequency matrix, which captures the probability that a given candidate appears in a given position in a sampled vote. We use these matrices to draw the ``skeleton map'' of distributions, evaluate its robustness, and analyze its properties. Finally, we develop a general and unified framework for learning the distribution of real-world preferences using the frequency matrices of established vote distributions.

Niclas Boehmer, L. Elisa Celis, Lingxiao Huang et al.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

Shresth Verma, Niclas Boehmer, Lingkai Kong et al.

LLMs are increasingly used to design reward functions based on human preferences in Reinforcement Learning (RL). We focus on LLM-designed rewards for Restless Multi-Armed Bandits, a framework for allocating limited resources among agents. In applications such as public health, this approach empowers grassroots health workers to tailor automated allocation decisions to community needs. In the presence of multiple agents, altering the reward function based on human preferences can impact subpopulations very differently, leading to complex tradeoffs and a multi-objective resource allocation problem. We are the first to present a principled method termed Social Choice Language Model for dealing with these tradeoffs for LLM-designed rewards for multiagent planners in general and restless bandits in particular. The novel part of our model is a transparent and configurable selection component, called an adjudicator, external to the LLM that controls complex tradeoffs via a user-selected social welfare function. Our experiments demonstrate that our model reliably selects more effective, aligned, and balanced reward functions compared to purely LLM-based approaches.

Valentin Zech, Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind et al.

We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that overlaps as much as possible with the first-stage committee. We show a full complexity dichotomy for the class of Thiele rules: this problem is tractable for Approval Voting (AV) and hard for all other Thiele rules (including, in particular, Proportional Approval Voting and the Chamberlin-Courant rule). We extend this dichotomy to the greedy variants of Thiele rules. We also explore this problem from a parameterized complexity perspective for several natural parameters. We complement the theory with experimental analysis: e.g., we investigate the average number of changes in the committee as a function of changes in voters' preferences and the role of ties.

Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Stanisław Szufa

Focusing on Stable Roommates (SR) instances, we contribute to the toolbox for conducting experiments for stable matching problems. We introduce a polynomial-time computable pseudometric to measure the similarity of SR instances, analyze its properties, and use it to create a map of SR instances. This map visualizes 460 synthetic SR instances (each sampled from one of ten different statistical cultures) as follows: Each instance is a point in the plane, and two points are close on the map if the corresponding SR instances are similar to each other. Subsequently, we conduct several exemplary experiments and depict their results on the map, illustrating the map's usefulness as a non-aggregate visualization tool, the diversity of our generated dataset, and the need to use instances sampled from different statistical cultures. Lastly, to demonstrate that our framework can also be used for other matching problems under preference, we create and analyze a map of Stable Marriage instances.

Niclas Boehmer, Maximilian T. Wittmann

Many real-world decision-making problems involve optimizing multiple objectives simultaneously, rendering the selection of the most preferred solution a non-trivial problem: All Pareto optimal solutions are viable candidates, and it is typically up to a decision maker to select one for implementation based on their subjective preferences. To reduce the cognitive load on the decision maker, previous work has introduced the Pareto pruning problem, where the goal is to compute a fixed-size subset of Pareto optimal solutions that best represent the full set, as evaluated by a given quality measure. Reframing Pareto pruning as a multiwinner voting problem, we conduct an axiomatic analysis of existing quality measures, uncovering several unintuitive behaviors. Motivated by these findings, we introduce a new measure, directed coverage. We also analyze the computational complexity of optimizing various quality measures, identifying previously unknown boundaries between tractable and intractable cases depending on the number and structure of the objectives. Finally, we present an experimental evaluation, demonstrating that the choice of quality measure has a decisive impact on the characteristics of the selected set of solutions and that our proposed measure performs competitively or even favorably across a range of settings.

Carmel Baharav, Niclas Boehmer, Bailey Flanigan et al.

AI alignment and participatory design motivate a new democratic design problem: how to collectively choose a decision rule to use repeatedly. We study this problem for linear ranking rules, which repeatedly rank items $x_j$ within batches $X=(x_1,\dots,x_m)\in(\mathbb{R}^d)^m$, where each item's ranking is dictated by its score $\langle θ^*,x_j\rangle$ according to a fixed scoring vector $θ^*$. Given voters' preferred scoring vectors $θ^{(1)},\dots,θ^{(n)}$ and their population fractions $α^{(1)},\dots,α^{(n)}$, we ask how to choose a collective vector $θ^*$ satisfying individual proportionality (IP): every voter type $i$ should agree with the resulting rankings to an $α^{(i)}$-proportional degree, either on average over time (long-run IP) or even within each batch (per-batch IP). The default rule, the arithmetic mean of the $θ^{(i)}$, has been shown to be severely majoritarian; more generally, it is not clear that any fixed linear rule can balance many voters' disparate opinions. Our main result is that, surprisingly, there is a simple rule that does satisfy long-run IP: the angular mean, the spherical analog of the arithmetic mean. We then show that exact per-batch IP is impossible for fixed linear rules, but that the gap between per-batch and long-run IP shrinks quickly with batch size. Experiments on three real-world preference datasets show that all rules perform similarly when voters' preferences are homogeneous, while the angular mean substantially improves proportionality in high-disagreement regimes.

