The Determinants of Judicial Promotion: Politics, Prestige, and Performance
For scholars of judicial behavior and institutional design, this paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of promotion determinants, though the findings are largely confirmatory of existing theories.
This paper examines promotion from U.S. District Courts to Courts of Appeals using a discrete-time hazard model on over 36,000 judge-year observations from 1930 to present, finding that political alignment with the president (β=2.12, p<0.001) is the strongest predictor, while elite credentials, productivity, and citation network centrality also matter, and higher reversal rates reduce promotion likelihood.
Judicial promotions shape the composition of higher courts, yet their determinants remain poorly understood. This paper examines promotion from U.S. District Courts to Courts of Appeals using a discrete-time hazard framework that models annual promotion probability. Using a judge-year panel covering over 36,000 observations from 1930 to present, we incorporate career timing, political alignment, elite credentials, and judicial performance measures. Promotion probabilities follow a life-cycle pattern and are strongly influenced by political alignment between judges and presidents ($β$ = 2.12, p < 0.001). Elite credentials and productivity increase promotion likelihood, while higher reversal rates reduce it. Citation network centrality exhibits a meaningful association ($β$ = 0.230, p = 0.025) that operates independently of elite credentials. Promotion outcomes reflect a dynamic process shaped by timing, politics, elite networks, and performance signals, with political considerations dominating but not eclipsing judicial behavior.