Kai Gao

Ching-Chun Chang, Kai Gao, Shuying Xu et al.

Neural backdoors represent insidious cybersecurity loopholes that render learning machinery vulnerable to unauthorised manipulations, potentially enabling the weaponisation of artificial intelligence with catastrophic consequences. A backdoor attack involves the clandestine infiltration of a trigger during the learning process, metaphorically analogous to hypnopaedia, where ideas are implanted into a subject's subconscious mind under the state of hypnosis or unconsciousness. When activated by a sensory stimulus, the trigger evokes conditioned reflex that directs a machine to mount a predetermined response. In this study, we propose a cybernetic framework for constant surveillance of backdoors threats, driven by the dynamic nature of untrustworthy data sources. We develop a self-aware unlearning mechanism to autonomously detach a machine's behaviour from the backdoor trigger. Through reverse engineering and statistical inference, we detect deceptive patterns and estimate the likelihood of backdoor infection. We employ model inversion to elicit artificial mental imagery, using stochastic processes to disrupt optimisation pathways and avoid convergent but potentially flawed patterns. This is followed by hypothesis analysis, which estimates the likelihood of each potentially malicious pattern being the true trigger and infers the probability of infection. The primary objective of this study is to maintain a stable state of equilibrium between knowledge fidelity and backdoor vulnerability.

Ching-Chun Chang, Fan-Yun Chen, Shih-Hong Gu et al.

As the cornerstone of artificial intelligence, machine perception confronts a fundamental threat posed by adversarial illusions. These adversarial attacks manifest in two primary forms: deductive illusion, where specific stimuli are crafted based on the victim model's general decision logic, and inductive illusion, where the victim model's general decision logic is shaped by specific stimuli. The former exploits the model's decision boundaries to create a stimulus that, when applied, interferes with its decision-making process. The latter reinforces a conditioned reflex in the model, embedding a backdoor during its learning phase that, when triggered by a stimulus, causes aberrant behaviours. The multifaceted nature of adversarial illusions calls for a unified defence framework, addressing vulnerabilities across various forms of attack. In this study, we propose a disillusion paradigm based on the concept of an imitation game. At the heart of the imitation game lies a multimodal generative agent, steered by chain-of-thought reasoning, which observes, internalises and reconstructs the semantic essence of a sample, liberated from the classic pursuit of reversing the sample to its original state. As a proof of concept, we conduct experimental simulations using a multimodal generative dialogue agent and evaluates the methodology under a variety of attack scenarios.