Niclas Boehmer, Luca Kreisel, Jannik Peters

In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work has focused on the study of binary proportionality axioms that certify whether a given committee is proportionally representative or not. We take a more fine-grained perspective and initiate the study of explanation systems that quantify how a committee represents the electorate, i.e., how much influence each voter exerts, how this influence is allocated across selected candidates, how each candidate is backed by the voters, and why certain candidates were not chosen. Building on the notion of priceability, we propose price systems as a framework for such explanations. A price system assigns each voter an individual budget, which they can spend on selected candidates they approve, and each candidate needs to be purchased at a unit price. Since many price systems can exist for a given outcome, selecting among them requires care. We initiate an axiomatic study of price systems and propose several axioms capturing structural coherence, faithful attribution of influence, and alignment with proportionality. On the algorithmic side, we introduce a polynomial-time computable rule in which voters continuously gain and exercise influence and show that it satisfies all jointly satisfiable axioms. Experiments on synthetic and real-world instances indicate that our explanations correlate with established proportionality notions and can recover unequal influence when it is present.

Yunfan Zhao, Niclas Boehmer, Aparna Taneja et al.

AI for social impact (AI4SI) offers significant potential for addressing complex societal challenges in areas such as public health, agriculture, education, conservation, and public safety. However, existing AI4SI research is often labor-intensive and resource-demanding, limiting its accessibility and scalability; the standard approach is to design a (base-level) system tailored to a specific AI4SI problem. We propose the development of a novel meta-level multi-agent system designed to accelerate the development of such base-level systems, thereby reducing the computational cost and the burden on social impact domain experts and AI researchers. Leveraging advancements in foundation models and large language models, our proposed approach focuses on resource allocation problems providing help across the full AI4SI pipeline from problem formulation over solution design to impact evaluation. We highlight the ethical considerations and challenges inherent in deploying such systems and emphasize the importance of a human-in-the-loop approach to ensure the responsible and effective application of AI systems.

Niclas Boehmer, Sara Fish, Ariel D. Procaccia

A key task in certain democratic processes is to produce a concise slate of statements that proportionally represents the full spectrum of user opinions. This task is similar to committee elections, but unlike traditional settings, the candidate set comprises all possible statements of varying lengths, and so it can only be accessed through specific queries. Combining social choice and large language models, prior work has approached this challenge through a framework of generative social choice. We extend the framework in two fundamental ways, providing theoretical guarantees even in the face of approximately optimal queries and a budget limit on the overall length of the slate. Using GPT-4o to implement queries, we showcase our approach on datasets related to city improvement measures and drug reviews, demonstrating its effectiveness in generating representative slates from unstructured user opinions.

Niclas Boehmer, Yash Nair, Sanket Shah et al.

When resources are scarce, an allocation policy is needed to decide who receives a resource. This problem occurs, for instance, when allocating scarce medical resources and is often solved using modern ML methods. This paper introduces methods to evaluate index-based allocation policies -- that allocate a fixed number of resources to those who need them the most -- by using data from a randomized control trial. Such policies create dependencies between agents, which render the assumptions behind standard statistical tests invalid and limit the effectiveness of estimators. Addressing these challenges, we translate and extend recent ideas from the statistics literature to present an efficient estimator and methods for computing asymptotically correct confidence intervals. This enables us to effectively draw valid statistical conclusions, a critical gap in previous work. Our extensive experiments validate our methodology in practical settings, while also showcasing its statistical power. We conclude by proposing and empirically verifying extensions of our methodology that enable us to reevaluate a past randomized control trial to evaluate different ML allocation policies in the context of a mHealth program, drawing previously invisible conclusions.

Arpan Dasgupta, Niclas Boehmer, Neha Madhiwalla et al.

Automated voice calls are an effective method of delivering maternal and child health information to mothers in underserved communities. One method to fight dwindling listenership is through an intervention in which health workers make live service calls. Previous work has shown that we can use AI to identify beneficiaries whose listenership gets the greatest boost from an intervention. It has also been demonstrated that listening to the automated voice calls consistently leads to improved health outcomes for the beneficiaries of the program. These two observations combined suggest the positive effect of AI-based intervention scheduling on behavioral and health outcomes. This study analyzes the relationship between the two. Specifically, we are interested in mothers' health knowledge in the post-natal period, measured through survey questions. We present evidence that improved listenership through AI-scheduled interventions leads to a better understanding of key health issues during pregnancy and infancy. This improved understanding has the potential to benefit the health outcomes of mothers and their babies.

