Dynamic Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems with Side Initial State Information
This work addresses security vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems, but it appears incremental as it builds on existing detection frameworks with specific side information assumptions.
The paper tackles the problem of detecting data deception attacks in cyber-physical systems by analyzing how side initial state information affects attack detectability, and it designs a dynamic attack detector to identify detectable attacks.
This paper studies the impact of side initial state information on the detectability of data deception attacks against cyber-physical systems. We assume the attack detector has access to a linear function of the initial system state that cannot be altered by an attacker. First, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for an attack to be undetectable by any dynamic attack detector under each specific side information pattern. Second, we characterize attacks that can be sustained for arbitrarily long periods without being detected. Third, we define the zero state inducing attack, the only type of attack that remains dynamically undetectable regardless of the side initial state information available to the attack detector. Finally, we design a dynamic attack detector that detects detectable attacks.