Horizontal SCA Attacks on Binary kP Algorithms using Chevallier-Mames Atomic Blocks
For cryptographers and hardware designers, it shows that a widely used countermeasure (Chevallier-Mames atomic blocks) is insufficient against single-trace attacks.
This work demonstrates that binary kP algorithms using Chevallier-Mames atomic blocks are vulnerable to single-trace SCA attacks, even with projective coordinate randomization, based on software and hardware implementations.
Scalar multiplication kP is the operation most frequently targeted in Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptosystems. To protect against single-trace Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks, the atomicity principle and various atomic block patterns have been proposed in the past. In this work we use our software and hardware implementations to demonstrate that binary right-to left and left-to-right kP algorithms, when implemented with Chevallier-Mames atomic block patterns, are still vulnerable to single-trace SCA attacks. The vulnerability remains true for the left-to-right kP algorithm with projective coordinate randomization.