Thomas L. Griffiths

Akshara Prabhakar, Thomas L. Griffiths, R. Thomas McCoy · princeton

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to enhance the multi-step reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, debates persist about whether LLMs exhibit abstract generalization or rely on shallow heuristics when given CoT prompts. To understand the factors influencing CoT reasoning we provide a detailed case study of the symbolic reasoning task of decoding shift ciphers, where letters are shifted forward some number of steps in the alphabet. We analyze the pattern of results produced by three LLMs -- GPT-4, Claude 3, and Llama 3.1 -- performing this task using CoT prompting. By focusing on a single relatively simple task, we are able to identify three factors that systematically affect CoT performance: the probability of the task's expected output (probability), what the model has implicitly learned during pre-training (memorization), and the number of intermediate operations involved in reasoning (noisy reasoning). We show that these factors can drastically influence task accuracy across all three LLMs; e.g., when tested with GPT-4, varying the output's probability of occurrence shifts accuracy from 26% to 70%. Overall, we conclude that CoT prompting performance reflects both memorization and a probabilistic version of genuine reasoning. Code and data at this https://github.com/aksh555/deciphering_cot

Ilia Sucholutsky, Lukas Muttenthaler, Adrian Weller et al. · berkeley, cambridge

Biological and artificial information processing systems form representations of the world that they can use to categorize, reason, plan, navigate, and make decisions. How can we measure the similarity between the representations formed by these diverse systems? Do similarities in representations then translate into similar behavior? If so, then how can a system's representations be modified to better match those of another system? These questions pertaining to the study of representational alignment are at the heart of some of the most promising research areas in contemporary cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. In this Perspective, we survey the exciting recent developments in representational alignment research in the fields of cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. Despite their overlapping interests, there is limited knowledge transfer between these fields, so work in one field ends up duplicated in another, and useful innovations are not shared effectively. To improve communication, we propose a unifying framework that can serve as a common language for research on representational alignment, and map several streams of existing work across fields within our framework. We also lay out open problems in representational alignment where progress can benefit all three of these fields. We hope that this paper will catalyze cross-disciplinary collaboration and accelerate progress for all communities studying and developing information processing systems.

Michael Y. Li, Erin Grant, Thomas L. Griffiths · berkeley

Not being able to understand and predict the behavior of deep learning systems makes it hard to decide what architecture and algorithm to use for a given problem. In science and engineering, modeling is a methodology used to understand complex systems whose internal processes are opaque. Modeling replaces a complex system with a simpler, more interpretable surrogate. Drawing inspiration from this, we construct a class of surrogate models for neural networks using Gaussian processes. Rather than deriving kernels for infinite neural networks, we learn kernels empirically from the naturalistic behavior of finite neural networks. We demonstrate our approach captures existing phenomena related to the spectral bias of neural networks, and then show that our surrogate models can be used to solve practical problems such as identifying which points most influence the behavior of specific neural networks and predicting which architectures and algorithms will generalize well for specific datasets.

Katherine M. Collins, Ilia Sucholutsky, Umang Bhatt et al. · mit

What do we want from machine intelligence? We envision machines that are not just tools for thought, but partners in thought: reasonable, insightful, knowledgeable, reliable, and trustworthy systems that think with us. Current artificial intelligence (AI) systems satisfy some of these criteria, some of the time. In this Perspective, we show how the science of collaborative cognition can be put to work to engineer systems that really can be called ``thought partners,'' systems built to meet our expectations and complement our limitations. We lay out several modes of collaborative thought in which humans and AI thought partners can engage and propose desiderata for human-compatible thought partnerships. Drawing on motifs from computational cognitive science, we motivate an alternative scaling path for the design of thought partners and ecosystems around their use through a Bayesian lens, whereby the partners we construct actively build and reason over models of the human and world.

Yufei Tian, Abhilasha Ravichander, Lianhui Qin et al. · cmu

We explore the creative problem-solving capabilities of modern LLMs in a novel constrained setting. To this end, we create MACGYVER, an automatically generated dataset consisting of over 1,600 real-world problems deliberately designed to trigger innovative usage of objects and necessitate out-of-the-box thinking. We then present our collection to both LLMs and humans to compare and contrast their problem-solving abilities. MACGYVER is challenging for both groups, but in unique and complementary ways. For instance, humans excel in tasks they are familiar with but struggle with domain-specific knowledge, leading to a higher variance. In contrast, LLMs, exposed to a variety of specialized knowledge, attempt broader problems but fail by proposing physically-infeasible actions. Finally, we provide a detailed error analysis of LLMs, and demonstrate the potential of enhancing their problem-solving ability with novel prompting techniques such as iterative step-wise reflection and divergent-convergent thinking. This work (1) introduces a fresh arena for intelligent agents focusing on intricate aspects of physical reasoning, planning, and unconventional thinking, which supplements the existing spectrum of machine intelligence; and (2) provides insight into the constrained problem-solving capabilities of both humans and AI.

