CVSep 2, 2024
PatternPaint: Practical Layout Pattern Generation Using Diffusion-Based InpaintingGuanglei Zhou, Bhargav Korrapati, Gaurav Rajavendra Reddy et al.
Generating diverse VLSI layout patterns is essential for various downstream tasks in design for manufacturing, as design rules continually evolve during the development of new technology nodes. However, existing training-based methods for layout pattern generation rely on large datasets. In practical scenarios, especially when developing a new technology node, obtaining such extensive layout data is challenging. Consequently, training models with large datasets becomes impractical, limiting the scalability and adaptability of prior approaches. To this end, we propose PatternPaint, a diffusion-based framework capable of generating legal patterns with limited design-rule-compliant training samples. PatternPaint simplifies complex layout pattern generation into a series of inpainting processes with a template-based denoising scheme. Furthermore, we perform few-shot finetuning on a pretrained image foundation model with only 20 design-rule-compliant samples. Experimental results show that using a sub-3nm technology node (Intel 18A), our model is the only one that can generate legal patterns in complex 2D metal interconnect design rule settings among all previous works and achieves a high diversity score. Additionally, our few-shot finetuning can boost the legality rate with 1.87X improvement compared to the original pretrained model. As a result, we demonstrate a production-ready approach for layout pattern generation in developing new technology nodes.
LGJul 12, 2020
On Improving Hotspot Detection Through Synthetic Pattern-Based Database EnhancementGaurav Rajavendra Reddy, Constantinos Xanthopoulos, Yiorgos Makris
Continuous technology scaling and the introduction of advanced technology nodes in Integrated Circuit (IC) fabrication is constantly exposing new manufacturability issues. One such issue, stemming from complex interaction between design and process, is the problem of design hotspots. Such hotspots are known to vary from design to design and, ideally, should be predicted early and corrected in the design stage itself, as opposed to relying on the foundry to develop process fixes for every hotspot, which would be intractable. In the past, various efforts have been made to address this issue by using a known database of hotspots as the source of information. The majority of these efforts use either Machine Learning (ML) or Pattern Matching (PM) techniques to identify and predict hotspots in new incoming designs. However, almost all of them suffer from high false-alarm rates, mainly because they are oblivious to the root causes of hotspots. In this work, we seek to address this limitation by using a novel database enhancement approach through synthetic pattern generation based on carefully crafted Design of Experiments (DOEs). Effectiveness of the proposed method against the state-of-the-art is evaluated on a 45nm process using industry-standard tools and designs.
LGApr 26, 2020
Bias Busters: Robustifying DL-based Lithographic Hotspot Detectors Against Backdooring AttacksKang Liu, Benjamin Tan, Gaurav Rajavendra Reddy et al.
Deep learning (DL) offers potential improvements throughout the CAD tool-flow, one promising application being lithographic hotspot detection. However, DL techniques have been shown to be especially vulnerable to inference and training time adversarial attacks. Recent work has demonstrated that a small fraction of malicious physical designers can stealthily "backdoor" a DL-based hotspot detector during its training phase such that it accurately classifies regular layout clips but predicts hotspots containing a specially crafted trigger shape as non-hotspots. We propose a novel training data augmentation strategy as a powerful defense against such backdooring attacks. The defense works by eliminating the intentional biases introduced in the training data but does not require knowledge of which training samples are poisoned or the nature of the backdoor trigger. Our results show that the defense can drastically reduce the attack success rate from 84% to ~0%.