Rachel A. Freedman

Peter Barnett, Rachel Freedman, Justin Svegliato et al.

Reward learning algorithms utilize human feedback to infer a reward function, which is then used to train an AI system. This human feedback is often a preference comparison, in which the human teacher compares several samples of AI behavior and chooses which they believe best accomplishes the objective. While reward learning typically assumes that all feedback comes from a single teacher, in practice these systems often query multiple teachers to gather sufficient training data. In this paper, we investigate this disparity, and find that algorithmic evaluation of these different sources of feedback facilitates more accurate and efficient reward learning. We formally analyze the value of information (VOI) when reward learning from teachers with varying levels of rationality, and define and evaluate an algorithm that utilizes this VOI to actively select teachers to query for feedback. Surprisingly, we find that it is often more informative to query comparatively irrational teachers. By formalizing this problem and deriving an analytical solution, we hope to facilitate improvement in reward learning approaches to aligning AI behavior with human values.

Oliver Daniels-Koch, Rachel Freedman

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a powerful technique for training agents to perform difficult-to-specify tasks. However, human feedback can be noisy, particularly when human teachers lack relevant knowledge or experience. Levels of expertise vary across teachers, and a given teacher may have differing levels of expertise for different components of a task. RLHF algorithms that learn from multiple teachers therefore face an expertise problem: the reliability of a given piece of feedback depends both on the teacher that it comes from and how specialized that teacher is on relevant components of the task. Existing state-of-the-art RLHF algorithms assume that all evaluations come from the same distribution, obscuring this inter- and intra-human variance, and preventing them from accounting for or taking advantage of variations in expertise. We formalize this problem, implement it as an extension of an existing RLHF benchmark, evaluate the performance of a state-of-the-art RLHF algorithm, and explore techniques to improve query and teacher selection. Our key contribution is to demonstrate and characterize the expertise problem, and to provide an open-source implementation for testing future solutions.

Rachel Freedman, Justin Svegliato, Kyle Wray et al.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) enables machine learning systems to learn objectives from human feedback. A core limitation of these systems is their assumption that all feedback comes from a single human teacher, despite querying a range of distinct teachers. We propose the Hidden Utility Bandit (HUB) framework to model differences in teacher rationality, expertise, and costliness, formalizing the problem of learning from multiple teachers. We develop a variety of solution algorithms and apply them to two real-world domains: paper recommendation systems and COVID-19 vaccine testing. We find that the Active Teacher Selection (ATS) algorithm outperforms baseline algorithms by actively selecting when and which teacher to query. The HUB framework and ATS algorithm demonstrate the importance of leveraging differences between teachers to learn accurate reward models, facilitating future research on active teacher selection for robust reward modeling.

Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig et al.

Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic behavior, such as helping to commit crimes or producing racist text. One approach to fine-tuning, called reinforcement learning from human feedback, learns from humans' expressed preferences over multiple outputs. Another approach is constitutional AI, in which the input from humans is a list of high-level principles. But how do we deal with potentially diverging input from humans? How can we aggregate the input into consistent data about "collective" preferences or otherwise use it to make collective choices about model behavior? In this paper, we argue that the field of social choice is well positioned to address these questions, and we discuss ways forward for this agenda, drawing on discussions in a recent workshop on Social Choice for AI Ethics and Safety held in Berkeley, CA, USA in December 2023.