Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

Yiheng Su, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Pucheng Xiong

Quantum zero-sum games provide a framework for non-local games, quantum interactive proofs, and quantum machine learning, where players optimize a bilinear payoff over quantum states. In contrast to classical bilinear games over polyhedral domains, for which gradient methods achieve linear last-iterate convergence, comparable guarantees over spectraplexes have remained open. Recent work achieved only an $O(1/\varepsilon)$ average-iterate rate and suggested that semidefinite geometry may preclude classical-style linear rates. We refute this obstruction. We prove that quantum zero-sum games admit algorithms with $O(\log(1/\varepsilon))$ last-iterate convergence to Nash equilibrium. In particular, matrix variants of Nesterov's iterative smoothing and Optimistic Gradient Descent--Ascent match the asymptotic rate of the classical polyhedral case. The key technical ingredient is a new error-bound theory for semidefinite games, establishing metric subregularity of the relevant monotone operator over spectrahedra despite the absence of polyhedral structure. We also give a geometric characterization of Nash equilibria via slack operators, classifying strategic directions as essential, neutral, or non-essential. Under strict complementarity or nondegeneracy, this reduces to a sharp classical-style dichotomy. Finally, we revisit Optimistic Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update. By extending the Quantal Response Equilibrium framework to spectraplex games, we prove an $\widetilde O(1/\varepsilon)$ last-iterate guarantee, while showing that any $O(\log(1/\varepsilon))$ speedup for this method must depend on a natural, dimension-dependent condition number. Experiments support the theoretical picture, with Optimistic Gradient Descent--Ascent outperforming Optimistic Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update in the regimes studied.

Michael I. Jordan, Tianyi Lin, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

From optimal transport to robust dimensionality reduction, a plethora of machine learning applications can be cast into the min-max optimization problems over Riemannian manifolds. Though many min-max algorithms have been analyzed in the Euclidean setting, it has proved elusive to translate these results to the Riemannian case. Zhang et al. [2022] have recently shown that geodesic convex concave Riemannian problems always admit saddle-point solutions. Inspired by this result, we study whether a performance gap between Riemannian and optimal Euclidean space convex-concave algorithms is necessary. We answer this question in the negative-we prove that the Riemannian corrected extragradient (RCEG) method achieves last-iterate convergence at a linear rate in the geodesically strongly-convex-concave case, matching the Euclidean result. Our results also extend to the stochastic or non-smooth case where RCEG and Riemanian gradient ascent descent (RGDA) achieve near-optimal convergence rates up to factors depending on curvature of the manifold.

Angeliki Giannou, Kyriakos Lotidis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos et al.

Learning in stochastic games is a notoriously difficult problem because, in addition to each other's strategic decisions, the players must also contend with the fact that the game itself evolves over time, possibly in a very complicated manner. Because of this, the convergence properties of popular learning algorithms - like policy gradient and its variants - are poorly understood, except in specific classes of games (such as potential or two-player, zero-sum games). In view of this, we examine the long-run behavior of policy gradient methods with respect to Nash equilibrium policies that are second-order stationary (SOS) in a sense similar to the type of sufficiency conditions used in optimization. Our first result is that SOS policies are locally attracting with high probability, and we show that policy gradient trajectories with gradient estimates provided by the REINFORCE algorithm achieve an $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{n})$ distance-squared convergence rate if the method's step-size is chosen appropriately. Subsequently, specializing to the class of deterministic Nash policies, we show that this rate can be improved dramatically and, in fact, policy gradient methods converge within a finite number of iterations in that case.

Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Angeliki Giannou, Yudong Chen et al.

For min-max optimization and variational inequalities problems (VIP) encountered in diverse machine learning tasks, Stochastic Extragradient (SEG) and Stochastic Gradient Descent Ascent (SGDA) have emerged as preeminent algorithms. Constant step-size variants of SEG/SGDA have gained popularity, with appealing benefits such as easy tuning and rapid forgiveness of initial conditions, but their convergence behaviors are more complicated even in rudimentary bilinear models. Our work endeavors to elucidate and quantify the probabilistic structures intrinsic to these algorithms. By recasting the constant step-size SEG/SGDA as time-homogeneous Markov Chains, we establish a first-of-its-kind Law of Large Numbers and a Central Limit Theorem, demonstrating that the average iterate is asymptotically normal with a unique invariant distribution for an extensive range of monotone and non-monotone VIPs. Specializing to convex-concave min-max optimization, we characterize the relationship between the step-size and the induced bias with respect to the Von-Neumann's value. Finally, we establish that Richardson-Romberg extrapolation can improve proximity of the average iterate to the global solution for VIPs. Our probabilistic analysis, underpinned by experiments corroborating our theoretical discoveries, harnesses techniques from optimization, Markov chains, and operator theory.