R. Thomas McCoy, Shunyu Yao, Dan Friedman et al. · princeton

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

Raja Marjieh, Nori Jacoby, Joshua C. Peterson et al. · princeton

Shepard's universal law of generalization is a remarkable hypothesis about how intelligent organisms should perceive similarity. In its broadest form, the universal law states that the level of perceived similarity between a pair of stimuli should decay as a concave function of their distance when embedded in an appropriate psychological space. While extensively studied, evidence in support of the universal law has relied on low-dimensional stimuli and small stimulus sets that are very different from their real-world counterparts. This is largely because pairwise comparisons -- as required for similarity judgments -- scale quadratically in the number of stimuli. We provide direct evidence for the universal law in a naturalistic high-dimensional regime by analyzing an existing dataset of 214,200 human similarity judgments and a newly collected dataset of 390,819 human generalization judgments (N=2406 US participants) across three sets of natural images.

Minkyu Shin, Jin Kim, Bas van Opheusden et al.

How will superhuman artificial intelligence (AI) affect human decision making? And what will be the mechanisms behind this effect? We address these questions in a domain where AI already exceeds human performance, analyzing more than 5.8 million move decisions made by professional Go players over the past 71 years (1950-2021). To address the first question, we use a superhuman AI program to estimate the quality of human decisions across time, generating 58 billion counterfactual game patterns and comparing the win rates of actual human decisions with those of counterfactual AI decisions. We find that humans began to make significantly better decisions following the advent of superhuman AI. We then examine human players' strategies across time and find that novel decisions (i.e., previously unobserved moves) occurred more frequently and became associated with higher decision quality after the advent of superhuman AI. Our findings suggest that the development of superhuman AI programs may have prompted human players to break away from traditional strategies and induced them to explore novel moves, which in turn may have improved their decision-making.

Thomas L. Griffiths, Jian-Qiao Zhu, Erin Grant et al. · berkeley

The success of methods based on artificial neural networks in creating intelligent machines seems like it might pose a challenge to explanations of human cognition in terms of Bayesian inference. We argue that this is not the case, and that in fact these systems offer new opportunities for Bayesian modeling. Specifically, we argue that Bayesian models of cognition and artificial neural networks lie at different levels of analysis and are complementary modeling approaches, together offering a way to understand human cognition that spans these levels. We also argue that the same perspective can be applied to intelligent machines, where a Bayesian approach may be uniquely valuable in understanding the behavior of large, opaque artificial neural networks that are trained on proprietary data.

Raja Marjieh, Ilia Sucholutsky, Pol van Rijn et al.

Determining the extent to which the perceptual world can be recovered from language is a longstanding problem in philosophy and cognitive science. We show that state-of-the-art large language models can unlock new insights into this problem by providing a lower bound on the amount of perceptual information that can be extracted from language. Specifically, we elicit pairwise similarity judgments from GPT models across six psychophysical datasets. We show that the judgments are significantly correlated with human data across all domains, recovering well-known representations like the color wheel and pitch spiral. Surprisingly, we find that a model (GPT-4) co-trained on vision and language does not necessarily lead to improvements specific to the visual modality. To study the influence of specific languages on perception, we also apply the models to a multilingual color-naming task. We find that GPT-4 replicates cross-linguistic variation in English and Russian illuminating the interaction of language and perception.

Michael Chang, Thomas L. Griffiths, Sergey Levine

Iterative refinement -- start with a random guess, then iteratively improve the guess -- is a useful paradigm for representation learning because it offers a way to break symmetries among equally plausible explanations for the data. This property enables the application of such methods to infer representations of sets of entities, such as objects in physical scenes, structurally resembling clustering algorithms in latent space. However, most prior works differentiate through the unrolled refinement process, which can make optimization challenging. We observe that such methods can be made differentiable by means of the implicit function theorem, and develop an implicit differentiation approach that improves the stability and tractability of training by decoupling the forward and backward passes. This connection enables us to apply advances in optimizing implicit layers to not only improve the optimization of the slot attention module in SLATE, a state-of-the-art method for learning entity representations, but do so with constant space and time complexity in backpropagation and only one additional line of code.

Carlos G. Correa, Mark K. Ho, Frederick Callaway et al.

Human behavior emerges from planning over elaborate decompositions of tasks into goals, subgoals, and low-level actions. How are these decompositions created and used? Here, we propose and evaluate a normative framework for task decomposition based on the simple idea that people decompose tasks to reduce the overall cost of planning while maintaining task performance. Analyzing 11,117 distinct graph-structured planning tasks, we find that our framework justifies several existing heuristics for task decomposition and makes predictions that can be distinguished from two alternative normative accounts. We report a behavioral study of task decomposition ($N=806$) that uses 30 randomly sampled graphs, a larger and more diverse set than that of any previous behavioral study on this topic. We find that human responses are more consistent with our framework for task decomposition than alternative normative accounts and are most consistent with a heuristic -- betweenness centrality -- that is justified by our approach. Taken together, our results provide new theoretical insight into the computational principles underlying the intelligent structuring of goal-directed behavior.

