Mohammad Salahshour

Mohammad Salahshour, Sumanth Bhargava, Kajal Kumari et al. · allen-ai, eth-zurich

Collective information acquisition requires groups to combine personal evidence with social information while remaining coupled to the external state. Communication noise can affect this process, but the role of noise remains unclear. In an online experiment, 600 participants worked in four-person human groups estimating a room temperature across 25 rounds while receiving either faithful social information, comprehension noise in which each receiver saw independently perturbed social information, or production noise in which perturbations were stored before display and could be seen by multiple receivers. The thermometer cue was objectively veridical, but its reliability was subjectively uncertain and the unitless 50--250 room-temperature range created a task-induced conflict between displayed evidence and everyday temperature expectations. Production-noise groups spent more rounds tightly clustered around a wrong value than comprehension-noise groups (\(p=0.016\), group-level permutation). Production noise more often created a wrong common signal (\(p=0.025\), Fisher's exact test) and made that signal persist across more rounds (\(p=0.004\), permutation). Dynamic update models showed that production noise was not more harmful because people followed peers more strongly, but because the same peer influence acted on more correlated production-noise perturbations. Exploratory human analyses linked the mechanism to psychological patterns while a GPT-agent experiment clarified a boundary condition: GPT agents registered uncertainty through reduced confidence without reproducing human-scale production-noise vulnerability. Overall, noise did not simply degrade collective information acquisition. Comprehension noise could sometimes improve correction relative to the faithful control, whereas production noise could turn perturbations into common evidence and stabilize consensus on error.

Mahdi Abolhasani, Saman Moghimi-Araghi, Mohammad Salahshour

Costly cooperation and costly signaling are both difficult to reconcile with simple fitness maximization, yet both are common in biological and social systems. We study a model in which agents emit costly signals and condition their actions on the signals they observe. Across the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), Snowdrift (SD), and Stag Hunt (SH) games, we ask when this coevolutionary process can sustain cooperation and how it changes across well-mixed populations, spatial lattices, and fluctuating strategic environments. The simulations show that signals are selected less by their raw production costs than by the cooperative responses they currently elicit. In well-mixed populations, the mechanism sustains partial cooperation in PD and SD and drives near-complete cooperation in SH. On lattices, cooperation is strengthened further by local assortment. A reduced mean-field analysis explains why average population feedback is already sufficient in SD and SH, but not in the PD. To account for the PD dynamics, the reduced theory must include transient correlations associated with rare signals, inheritance, or spatial clustering. Our results therefore delineate a class of settings in which costly signals persist because they transiently organize cooperative responses and thereby reshape the effective strategic environment.