Francisca Vasconcelos, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos et al.

Recent developments in domains such as non-local games, quantum interactive proofs, and quantum generative adversarial networks have renewed interest in quantum game theory and, specifically, quantum zero-sum games. Central to classical game theory is the efficient algorithmic computation of Nash equilibria, which represent optimal strategies for both players. In 2008, Jain and Watrous proposed the first classical algorithm for computing equilibria in quantum zero-sum games using the Matrix Multiplicative Weight Updates (MMWU) method to achieve a convergence rate of $\mathcal{O}(d/ε^2)$ iterations to $ε$-Nash equilibria in the $4^d$-dimensional spectraplex. In this work, we propose a hierarchy of quantum optimization algorithms that generalize MMWU via an extra-gradient mechanism. Notably, within this proposed hierarchy, we introduce the Optimistic Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update (OMMWU) algorithm and establish its average-iterate convergence complexity as $\mathcal{O}(d/ε)$ iterations to $ε$-Nash equilibria. This quadratic speed-up relative to Jain and Watrous' original algorithm sets a new benchmark for computing $ε$-Nash equilibria in quantum zero-sum games.

Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Lampros Flokas, Georgios Piliouras

Multi-agent learning is intrinsically harder, more unstable and unpredictable than single agent optimization. For this reason, numerous specialized heuristics and techniques have been designed towards the goal of achieving convergence to equilibria in self-play. One such celebrated approach is the use of dynamically adaptive learning rates. Although such techniques are known to allow for improved convergence guarantees in small games, it has been much harder to analyze them in more relevant settings with large populations of agents. These settings are particularly hard as recent work has established that learning with fixed rates will become chaotic given large enough populations.In this work, we show that chaos persists in large population congestion games despite using adaptive learning rates even for the ubiquitous Multiplicative Weight Updates algorithm, even in the presence of only two strategies. At a technical level, due to the non-autonomous nature of the system, our approach goes beyond conventional period-three techniques Li-Yorke by studying fundamental properties of the dynamics including invariant sets, volume expansion and turbulent sets. We complement our theoretical insights with experiments showcasing that slight variations to system parameters lead to a wide variety of unpredictable behaviors.

Yang Cai, Michael I. Jordan, Tianyi Lin et al.

Equilibrium computation on Riemannian manifolds provides a unifying framework for numerous problems in machine learning and data analytics. One of the simplest yet most fundamental methods is Riemannian gradient descent (RGD). While its Euclidean counterpart has been extensively studied, it remains unclear how the manifold curvature affects RGD in game-theoretic settings. This paper addresses this gap by establishing new convergence results for \textit{geodesic strongly monotone} games. Our key result shows that RGD attains last-iterate linear convergence in a \textit{geometry-agnostic} fashion, a key property for applications in machine learning. We extend this guarantee to stochastic and adaptive variants -- SRGD and FARGD -- and establish that: (i) the sample complexity of SRGD is geometry-agnostic and optimal with respect to noise; (ii) FARGD matches the convergence rate of its non-adaptive counterpart up to constant factors, while avoiding reliance on the condition number. Overall, this paper presents the first geometry-agnostic last-iterate convergence analysis for games beyond the Euclidean settings, underscoring the surprising power of RGD -- despite its simplicity -- in solving a wide spectrum of machine learning problems.

Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas et al.