Ilia Sucholutsky, Thomas L. Griffiths

Should we care whether AI systems have representations of the world that are similar to those of humans? We provide an information-theoretic analysis that suggests that there should be a U-shaped relationship between the degree of representational alignment with humans and performance on few-shot learning tasks. We confirm this prediction empirically, finding such a relationship in an analysis of the performance of 491 computer vision models. We also show that highly-aligned models are more robust to both natural adversarial attacks and domain shifts. Our results suggest that human-alignment is often a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for models to make effective use of limited data, be robust, and generalize well.

Sreejan Kumar, Carlos G. Correa, Ishita Dasgupta et al.

Strong inductive biases give humans the ability to quickly learn to perform a variety of tasks. Although meta-learning is a method to endow neural networks with useful inductive biases, agents trained by meta-learning may sometimes acquire very different strategies from humans. We show that co-training these agents on predicting representations from natural language task descriptions and programs induced to generate such tasks guides them toward more human-like inductive biases. Human-generated language descriptions and program induction models that add new learned primitives both contain abstract concepts that can compress description length. Co-training on these representations result in more human-like behavior in downstream meta-reinforcement learning agents than less abstract controls (synthetic language descriptions, program induction without learned primitives), suggesting that the abstraction supported by these representations is key.

Raja Marjieh, Pol van Rijn, Ilia Sucholutsky et al.

Human similarity judgments are a powerful supervision signal for machine learning applications based on techniques such as contrastive learning, information retrieval, and model alignment, but classical methods for collecting human similarity judgments are too expensive to be used at scale. Recent methods propose using pre-trained deep neural networks (DNNs) to approximate human similarity, but pre-trained DNNs may not be available for certain domains (e.g., medical images, low-resource languages) and their performance in approximating human similarity has not been extensively tested. We conducted an evaluation of 611 pre-trained models across three domains -- images, audio, video -- and found that there is a large gap in performance between human similarity judgments and pre-trained DNNs. To address this gap, we propose a new class of similarity approximation methods based on language. To collect the language data required by these new methods, we also developed and validated a novel adaptive tag collection pipeline. We find that our proposed language-based methods are significantly cheaper, in the number of human judgments, than classical methods, but still improve performance over the DNN-based methods. Finally, we also develop `stacked' methods that combine language embeddings with DNN embeddings, and find that these consistently provide the best approximations for human similarity across all three of our modalities. Based on the results of this comprehensive study, we provide a concise guide for researchers interested in collecting or approximating human similarity data. To accompany this guide, we also release all of the similarity and language data, a total of 206,339 human judgments, that we collected in our experiments, along with a detailed breakdown of all modeling results.

Theodore R. Sumers, Shunyu Yao, Karthik Narasimhan et al.

Recent efforts have augmented large language models (LLMs) with external resources (e.g., the Internet) or internal control flows (e.g., prompt chaining) for tasks requiring grounding or reasoning, leading to a new class of language agents. While these agents have achieved substantial empirical success, we lack a systematic framework to organize existing agents and plan future developments. In this paper, we draw on the rich history of cognitive science and symbolic artificial intelligence to propose Cognitive Architectures for Language Agents (CoALA). CoALA describes a language agent with modular memory components, a structured action space to interact with internal memory and external environments, and a generalized decision-making process to choose actions. We use CoALA to retrospectively survey and organize a large body of recent work, and prospectively identify actionable directions towards more capable agents. Taken together, CoALA contextualizes today's language agents within the broader history of AI and outlines a path towards language-based general intelligence.

Ilia Sucholutsky, Ruairidh M. Battleday, Katherine M. Collins et al.

Supervised learning typically focuses on learning transferable representations from training examples annotated by humans. While rich annotations (like soft labels) carry more information than sparse annotations (like hard labels), they are also more expensive to collect. For example, while hard labels only provide information about the closest class an object belongs to (e.g., "this is a dog"), soft labels provide information about the object's relationship with multiple classes (e.g., "this is most likely a dog, but it could also be a wolf or a coyote"). We use information theory to compare how a number of commonly-used supervision signals contribute to representation-learning performance, as well as how their capacity is affected by factors such as the number of labels, classes, dimensions, and noise. Our framework provides theoretical justification for using hard labels in the big-data regime, but richer supervision signals for few-shot learning and out-of-distribution generalization. We validate these results empirically in a series of experiments with over 1 million crowdsourced image annotations and conduct a cost-benefit analysis to establish a tradeoff curve that enables users to optimize the cost of supervising representation learning on their own datasets.

Sreejan Kumar, Ishita Dasgupta, Nathaniel D. Daw et al.

The ability to acquire abstract knowledge is a hallmark of human intelligence and is believed by many to be one of the core differences between humans and neural network models. Agents can be endowed with an inductive bias towards abstraction through meta-learning, where they are trained on a distribution of tasks that share some abstract structure that can be learned and applied. However, because neural networks are hard to interpret, it can be difficult to tell whether agents have learned the underlying abstraction, or alternatively statistical patterns that are characteristic of that abstraction. In this work, we compare the performance of humans and agents in a meta-reinforcement learning paradigm in which tasks are generated from abstract rules. We define a novel methodology for building "task metamers" that closely match the statistics of the abstract tasks but use a different underlying generative process, and evaluate performance on both abstract and metamer tasks. We find that humans perform better at abstract tasks than metamer tasks whereas common neural network architectures typically perform worse on the abstract tasks than the matched metamers. This work provides a foundation for characterizing differences between humans and machine learning that can be used in future work towards developing machines with more human-like behavior.

