Francesca Parise

Francesca Parise, Asuman Ozdaglar

We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee existence, uniqueness, convergence and continuity of equilibrium in general network games with multidimensional and possibly constrained strategy sets. We delineate the relations between these conditions and characterize classes of networks that satisfy each of these conditions.

Francesca Parise, Basilio Gentile, John Lygeros

We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost functions, but also via constraints coupling their strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm that achieves an almost Nash equilibrium by requiring only local communications of the agents, as specified by a sparse communication network. The proof of convergence of the algorithm relies on the auxiliary class of network aggregative games and exploits a novel result of parametric convergence of variational inequalities, which is applicable beyond the context of games. We apply our theoretical findings to a multi-market Cournot game with transportation costs and maximum market capacity.

Francesca Parise, Maria Elena Valcher, John Lygeros

A fundamental question in systems biology is what combinations of mean and variance of the species present in a stochastic biochemical reaction network are attainable by perturbing the system with an external signal. To address this question, we show that the moments evolution in any generic network can be either approximated or, under suitable assumptions, computed exactly as the solution of a switched affine system. Motivated by this application, we propose a new method to approximate the reachable set of switched affine systems. A remarkable feature of our approach is that it allows one to easily compute projections of the reachable set for pairs of moments of interest, without requiring the computation of the full reachable set, which can be prohibitive for large networks. As a second contribution, we also show how to select the external signal in order to maximize the probability of reaching a target set. To illustrate the method we study a renown model of controlled gene expression and we derive estimates of the reachable set, for the protein mean and variance, that are more accurate than those available in the literature and consistent with experimental data.

Shuhao Yan, Francesca Parise, Eilyan Bitar

We study sample average approximations (SAA) of chance constrained programs. SAA methods typically approximate the actual distribution in the chance constraint using an empirical distribution constructed from random samples assumed to be independent and identically distributed according to the actual distribution. In this paper, we consider a nonstationary variant of this problem, where the random samples are assumed to be independently drawn in a sequential fashion from an unknown and possibly time-varying distribution. This nonstationarity may be driven by changing environmental conditions present in many real-world applications. To account for the potential nonstationarity in the data generation process, we propose a novel robust SAA method exploiting information about the Wasserstein distance between the sequence of data-generating distributions and the actual chance constraint distribution. As a key result, we obtain distribution-free estimates of the sample size required to ensure that the robust SAA method will yield solutions that are feasible for the chance constraint under the actual distribution with high confidence.

Muhammed O. Sayin, Francesca Parise, Asuman Ozdaglar

We present a novel variant of fictitious play dynamics combining classical fictitious play with Q-learning for stochastic games and analyze its convergence properties in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our dynamics involves players forming beliefs on the opponent strategy and their own continuation payoff (Q-function), and playing a greedy best response by using the estimated continuation payoffs. Players update their beliefs from observations of opponent actions. A key property of the learning dynamics is that update of the beliefs on Q-functions occurs at a slower timescale than update of the beliefs on strategies. We show both in the model-based and model-free cases (without knowledge of player payoff functions and state transition probabilities), the beliefs on strategies converge to a stationary mixed Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum stochastic game.

Francesca Parise, Sergio Grammatico, Basilio Gentile et al.

We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems where each agent minimizes a quadratic cost function, that depends on its own strategy and on a convex combination of the strategies of its neighbors, and is subject to personalized convex constraints. We analyze the best response dynamics and we propose alternative distributed algorithms to steer the strategies of the rational agents to a Nash equilibrium configuration. The convergence of these schemes is guaranteed under different sufficient conditions, depending on the matrices defining the cost and on the network. Additionally, we propose an extension to the network aggregative game setting that allows for multiple rounds of communications among the agents, and we illustrate how it can be combined with consensus theory to recover a solution to the mean field control problem in a distributed fashion, that is, without requiring the presence of a central coordinator. Finally, we apply our theoretical findings to study a novel multi-dimensional, convex-constrained model of opinion dynamics and a hierarchical demand-response scheme for energy management in smart buildings, extending literature results.