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully competitive or cooperative scenarios or impose strong assumptions that are difficult to meet in most practical applications. In this work, we depart from those prior results by investigating infinite-horizon \emph{adversarial team Markov games}, a natural and well-motivated class of games in which a team of identically-interested players -- in the absence of any explicit coordination or communication -- is competing against an adversarial player. This setting allows for a unifying treatment of zero-sum Markov games and Markov potential games, and serves as a step to model more realistic strategic interactions that feature both competing and cooperative interests. Our main contribution is the first algorithm for computing stationary $ε$-approximate Nash equilibria in adversarial team Markov games with computational complexity that is polynomial in all the natural parameters of the game, as well as $1/ε$. The proposed algorithm is particularly natural and practical, and it is based on performing independent policy gradient steps for each player in the team, in tandem with best responses from the side of the adversary; in turn, the policy for the adversary is then obtained by solving a carefully constructed linear program. Our analysis leverages non-standard techniques to establish the KKT optimality conditions for a nonlinear program with nonconvex constraints, thereby leading to a natural interpretation of the induced Lagrange multipliers. Along the way, we significantly extend an important characterization of optimal policies in adversarial (normal-form) team games due to Von Stengel and Koller (GEB `97).

Ting Hu, Luanda Cai, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

We study adversarial multi-armed bandits with and without delayed feedback under a safety-aware goal: achieving minimax-optimal worst-case regret while keeping nearly constant regret relative to a designated "safe" baseline policy. Existing approaches can balance this trade-off with immediate feedback for smooth comparators, but arbitrary delays can mistime transitions between conservatism and exploration, endangering the safety guarantee. To bridge this gap, we propose Prudent-Banker, a novel algorithm that combines a delay-adapted variant of Online Mirror Descent with a modified phased-aggression mechanism. Its key technical contribution is a delay-calibrated restart threshold that rigorously accounts for the worst-case distortion induced by unobserved feedback and reliably detects comparator suboptimality. We also establish new lower bounds for safety-constrained adversarial delayed bandits, showing that the regret guarantees of Prudent-Banker are unimprovable, up to logarithmic factors, under the baseline-safety requirement. To the best of our knowledge, Prudent-Banker is the first algorithm to achieve the optimal safety--robustness trade-off: pseudo-regret $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T}+\sqrt{D})$ together with $\widetilde{O}(1)$ regret against the safe comparator, both with and without delays. Experiments across diverse delay distributions show that, unlike standard delay-robust baselines, Prudent-Banker effectively balances safety and learning.

Yiheng Su, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

In this paper we investigate the exploitability of a Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) learner with constant step size $η$ in $n\times m$ two-player zero-sum games played over $T$ rounds against a clairvoyant optimizer. In contrast with prior analysis, we show that exploitability is an inherent feature of the FTRL family, rather than an artifact of specific instantiations. First, for fixed optimizer, we establish a sweeping law of order $Ω(N/η)$, proving that exploitation scales to the number of the learner's suboptimal actions $N$ and vanishes in their absence. Second, for alternating optimizer, a surplus of $Ω(ηT/\mathrm{poly}(n,m))$ can be guaranteed regardless of the equilibrium structure, with high probability, in random games. Our analysis uncovers once more the sharp geometric dichotomy: non-steep regularizers allow the optimizer to extract maximum surplus via finite-time elimination of suboptimal actions, whereas steep ones introduce a vanishing correction that may delay exploitation. Finally, we discuss whether this leverage persists under bilateral payoff uncertainty and we propose susceptibility measure to quantify which regularizers are most vulnerable to strategic manipulation.

Konstantinos Emmanouilidis, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Rene Vidal

From adversarial robustness to multi-agent learning, many machine learning tasks can be cast as finite-sum min-max optimization or, more generally, as variational inequality problems (VIPs). Owing to their simplicity and scalability, stochastic gradient methods with constant step size are widely used, despite the fact that they converge only up to a constant term. Among the many heuristics adopted in practice, two classical techniques have recently attracted attention to mitigate this issue: \emph{Random Reshuffling} of data and \emph{Richardson--Romberg extrapolation} across iterates. Random Reshuffling sharpens the mean-squared error (MSE) of the estimated solution, while Richardson-Romberg extrapolation acts orthogonally, providing a second-order reduction in its bias. In this work, we show that their composition is strictly better than both, not only maintaining the enhanced MSE guarantees but also yielding an even greater cubic refinement in the bias. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first theoretical guarantees for such a synergy in structured non-monotone VIPs. Our analysis proceeds in two steps: (i) we smooth the discrete noise induced by reshuffling and leverage tools from continuous-state Markov chain theory to establish a novel law of large numbers and a central limit theorem for its iterates; and (ii) we employ spectral tensor techniques to prove that extrapolation debiases and sharpens the asymptotic behavior even under the biased gradient oracle induced by reshuffling. Finally, extensive experiments validate our theory, consistently demonstrating substantial speedups in practice.

Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider et al.

Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory. Typically, they involve repeated strategic interactions of the principal and agent, taking place under uncertainty and over time. While appealing in theory, players seldom use complex dynamic strategies in practice, often preferring to circumvent complexity and approach uncertainty through learning. We initiate the study of repeated contracts with a learning agent, focusing on agents who achieve no-regret outcomes. Optimizing against a no-regret agent is a known open problem in general games; we achieve an optimal solution to this problem for a canonical contract setting, in which the agent's choice among multiple actions leads to success/failure. The solution has a surprisingly simple structure: for some $α> 0$, initially offer the agent a linear contract with scalar $α$, then switch to offering a linear contract with scalar $0$. This switch causes the agent to ``free-fall'' through their action space and during this time provides the principal with non-zero reward at zero cost. Despite apparent exploitation of the agent, this dynamic contract can leave \emph{both} players better off compared to the best static contract. Our results generalize beyond success/failure, to arbitrary non-linear contracts which the principal rescales dynamically. Finally, we quantify the dependence of our results on knowledge of the time horizon, and are the first to address this consideration in the study of strategizing against learning agents.

Iosif Sakos, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos et al.

A wide array of modern machine learning applications - from adversarial models to multi-agent reinforcement learning - can be formulated as non-cooperative games whose Nash equilibria represent the system's desired operational states. Despite having a highly non-convex loss landscape, many cases of interest possess a latent convex structure that could potentially be leveraged to yield convergence to equilibrium. Driven by this observation, our paper proposes a flexible first-order method that successfully exploits such "hidden structures" and achieves convergence under minimal assumptions for the transformation connecting the players' control variables to the game's latent, convex-structured layer. The proposed method - which we call preconditioned hidden gradient descent (PHGD) - hinges on a judiciously chosen gradient preconditioning scheme related to natural gradient methods. Importantly, we make no separability assumptions for the game's hidden structure, and we provide explicit convergence rate guarantees for both deterministic and stochastic environments.

Fivos Kalogiannis, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Ian Gemp et al.

We contribute the first provable guarantees of global convergence to Nash equilibria (NE) in two-player zero-sum convex Markov games (cMGs) by using independent policy gradient methods. Convex Markov games, recently defined by Gemp et al. (2024), extend Markov decision processes to multi-agent settings with preferences that are convex over occupancy measures, offering a broad framework for modeling generic strategic interactions. However, even the fundamental min-max case of cMGs presents significant challenges, including inherent nonconvexity, the absence of Bellman consistency, and the complexity of the infinite horizon. We follow a two-step approach. First, leveraging properties of hidden-convex--hidden-concave functions, we show that a simple nonconvex regularization transforms the min-max optimization problem into a nonconvex-proximal Polyak-Lojasiewicz (NC-pPL) objective. Crucially, this regularization can stabilize the iterates of independent policy gradient methods and ultimately lead them to converge to equilibria. Second, building on this reduction, we address the general constrained min-max problems under NC-pPL and two-sided pPL conditions, providing the first global convergence guarantees for stochastic nested and alternating gradient descent-ascent methods, which we believe may be of independent interest.

Roger Waleffe, Devesh Sarda, Jason Mohoney et al.

We study distributed training of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) on billion-scale graphs that are partitioned across machines. Efficient training in this setting relies on min-edge-cut partitioning algorithms, which minimize cross-machine communication due to GNN neighborhood sampling. Yet, min-edge-cut partitioning over large graphs remains a challenge: State-of-the-art (SoTA) offline methods (e.g., METIS) are effective, but they require orders of magnitude more memory and runtime than GNN training itself, while computationally efficient algorithms (e.g., streaming greedy approaches) suffer from increased edge cuts. Thus, in this work we introduce Armada, a new end-to-end system for distributed GNN training whose key contribution is GREM, a novel min-edge-cut partitioning algorithm that can efficiently scale to large graphs. GREM builds on streaming greedy approaches with one key addition: prior vertex assignments are continuously refined during streaming, rather than frozen after an initial greedy selection. Our theoretical analysis and experimental results show that this refinement is critical to minimizing edge cuts and enables GREM to reach partition quality comparable to METIS but with 8-65x less memory and 8-46x faster. Given a partitioned graph, Armada leverages a new disaggregated architecture for distributed GNN training to further improve efficiency; we find that on common cloud machines, even with zero communication, GNN neighborhood sampling and feature loading bottleneck training. Disaggregation allows Armada to independently allocate resources for these operations and ensure that expensive GPUs remain saturated with computation. We evaluate Armada against SoTA systems for distributed GNN training and find that the disaggregated architecture leads to runtime improvements up to 4.5x and cost reductions up to 3.1x.

