Yuan Chen

Yuan Chen, Soummya Kar, José M. F. Moura

The growth in the number of devices connected to the Internet of Things (IoT) poses major challenges in security. The integrity and trustworthiness of data and data analytics are increasingly important concerns in IoT applications. These are compounded by the highly distributed nature of IoT devices, making it infeasible to prevent attacks and intrusions on all data sources. Adversaries may hijack devices and compromise their data. As a result, reactive countermeasures, such as intrusion detection and resilient analytics, become vital components of security. This paper overviews algorithms for secure distributed inference in IoT.

Yuan Chen, Soummya Kar, José M. F. Moura

This paper studies an attacker against a cyber-physical system (CPS) whose goal is to move the state of a CPS to a target state while ensuring that his or her probability of being detected does not exceed a given bound. The attacker's probability of being detected is related to the nonnegative bias induced by his or her attack on the CPS' detection statistic. We formulate a linear quadratic cost function that captures the attacker's control goal and establish constraints on the induced bias that reflect the attacker's detection-avoidance objectives. When the attacker is constrained to be detected at the false-alarm rate of the detector, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate. In the case that the attacker's bias is upper bounded by a positive constant, we provide two algorithms -- an optimal algorithm and a sub-optimal, less computationally intensive algorithm -- to find suitable attack sequences. Finally, we illustrate our attack strategies in numerical examples based on a remotely-controlled helicopter under attack.

Yuan Chen, Soummya Kar, Jose' M. F. Moura

This paper studies the impact of side initial state information on the detectability of data deception attacks against cyber-physical systems. We assume the attack detector has access to a linear function of the initial system state that cannot be altered by an attacker. First, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for an attack to be undetectable by any dynamic attack detector under each specific side information pattern. Second, we characterize attacks that can be sustained for arbitrarily long periods without being detected. Third, we define the zero state inducing attack, the only type of attack that remains dynamically undetectable regardless of the side initial state information available to the attack detector. Finally, we design a dynamic attack detector that detects detectable attacks.