Michael Chang, Alyssa L. Dayan, Franziska Meier et al.

Object rearrangement is a challenge for embodied agents because solving these tasks requires generalizing across a combinatorially large set of configurations of entities and their locations. Worse, the representations of these entities are unknown and must be inferred from sensory percepts. We present a hierarchical abstraction approach to uncover these underlying entities and achieve combinatorial generalization from unstructured visual inputs. By constructing a factorized transition graph over clusters of entity representations inferred from pixels, we show how to learn a correspondence between intervening on states of entities in the agent's model and acting on objects in the environment. We use this correspondence to develop a method for control that generalizes to different numbers and configurations of objects, which outperforms current offline deep RL methods when evaluated on simulated rearrangement tasks.

Raja Marjieh, Ilia Sucholutsky, Thomas A. Langlois et al.

Diffusion models are a class of generative models that learn to synthesize samples by inverting a diffusion process that gradually maps data into noise. While these models have enjoyed great success recently, a full theoretical understanding of their observed properties is still lacking, in particular, their weak sensitivity to the choice of noise family and the role of adequate scheduling of noise levels for good synthesis. By identifying a correspondence between diffusion models and a well-known paradigm in cognitive science known as serial reproduction, whereby human agents iteratively observe and reproduce stimuli from memory, we show how the aforementioned properties of diffusion models can be explained as a natural consequence of this correspondence. We then complement our theoretical analysis with simulations that exhibit these key features. Our work highlights how classic paradigms in cognitive science can shed light on state-of-the-art machine learning problems.

Theodore R. Sumers, Robert D. Hawkins, Mark K. Ho et al.

Natural language is an intuitive and expressive way to communicate reward information to autonomous agents. It encompasses everything from concrete instructions to abstract descriptions of the world. Despite this, natural language is often challenging to learn from: it is difficult for machine learning methods to make appropriate inferences from such a wide range of input. This paper proposes a generalization of reward design as a unifying principle to ground linguistic communication: speakers choose utterances to maximize expected rewards from the listener's future behaviors. We first extend reward design to incorporate reasoning about unknown future states in a linear bandit setting. We then define a speaker model which chooses utterances according to this objective. Simulations show that short-horizon speakers (reasoning primarily about a single, known state) tend to use instructions, while long-horizon speakers (reasoning primarily about unknown, future states) tend to describe the reward function. We then define a pragmatic listener which performs inverse reward design by jointly inferring the speaker's latent horizon and rewards. Our findings suggest that this extension of reward design to linguistic communication, including the notion of a latent speaker horizon, is a promising direction for achieving more robust alignment outcomes from natural language supervision.

Sunayana Rane, Mira L. Nencheva, Zeyu Wang et al.

For human children as well as machine learning systems, a key challenge in learning a word is linking the word to the visual phenomena it describes. We explore this aspect of word learning by using the performance of computer vision systems as a proxy for the difficulty of learning a word from visual cues. We show that the age at which children acquire different categories of words is correlated with the performance of visual classification and captioning systems, over and above the expected effects of word frequency. The performance of the computer vision systems is correlated with human judgments of the concreteness of words, which are in turn a predictor of children's word learning, suggesting that these models are capturing the relationship between words and visual phenomena.

Jian-Qiao Zhu, Joshua C. Peterson, Benjamin Enke et al. · princeton

Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of strategic decision-making in the context of initial play in two-player matrix games, analyzing over 90,000 human decisions across more than 2,400 procedurally generated games that span a much wider space than previous datasets. We show that a deep neural network trained on these data predicts people's choices better than leading theories of strategic behavior, indicating that there is systematic variation that is not explained by those theories. We then modify the network to produce a new, interpretable behavioral model, revealing what the original network learned about people: their ability to optimally respond and their capacity to reason about others are dependent on the complexity of individual games. This context-dependence is critical in explaining deviations from the rational Nash equilibrium, response times, and uncertainty in strategic decisions. More broadly, our results demonstrate how machine learning can be applied beyond prediction to further help generate novel explanations of complex human behavior.

Mathew D. Hardy, Bill D. Thompson, P. M. Krafft et al.

Large-scale social networks are thought to contribute to polarization by amplifying people's biases. However, the complexity of these technologies makes it difficult to identify the mechanisms responsible and to evaluate mitigation strategies. Here we show under controlled laboratory conditions that information transmission through social networks amplifies motivational biases on a simple perceptual decision-making task. Participants in a large behavioral experiment showed increased rates of biased decision-making when part of a social network relative to asocial participants, across 40 independently evolving populations. Drawing on techniques from machine learning and Bayesian statistics, we identify a simple adjustment to content-selection algorithms that is predicted to mitigate bias amplification. This algorithm generates a sample of perspectives from within an individual's network that is more representative of the population as a whole. In a second large experiment, this strategy reduced bias amplification while maintaining the benefits of information sharing.