Daniel Hsu, Clayton Sanford, Rocco Servedio et al.

We consider the well-studied problem of learning intersections of halfspaces under the Gaussian distribution in the challenging \emph{agnostic learning} model. Recent work of Diakonikolas et al. (2021) shows that any Statistical Query (SQ) algorithm for agnostically learning the class of intersections of $k$ halfspaces over $\mathbb{R}^n$ to constant excess error either must make queries of tolerance at most $n^{-\tildeΩ(\sqrt{\log k})}$ or must make $2^{n^{Ω(1)}}$ queries. We strengthen this result by improving the tolerance requirement to $n^{-\tildeΩ(\log k)}$. This lower bound is essentially best possible since an SQ algorithm of Klivans et al. (2008) agnostically learns this class to any constant excess error using $n^{O(\log k)}$ queries of tolerance $n^{-O(\log k)}$. We prove two variants of our lower bound, each of which combines ingredients from Diakonikolas et al. (2021) with (an extension of) a different earlier approach for agnostic SQ lower bounds for the Boolean setting due to Dachman-Soled et al. (2014). Our approach also yields lower bounds for agnostically SQ learning the class of "convex subspace juntas" (studied by Vempala, 2010) and the class of sets with bounded Gaussian surface area; all of these lower bounds are nearly optimal since they essentially match known upper bounds from Klivans et al. (2008).

Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Panageas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games. Formally, two-team zero-sum games are defined as multi-player games where players are split into two competing sets of agents, each experiencing a utility identical to that of their teammates and opposite to that of the opposing team. We focus on the solution concept of Nash equilibria (NE). We first show that computing NE for this class of games is $\textit{hard}$ for the complexity class ${\mathrm{CLS}}$. To further examine the capabilities of online learning algorithms in games with full-information feedback, we propose a benchmark of a simple -- yet nontrivial -- family of such games. These games do not enjoy the properties used to prove convergence for relevant algorithms. In particular, we use a dynamical systems perspective to demonstrate that gradient descent-ascent, its optimistic variant, optimistic multiplicative weights update, and extra gradient fail to converge (even locally) to a Nash equilibrium. On a brighter note, we propose a first-order method that leverages control theory techniques and under some conditions enjoys last-iterate local convergence to a Nash equilibrium. We also believe our proposed method is of independent interest for general min-max optimization.

Daniel Hsu, Clayton Sanford, Rocco A. Servedio et al.

This paper considers the following question: how well can depth-two ReLU networks with randomly initialized bottom-level weights represent smooth functions? We give near-matching upper- and lower-bounds for $L_2$-approximation in terms of the Lipschitz constant, the desired accuracy, and the dimension of the problem, as well as similar results in terms of Sobolev norms. Our positive results employ tools from harmonic analysis and ridgelet representation theory, while our lower-bounds are based on (robust versions of) dimensionality arguments.

Lampros Flokas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Georgios Piliouras

Many recent AI architectures are inspired by zero-sum games, however, the behavior of their dynamics is still not well understood. Inspired by this, we study standard gradient descent ascent (GDA) dynamics in a specific class of non-convex non-concave zero-sum games, that we call hidden zero-sum games. In this class, players control the inputs of smooth but possibly non-linear functions whose outputs are being applied as inputs to a convex-concave game. Unlike general zero-sum games, these games have a well-defined notion of solution; outcomes that implement the von-Neumann equilibrium of the "hidden" convex-concave game. We prove that if the hidden game is strictly convex-concave then vanilla GDA converges not merely to local Nash, but typically to the von-Neumann solution. If the game lacks strict convexity properties, GDA may fail to converge to any equilibrium, however, by applying standard regularization techniques we can prove convergence to a von-Neumann solution of a slightly perturbed zero-sum game. Our convergence guarantees are non-local, which as far as we know is a first-of-its-kind type of result in non-convex non-concave games. Finally, we discuss connections of our framework with generative adversarial networks.

