Kannan Srinathan

Aman Rojjha, Gaurang Tandon, Varul Srivastava et al.

Electronic voting systems must balance public verifiability with voter privacy and coercion resistance. Existing cryptographic protocols typically achieve end-to-end verifiability by revealing vote distributions, relying on trusted clients, or enabling transferable receipts - design choices that often compromise trust or privacy in real-world deployments. We present ACE, a voting protocol that reconciles public auditability with strong privacy guarantees. The protocol combines a publicly verifiable, tally-hiding aggregation mechanism with an Audit-or-Cast challenge that enforces cast-as-intended even under untrusted client assumptions. Tallier-side re-randomization eliminates persistent links between voters and public records, yielding information-theoretic receipt-freeness assuming at least one honest tallier. We formalize the security of ACE and show that it simultaneously achieves end-to-end verifiability, publicly tally-hiding results, and strong receipt-freeness without trusted clients.

Niraj Kumar, Rashmi Gangadharaiah, Kannan Srinathan et al.

In this paper, we show that certain phrases although not present in a given question/query, play a very important role in answering the question. Exploring the role of such phrases in answering questions not only reduces the dependency on matching question phrases for extracting answers, but also improves the quality of the extracted answers. Here matching question phrases means phrases which co-occur in given question and candidate answers. To achieve the above discussed goal, we introduce a bigram-based word graph model populated with semantic and topical relatedness of terms in the given document. Next, we apply an improved version of ranking with a prior-based approach, which ranks all words in the candidate document with respect to a set of root words (i.e. non-stopwords present in the question and in the candidate document). As a result, terms logically related to the root words are scored higher than terms that are not related to the root words. Experimental results show that our devised system performs better than state-of-the-art for the task of answering Why-questions.

Anuj Gupta, Prasant Gopal, Piyush Bansal et al.

The problem of Authenticated Byzantine Generals (ABG) aims to simulate a virtual reliable broadcast channel from the General to all the players via a protocol over a real (point-to-point) network in the presence of faults. We propose a new model to study the self-composition of ABG protocols. The central dogma of our approach can be phrased as follows: Consider a player who diligently executes (only) the delegated protocol but the adversary steals some private information from him. Should such a player be considered faulty? With respect to ABG protocols, we argue that the answer has to be no. In the new model we show that in spite of using unique session identifiers, if $n < 2t$, there cannot exist any ABG protocol that composes in parallel even twice. Further, for $n \geq 2t$, we design ABG protocols that compose for any number of parallel executions. Besides investigating the composition of ABG under a new light, our work also brings out several new insights into Canetti's Universal Composability framework. Specifically, we show that there are several undesirable effects if one deviates from our dogma. This provides further evidence as to why our dogma is the right framework to study the composition of ABG protocols.