The Co-evolution of Costly Signaling and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
For researchers studying the evolution of cooperation, this work delineates conditions under which costly signaling can transiently organize cooperative responses, reshaping strategic environments.
The study shows that costly signaling can sustain cooperation in social dilemmas (Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt) when agents condition actions on signals, with cooperation levels varying by game and population structure. In well-mixed populations, partial cooperation emerges in PD and SD, while near-complete cooperation occurs in SH; spatial lattices further enhance cooperation.
Costly cooperation and costly signaling are both difficult to reconcile with simple fitness maximization, yet both are common in biological and social systems. We study a model in which agents emit costly signals and condition their actions on the signals they observe. Across the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), Snowdrift (SD), and Stag Hunt (SH) games, we ask when this coevolutionary process can sustain cooperation and how it changes across well-mixed populations, spatial lattices, and fluctuating strategic environments. The simulations show that signals are selected less by their raw production costs than by the cooperative responses they currently elicit. In well-mixed populations, the mechanism sustains partial cooperation in PD and SD and drives near-complete cooperation in SH. On lattices, cooperation is strengthened further by local assortment. A reduced mean-field analysis explains why average population feedback is already sufficient in SD and SH, but not in the PD. To account for the PD dynamics, the reduced theory must include transient correlations associated with rare signals, inheritance, or spatial clustering. Our results therefore delineate a class of settings in which costly signals persist because they transiently organize cooperative responses and thereby reshape the effective strategic environment.