Alkistis Aikaterini Sigourou

Gerald Isheanesu Matungamire, Alkistis Aikaterini Sigourou, Gerrit Schrock et al.

Scalar multiplication kP is the operation most frequently targeted in Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystems. To protect against single-trace Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks, the atomicity principle and various atomic block patterns have been proposed in the past. In this work we use our software and hardware implementations to demonstrate that binary right-to left and left-to-right kP algorithms, when implemented with Chevallier-Mames atomic block patterns, are still vulnerable to single-trace SCA attacks. The vulnerability remains true for the left-to-right kP algorithm with projective coordinate randomization.

Alkistis Aikaterini Sigourou, Zoya Dyka, Peter Langendoerfer et al.

Scalar multiplication kP is a critical operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC), often targeted by Side-Channel Analysis (SCA). Despite strategies based on atomic patterns to enhance security, the binary kP algorithms remain susceptible to simple SCA due to energy consumption variations in field multipliers during passing two different or two identical operands. This vulnerability arises independent of the multiplication method used. We implemented and analysed two mitigation techniques: one involving data redirection and another focusing on bus reloading.