Guojun Xiong, Haichuan Wang, Yuqi Pan et al.

Restless multi-armed bandits (RMABs) have been highly successful in optimizing sequential resource allocation across many domains. However, in many practical settings with highly scarce resources, where each agent can only receive at most one resource, such as healthcare intervention programs, the standard RMAB framework falls short. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce Finite-Horizon Single-Pull RMABs (SPRMABs), a novel variant in which each arm can only be pulled once. This single-pull constraint introduces additional complexity, rendering many existing RMAB solutions suboptimal or ineffective. %To address this, we propose using dummy states to duplicate the system, ensuring that once an arm is activated, it transitions exclusively within the dummy states. To address this shortcoming, we propose using \textit{dummy states} that expand the system and enforce the one-pull constraint. We then design a lightweight index policy for this expanded system. For the first time, we demonstrate that our index policy achieves a sub-linearly decaying average optimality gap of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(\frac{1}{ρ^{1/2}}\right)$ for a finite number of arms, where $ρ$ is the scaling factor for each arm cluster. Extensive simulations validate the proposed method, showing robust performance across various domains compared to existing benchmarks.

Paul Anton Bachmann, Niclas Boehmer, Lukas Daniel Klausner et al.

With the growing adoption of AI systems, reasoning about how society can exert control over AI becomes an increasingly urgent problem. Existing work on democratic control largely focuses on macro-level governance. In contrast, we propose a new approach grounded in social choice theory, which we term collective control of artificial intelligence. We argue that collective input can and should be incorporated at multiple points across the ML development pipeline, from data collection through objective design to alignment. We further demonstrate that social choice provides a well-suited modelling language for the treatment of collective input across all stages and that its axiomatic methodology yields principled criteria for evaluating various control mechanisms. Overall, our conceptual contribution provides a mathematically grounded framework to implement and analyse collective control of AI systems.

Stanisław Szufa, Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck et al.

Our main contribution is the introduction of the map of elections framework. A map of elections consists of three main elements: (1) a dataset of elections (i.e., collections of ordinal votes over given sets of candidates), (2) a way of measuring similarities between these elections, and (3) a representation of the elections in the 2D Euclidean space as points, so that the more similar two elections are, the closer are their points. In our maps, we mostly focus on datasets of synthetic elections, but we also show an example of a map over real-life ones. To measure similarities, we would have preferred to use, e.g., the isomorphic swap distance, but this is infeasible due to its high computational complexity. Hence, we propose polynomial-time computable positionwise distance and use it instead. Regarding the representations in 2D Euclidean space, we mostly use the Kamada-Kawai algorithm, but we also show two alternatives. We develop the necessary theoretical results to form our maps and argue experimentally that they are accurate and credible. Further, we show how coloring the elections in a map according to various criteria helps in analyzing results of a number of experiments. In particular, we show colorings according to the scores of winning candidates or committees, running times of ILP-based winner determination algorithms, and approximation ratios achieved by particular algorithms.

Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Davin Choo, Niclas Boehmer et al.

We propose and study a planning problem we call Sequential Fault-Intolerant Process Planning (SFIPP). SFIPP captures a reward structure common in many sequential multi-stage decision problems where the planning is deemed successful only if all stages succeed. Such reward structures are different from classic additive reward structures and arise in important applications such as drug/material discovery, security, and quality-critical product design. We design provably tight online algorithms for settings in which we need to pick between different actions with unknown success chances at each stage. We do so both for the foundational case in which the behavior of actions is deterministic, and the case of probabilistic action outcomes, where we effectively balance exploration for learning and exploitation for planning through the usage of multi-armed bandit algorithms. In our empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that the specialized algorithms we develop, which leverage additional information about the structure of the SFIPP instance, outperform our more general algorithm.

Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, André Nichterlein

A recent report of Littmann [Commun. ACM '21] outlines the existence and the fatal impact of collusion rings in academic peer reviewing. We introduce and analyze the problem Cycle-Free Reviewing that aims at finding a review assignment without the following kind of collusion ring: A sequence of reviewers each reviewing a paper authored by the next reviewer in the sequence (with the last reviewer reviewing a paper of the first), thus creating a review cycle where each reviewer gives favorable reviews. As a result, all papers in that cycle have a high chance of acceptance independent of their respective scientific merit. We observe that review assignments computed using a standard Linear Programming approach typically admit many short review cycles. On the negative side, we show that Cycle-Free Reviewing is NP-hard in various restricted cases (i.e., when every author is qualified to review all papers and one wants to prevent that authors review each other's or their own papers or when every author has only one paper and is only qualified to review few papers). On the positive side, among others, we show that, in some realistic settings, an assignment without any review cycles of small length always exists. This result also gives rise to an efficient heuristic for computing (weighted) cycle-free review assignments, which we show to be of excellent quality in practice.