Chunru Lin, Hongxin Zhang, Fenghao Yu et al.

The ability to reason, adapt, and creatively solve problems under unexpected challenges is essential for robots operating in real-world environments. However, current robotic benchmarks primarily emphasize skill-level execution and provide limited insight into such cognitive reasoning capabilities. We introduce RoboWits, a bi-manual robotic benchmark designed to systematically evaluate cognitive reasoning, creative tool use, and robustness to unexpected conditions. To enable scalable construction of high-quality reasoning-centric unexpected scenarios, we propose an automated task generation pipeline formulated as a multi-agent cooperative framework, comprising agents for seed task generation and verification, metric generation, scene generation, and task mutation. Using the pipeline, we curated 30 diverse seed tasks and 208 tasks with mutations and graded difficulty across geometry, material, and assembly-based reasoning. We benchmark popular robot policies, pre-trained VLAs, and oracle-state planners. Our results reveal a significant performance gap: while pre-trained VLAs exhibit preliminary success on seed tasks after single-task fine-tuning, they struggle to perform on mutated tasks, implying their brittleness in manipulation tasks requiring reasoning, strategy adaptation, and robustness to deceptive or constrained environments. Project page is available at https://umass-embodied-agi.github.io/RoboWits.

Ryan Liu, Howard Yen, Raja Marjieh et al.

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes.

Carlos G. Correa, Sophia Sanborn, Mark K. Ho et al.

Human behavior is often assumed to be hierarchically structured, made up of abstract actions that can be decomposed into concrete actions. However, behavior is typically measured as a sequence of actions, which makes it difficult to infer its hierarchical structure. In this paper, we explore how people form hierarchically structured plans, using an experimental paradigm with observable hierarchical representations: participants create programs that produce sequences of actions in a language with explicit hierarchical structure. This task lets us test two well-established principles of human behavior: utility maximization (i.e. using fewer actions) and minimum description length (MDL; i.e. having a shorter program). We find that humans are sensitive to both metrics, but that both accounts fail to predict a qualitative feature of human-created programs, namely that people prefer programs with reuse over and above the predictions of MDL. We formalize this preference for reuse by extending the MDL account into a generative model over programs, modeling hierarchy choice as the induction of a grammar over actions. Our account can explain the preference for reuse and provides better predictions of human behavior, going beyond simple accounts of compressibility to highlight a principle that guides hierarchical planning.

Sunayana Rane, Mark Ho, Ilia Sucholutsky et al.

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

Ruiqi He, Carlos G. Correa, Thomas L. Griffiths et al.

How are people able to plan so efficiently despite limited cognitive resources? We aimed to answer this question by extending an existing model of human task decomposition that can explain a wide range of simple planning problems by adding structure information to the task to facilitate planning in more complex tasks. The extended model was then applied to a more complex planning domain of spatial navigation. Our results suggest that our framework can correctly predict the navigation strategies of the majority of the participants in an online experiment.

Kerem Oktar, Ilia Sucholutsky, Tania Lombrozo et al.

The increasing prevalence of artificial agents creates a correspondingly increasing need to manage disagreements between humans and artificial agents, as well as between artificial agents themselves. Considering this larger space of possible agents exposes an opportunity for furthering our understanding of the nature of disagreement: past studies in psychology have often cast disagreement as two agents forming diverging evaluations of the same object, but disagreement can also arise from differences in how agents represent that object. AI research on human-machine alignment and recent work in computational cognitive science have focused on this latter kind of disagreement, and have developed tools that can be used to quantify the extent of representational overlap between agents. Understanding how divergence and misalignment interact to produce disagreement, and how resolution strategies depend on this interaction, is key to promoting effective collaboration between diverse types of agents.

Sunayana Rane, Brenden M. Lake, Thomas L. Griffiths

Developing AI systems with a human-like understanding of everyday concepts is a key step towards developing safe, reliable systems whose behavior makes sense to humans. When probing concept understanding, asking questions about plausible category members (e.g., "Is a car a vehicle?") is likely to recall patterns in the model's vast training data. We pursue an alternative strategy, characterizing the boundaries of conceptual categories by asking about implausible category members (e.g., "Is an olive a vehicle?") to probe the kind of concept-level knowledge we take for granted in fellow humans. We characterize concept boundaries for a set of fundamental concepts by studying AI systems' assignments of objects to superordinate categories from a classic psychological study by Rosch and Mervis, as well as their assignments of the same objects to mismatched superordinate categories. We compare these assignments to those made by human participants on the full range of within-category and cross-category assignment tasks. Our results reveal a range of concepts for which which models differ in meaningful and surprising ways from humans, including treating "words" as belonging to categories like "vehicles" and "clothing," identifying several "vegetable" category members as "fruit," and assigning exemplars from non-weapon categories to the "weapons" category. We also demonstrate how these instances of concept misalignment translate into problematic downstream behavior with implications for AI safety.

Ryan Liu, Dilip Arumugam, Cedegao E. Zhang et al.

