Ilya Davidson, Sandro Claudio Lera, Robert Mahari
Judicial promotions shape the composition of higher courts, yet their determinants remain poorly understood. This paper examines promotion from U.S. District Courts to Courts of Appeals using a discrete-time hazard framework that models annual promotion probability. Using a judge-year panel covering over 36,000 observations from 1930 to present, we incorporate career timing, political alignment, elite credentials, and judicial performance measures. Promotion probabilities follow a life-cycle pattern and are strongly influenced by political alignment between judges and presidents ($β$ = 2.12, p < 0.001). Elite credentials and productivity increase promotion likelihood, while higher reversal rates reduce it. Citation network centrality exhibits a meaningful association ($β$ = 0.230, p = 0.025) that operates independently of elite credentials. Promotion outcomes reflect a dynamic process shaped by timing, politics, elite networks, and performance signals, with political considerations dominating but not eclipsing judicial behavior.