CRApr 21

Audit-or-Cast: Enforcing Honest Elections with Privacy-Preserving Public Verification

arXiv:2604.181639.9h-index: 16
Predicted impact top 82% in CR · last 90 daysOriginality Highly original
AI Analysis

For electronic voting systems, ACE solves the long-standing tension between public verifiability and strong privacy/coercion resistance, enabling honest elections with privacy-preserving public verification.

ACE is a voting protocol that achieves end-to-end verifiability, tally-hiding, and receipt-freeness without trusted clients, using a novel Audit-or-Cast challenge and tallier-side re-randomization.

Electronic voting systems must balance public verifiability with voter privacy and coercion resistance. Existing cryptographic protocols typically achieve end-to-end verifiability by revealing vote distributions, relying on trusted clients, or enabling transferable receipts - design choices that often compromise trust or privacy in real-world deployments. We present ACE, a voting protocol that reconciles public auditability with strong privacy guarantees. The protocol combines a publicly verifiable, tally-hiding aggregation mechanism with an Audit-or-Cast challenge that enforces cast-as-intended even under untrusted client assumptions. Tallier-side re-randomization eliminates persistent links between voters and public records, yielding information-theoretic receipt-freeness assuming at least one honest tallier. We formalize the security of ACE and show that it simultaneously achieves end-to-end verifiability, publicly tally-hiding results, and strong receipt-freeness without trusted clients.

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