While contemporary large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable in isolation, there are still many difficult problems that lie beyond the abilities of a single LLM. For such tasks, there is still uncertainty about how best to take many LLMs as parts and combine them into a greater whole. This position paper argues that potential blueprints for designing such modular language agents can be found in the existing literature on cognitive models and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. To make this point clear, we formalize the idea of an agent template that specifies roles for individual LLMs and how their functionalities should be composed. We then survey a variety of existing language agents in the literature and highlight their underlying templates derived directly from cognitive models or AI algorithms. By highlighting these designs, we aim to call attention to agent templates inspired by cognitive science and AI as a powerful tool for developing effective, interpretable language agents.

Elizabeth Mieczkowski, Katherine M. Collins, Ilia Sucholutsky et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are growing increasingly capable, prompting recent interest in LLM teams. Yet, despite increased deployment of LLM teams at scale, we lack a principled framework for addressing key questions such as when a team is helpful, how many agents to use, how structure impacts performance -- and whether a team is better than a single agent. Rather than designing and testing these possibilities through trial-and-error, we propose using distributed systems as a principled foundation for creating and evaluating LLM teams. We find that many of the fundamental advantages and challenges studied in distributed computing also arise in LLM teams, highlighting the rich practical insights that can come from the cross-talk of these two fields of study.

Sevan K. Harootonian, Mark K. Ho, Thomas L. Griffiths et al.

How do LLMs decide what to teach next: by reasoning about a learner's knowledge, or by using simpler rules of thumb? We test this in a controlled task previously used to study human teaching strategies. On each trial, a teacher LLM sees a hypothetical learner's trajectory through a reward-annotated directed graph and must reveal a single edge so the learner would choose a better path if they replanned. We run a range of LLMs as simulated teachers and fit their trial-by-trial choices with the same cognitive models used for humans: a Bayes-Optimal teacher that infers which transitions the learner is missing (inverse planning), weaker Bayesian variants, heuristic baselines (e.g., reward based), and non-mentalizing utility models. In a baseline experiment matched to the stimuli presented to human subjects, most LLMs perform well, show little change in strategy over trials, and their graph-by-graph performance is similar to that of humans. Model comparison (BIC) shows that Bayes-Optimal teaching best explains most models' choices. When given a scaffolding intervention, models follow auxiliary inference- or reward-focused prompts, but these scaffolds do not reliably improve later teaching on heuristic-incongruent test graphs and can sometimes reduce performance. Overall, cognitive model fits provide insight into LLM tutoring policies and show that prompt compliance does not guarantee better teaching decisions.

Qiawen Ella Liu, Raja Marjieh, Jian-Qiao Zhu et al.

Four-term word analogies (A:B::C:D) are classically modeled geometrically as ''parallelograms,'' yet recent work suggests this model poorly captures how humans produce analogies, with simple local-similarity heuristics often providing a better account (Peterson et al., 2020). But does the parallelogram model fail because it is a bad model of analogical relations, or because people are not very good at generating relation-preserving analogies? We compared human and large language model (LLM) analogy completions on the same set of analogy problems from (Peterson et al., 2020). We find that LLM-generated analogies are reliably judged as better than human-generated ones, and are also more closely aligned with the parallelogram structure in a distributional embedding space (GloVe). Crucially, we show that the improvement over human analogies was driven by greater parallelogram alignment and reduced reliance on accessible words rather than enhanced sensitivity to local similarity. Moreover, the LLM advantage is driven not by uniformly superior responses by LLMs, but by humans producing a long tail of weak completions: when only modal (most frequent) responses by both systems are compared, the LLM advantage disappears. However, greater parallelogram alignment and lower word frequency continue to predict which LLM completions are rated higher than those of humans. Overall, these results suggest that the parallelogram model is not a poor account of word analogy. Rather, humans may often fail to produce completions that satisfy this relational constraint, whereas LLMs do so more consistently.

Henry C. Conklin, Tom Hosking, Tan Yi-Chern et al.

Despite the increasing prevalence of large language models (LLMs), we still have a limited understanding of how their representational spaces are structured. This limits our ability to interpret how and what they learn or relate them to learning in humans. We argue LLMs are best seen as an instance of lossy compression, where over training they learn by retaining only information in their training data relevant to their objective(s). We show pre-training results in models that are optimally compressed for next-sequence prediction, approaching the Information Bottleneck bound on compression. Across an array of open weights models, each compresses differently, likely due to differences in the data and training recipes used. However even across different families of LLMs the optimality of a model's compression, and the information present in it, can predict downstream performance on across a wide array of benchmarks, letting us directly link representational structure to actionable insights about model performance. In the general case the work presented here offers a unified Information-Theoretic framing for how these models learn that is deployable at scale.

Haoyu Hu, Raja Marjieh, Katherine M Collins et al.