Angeliki Giannou, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos

In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider the full spectrum of uncertainty that the players may encounter - from noisy, oracle-based feedback, to bandit, payoff-based information. In this general context, we establish a comprehensive equivalence between the stability of a Nash equilibrium and its support: a Nash equilibrium is stable and attracting with arbitrarily high probability if and only if it is strict (i.e., each equilibrium strategy has a unique best response). This equivalence extends existing continuous-time versions of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory to a bona fide algorithmic learning setting, and it provides a clear refinement criterion for the prediction of the day-to-day behavior of no-regret learning in games

Christos Tzamos, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Ilias Zadik

We study the fundamental task of estimating the median of an underlying distribution from a finite number of samples, under pure differential privacy constraints. We focus on distributions satisfying the minimal assumption that they have a positive density at a small neighborhood around the median. In particular, the distribution is allowed to output unbounded values and is not required to have finite moments. We compute the exact, up-to-constant terms, statistical rate of estimation for the median by providing nearly-tight upper and lower bounds. Furthermore, we design a polynomial-time differentially private algorithm which provably achieves the optimal performance. At a technical level, our results leverage a Lipschitz Extension Lemma which allows us to design and analyze differentially private algorithms solely on appropriately defined "typical" instances of the samples.

Lampros Flokas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Thanasis Lianeas et al.

Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under no-regret learning converges to the game's set of coarse correlated equilibria. By contrast, our understanding of how the day-to-day behavior of the dynamics correlates to the game's Nash equilibria is much more limited, and only partial results are known for certain classes of games (such as zero-sum or congestion games). In this paper, we study the dynamics of "follow-the-regularized-leader" (FTRL), arguably the most well-studied class of no-regret dynamics, and we establish a sweeping negative result showing that the notion of mixed Nash equilibrium is antithetical to no-regret learning. Specifically, we show that any Nash equilibrium which is not strict (in that every player has a unique best response) cannot be stable and attracting under the dynamics of FTRL. This result has significant implications for predicting the outcome of a learning process as it shows unequivocally that only strict (and hence, pure) Nash equilibria can emerge as stable limit points thereof.

Lampros Flokas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Georgios Piliouras

We consider the case of derivative-free algorithms for non-convex optimization, also known as zero order algorithms, that use only function evaluations rather than gradients. For a wide variety of gradient approximators based on finite differences, we establish asymptotic convergence to second order stationary points using a carefully tailored application of the Stable Manifold Theorem. Regarding efficiency, we introduce a noisy zero-order method that converges to second order stationary points, i.e avoids saddle points. Our algorithm uses only $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1 / ε^2)$ approximate gradient calculations and, thus, it matches the converge rate guarantees of their exact gradient counterparts up to constants. In contrast to previous work, our convergence rate analysis avoids imposing additional dimension dependent slowdowns in the number of iterations required for non-convex zero order optimization.

Lampros Flokas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Georgios Piliouras

We study a wide class of non-convex non-concave min-max games that generalizes over standard bilinear zero-sum games. In this class, players control the inputs of a smooth function whose output is being applied to a bilinear zero-sum game. This class of games is motivated by the indirect nature of the competition in Generative Adversarial Networks, where players control the parameters of a neural network while the actual competition happens between the distributions that the generator and discriminator capture. We establish theoretically, that depending on the specific instance of the problem gradient-descent-ascent dynamics can exhibit a variety of behaviors antithetical to convergence to the game theoretically meaningful min-max solution. Specifically, different forms of recurrent behavior (including periodicity and Poincaré recurrence) are possible as well as convergence to spurious (non-min-max) equilibria for a positive measure of initial conditions. At the technical level, our analysis combines tools from optimization theory, game theory and dynamical systems.

Georgios Paraskevopoulos, Efthymios Tzinis, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis et al.

We present a novel view of nonlinear manifold learning using derivative-free optimization techniques. Specifically, we propose an extension of the classical multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) method, where instead of performing gradient descent, we sample and evaluate possible "moves" in a sphere of fixed radius for each point in the embedded space. A fixed-point convergence guarantee can be shown by formulating the proposed algorithm as an instance of General Pattern Search (GPS) framework. Evaluation on both clean and noisy synthetic datasets shows that pattern search MDS can accurately infer the intrinsic geometry of manifolds embedded in high-dimensional spaces. Additionally, experiments on real data, even under noisy conditions, demonstrate that the proposed pattern search MDS yields state-of-the-art results.