Writing code has been one of the most transformative ways for human societies to translate abstract ideas into tangible technologies. Modern AI is transforming this process by enabling experts and non-experts alike to generate code without actually writing code, but instead, through natural language instructions, or "vibe coding". While increasingly popular, the cumulative impact of vibe coding on productivity and collaboration, as well as the role of humans in this process, remains unclear. Here, we introduce a controlled experimental framework for studying collaborative vibe coding and use it to compare human-led, AI-led, and hybrid groups. Across 16 experiments involving 604 human participants, we show that people provide uniquely effective high-level instructions for vibe coding across iterations, whereas AI-provided instructions often result in performance collapse. We further demonstrate that hybrid systems perform best when humans retain directional control (providing the instructions), while evaluation is delegated to AI.

Yiming Zuo, Karhan Kayan, Maggie Wang et al.

Building a foundation model for 3D vision is a complex challenge that remains unsolved. Towards that goal, it is important to understand the 3D reasoning capabilities of current models as well as identify the gaps between these models and humans. Therefore, we construct a new 3D visual understanding benchmark named UniQA-3D. UniQA-3D covers fundamental 3D vision tasks in the Visual Question Answering (VQA) format. We evaluate state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specialized models, and human subjects on it. Our results show that VLMs generally perform poorly, while the specialized models are accurate but not robust, failing under geometric perturbations. In contrast, human vision continues to be the most reliable 3D visual system. We further demonstrate that neural networks align more closely with human 3D vision mechanisms compared to classical computer vision methods, and Transformer-based networks such as ViT align more closely with human 3D vision mechanisms than CNNs. We hope our study will benefit the future development of foundation models for 3D vision. Code is available at https://github.com/princeton-vl/UniQA-3D .

Lance Ying, Ryan Truong, Prafull Sharma et al.

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play \textbf{all conceivable human games}, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy -- the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10\% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

Jiayi Geng, Howard Chen, Ryan Liu et al.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Qiawen Ella Liu, Marina Dubova, Henry Conklin et al.

Are large language models (LLMs) creative in the same way humans are, and can the same interventions increase creativity in both? We evaluate a promising but largely untested intervention for creativity: forcing creators to draw an analogy from a random, remote source domain (''cross-domain mapping''). Human participants and LLMs generated novel features for ten daily products (e.g., backpack, TV) under two prompts: (i) cross-domain mapping, which required translating a property from a randomly assigned source (e.g., octopus, cactus, GPS), and (ii) user-need, which required proposing innovations targeting unmet user needs. We show that humans reliably benefit from randomly assigned cross-domain mappings, while LLMs, on average, generate more original ideas than humans and do not show a statistically significant effect of cross-domain mappings. However, in both systems, the impact of cross-domain mapping increases when the inspiration source becomes more semantically distant from the target. Our results highlight both the role of remote association in creative ideation and systematic differences in how humans and LLMs respond to the same intervention for creativity.

Gianluca M. Bencomo, Jake C. Snell, Thomas L. Griffiths

Bayesian filtering approximates the true underlying behavior of a time-varying system by inverting an explicit generative model to convert noisy measurements into state estimates. This process typically requires either storage, inversion, and multiplication of large matrices or Monte Carlo estimation, neither of which are practical in high-dimensional state spaces such as the weight spaces of artificial neural networks. Here, we frame the standard Bayesian filtering problem as optimization over a time-varying objective. Instead of maintaining matrices for the filtering equations or simulating particles, we specify an optimizer that defines the Bayesian filter implicitly. In the linear-Gaussian setting, we show that every Kalman filter has an equivalent formulation using K steps of gradient descent. In the nonlinear setting, our experiments demonstrate that our framework results in filters that are effective, robust, and scalable to high-dimensional systems, comparing well against the standard toolbox of Bayesian filtering solutions. We suggest that it is easier to fine-tune an optimizer than it is to specify the correct filtering equations, making our framework an attractive option for high-dimensional filtering problems.

Shunyu Yao, Dian Yu, Jeffrey Zhao et al.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/princeton-nlp/tree-of-thought-llm.

Micah Carroll, Rohin Shah, Mark K. Ho et al.

While we would like agents that can coordinate with humans, current algorithms such as self-play and population-based training create agents that can coordinate with themselves. Agents that assume their partner to be optimal or similar to them can converge to coordination protocols that fail to understand and be understood by humans. To demonstrate this, we introduce a simple environment that requires challenging coordination, based on the popular game Overcooked, and learn a simple model that mimics human play. We evaluate the performance of agents trained via self-play and population-based training. These agents perform very well when paired with themselves, but when paired with our human model, they are significantly worse than agents designed to play with the human model. An experiment with a planning algorithm yields the same conclusion, though only when the human-aware planner is given the exact human model that it is playing with. A user study with real humans shows this pattern as well, though less strongly. Qualitatively, we find that the gains come from having the agent adapt to the human's gameplay. Given this result, we suggest several approaches for designing agents that learn about humans in order to better coordinate with them. Code is available at https://github.com/HumanCompatibleAI/overcooked_ai.

Addison J. Wu, Ryan Liu, Xuechunzi Bai et al.

As large language models (LLMs) are adopted into frameworks that grant them the capacity to make real decisions, it is increasingly important to ensure that they are unbiased. In this paper, we argue that the predominant approach of simply removing existing biases from models is not enough. Using a paradigm from the psychology literature, we demonstrate that LLMs can spontaneously develop novel social biases about artificial demographic groups even when no inherent differences exist. These biases result in highly stratified task allocations, which are less fair than assignments by human participants and are exacerbated by newer and larger models. In social science, emergent biases like these have been shown to result from exploration-exploitation trade-offs, where the decision-maker explores too little, allowing early observations to strongly influence impressions about entire demographic groups. To alleviate this effect, we examine a series of interventions targeting model inputs, problem structure, and explicit steering. We find that explicitly incentivizing exploration most robustly reduces stratification, highlighting the need for better multifaceted objectives to mitigate bias. These results reveal that LLMs are not merely passive mirrors of human social biases, but can actively create new ones from experience, raising urgent questions about how these systems will shape societies over time.

Ryan Liu, Jiayi Geng, Addison J. Wu et al.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for improving large language and multimodal model performance. However, it is still an open question under which settings CoT systematically reduces performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, focusing on six representative tasks from the psychological literature where deliberation hurts performance in humans. In three of these tasks, state-of-the-art models exhibit significant performance drop-offs with CoT (up to 36.3\% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o), while in others, CoT effects are mixed, with positive, neutral, and negative changes. While models and humans do not exhibit perfectly parallel cognitive processes, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for humans helps identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human verbal thinking and deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a perspective for understanding the impact of inference-time reasoning.

Marcel Binz, Elif Akata, Abdullah Almaatouq et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.

Jake C. Snell, Gianluca Bencomo, Thomas L. Griffiths

Most applications of machine learning to classification assume a closed set of balanced classes. This is at odds with the real world, where class occurrence statistics often follow a long-tailed power-law distribution and it is unlikely that all classes are seen in a single sample. Nonparametric Bayesian models naturally capture this phenomenon, but have significant practical barriers to widespread adoption, namely implementation complexity and computational inefficiency. To address this, we present a method for extracting the inductive bias from a nonparametric Bayesian model and transferring it to an artificial neural network. By simulating data with a nonparametric Bayesian prior, we can metalearn a sequence model that performs inference over an unlimited set of classes. After training, this "neural circuit" has distilled the corresponding inductive bias and can successfully perform sequential inference over an open set of classes. Our experimental results show that the metalearned neural circuit achieves comparable or better performance than particle filter-based methods for inference in these models while being faster and simpler to use than methods that explicitly incorporate Bayesian nonparametric inference.

Milena Rmus, Mathew D. Hardy, Thomas L. Griffiths et al.

Reliable human-machine discrimination is becoming increasingly important as large language models and autonomous agents are deployed in online settings. Existing approaches evaluate whether a system can produce behavior or responses indistinguishable from those of a human, following the emphasis on outputs as a criterion for intelligence proposed by Alan Turing. Cognitive science offers an alternative perspective: evaluating the process by which behavior is produced. To test whether cognitive processes can reliably distinguish humans from machines, we introduce CogCAPTCHA30, a battery of 30 cognitive tasks designed to elicit diagnostic process-level features even when task performance is matched. Across the battery, process-level features provide stronger discriminative signal than performance metrics alone, reliably distinguishing humans from agents even under output matching (mean process-feature classifier AUC = 0.88). To evaluate agentic process differences, we compare off-the-shelf frontier agents (Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro), Centaur (a language model fine-tuned on 10.7M human decisions), and two task-specific fine-tuning approaches applied to Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct: action-level supervised fine-tuning (A-SFT) and process-level fine-tuning (P-SFT), which directly optimizes process features. Broad fine-tuning on human decisions improves human-like task processes relative to off-the-shelf agents, while task-specific process-level supervision further improves behavioral mimicry. However, this advantage diminishes under cross-task transfer when supervised process targets do not naturally generalize across tasks. Explicit process-level supervision can improve human behavioral mimicry, but only if appropriate task-specific process representations are available, highlighting process specification as a bottleneck for achieving human-like cognitive processes in machines.

Elizabeth Mieczkowski, Alexander Ku, Tiwalayo Eisape et al.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in teams, yet existing coordination approaches often occupy two extremes. Highly structured methods rely on fixed roles, pipelines, or task decompositions assigned a priori. In contrast, fully unstructured teams enable adaptability and exploration but suffer from inefficiencies such as error propagation, inter-agent conflicts, and wasted resources (measured in time, tokens, or file operations). We introduce Language Agent Teams for Task Evolution (LATTE), a framework for coordinating LLM teams inspired by distributed systems, where processors must operate under partial observability and communication constraints. In LATTE, a team of agents collaboratively construct and maintain a shared, evolving coordination graph which encodes sub-task dependencies, individual agent assignment, and the current state of sub-task progress. This protocol maintains consistency while empowering agents to dynamically allocate work, adapt coordination, and discover new tasks. Across multiple collaborative tasks and a variety of base models, we demonstrate how LATTE reduces token usage, wall-clock time, communication, and coordination failures (e.g. file conflicts and redundant outputs) while matching or exceeding the accuracy of standard designs including MetaGPT, decentralized teams, top-down Leader-Worker hierarchies, and static decompositions.