Haifeng Xu

Yuwei Cheng, Weiyi Tian, Haifeng Xu

Fine-tuning is often believed to reduce uncertainty and diversity in large language models, but existing analyses overlook output length, a key confounder, and therefore fail to capture how uncertainty is distributed across an entire generation rollout. To address this, we propose Canopy Entropy ($\mathrm{CE}^\star$), a measure that views language generation from a tree perspective, where ``canopy'' represents the space of all possible rollouts, making $\mathrm{CE}^\star$ naturally quantify the effective size of the generation space. $\mathrm{CE}^\star$ jointly captures uncertainty in both the output length $N$ and the generated sequence $Y_{1:N}$ -- indeed, we show that it equals to total Shannon entropy $H(N, Y_{1:N}\mid X)$, where $X$ denotes the prompt. This formulation yields interpretable metrics, including a length-entropy correlation term $ρ(N, r_N)$, where $r_N$ is the entropy rate, quantifying information conveyance efficiency by indicating whether longer outputs are more or less informative per token. Empirically, across tasks and model families, we find that fine-tuned models consistently exhibit stronger positive correlation $ρ(N, r_N)$, even when total entropy decreases. Furthermore, after controlling for model family, task, prompt, and output-length effects, we find that fine-tuning nearly triples the correlation strength between entropy rate and semantic diversity, suggesting that aligned models convert token uncertainty into semantic diversity more efficiently. Overall, these results demonstrate that fine-tuning does not simply reduce uncertainty, but fundamentally reorganizes it into more informative and semantically meaningful generations. Our code is available at https://github.com/WeiyiTian/canopy-entropy.

Anshuka Rangi, Haifeng Xu, Long Tran-Thanh et al.

To understand the security threats to reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, this paper studies poisoning attacks to manipulate \emph{any} order-optimal learning algorithm towards a targeted policy in episodic RL and examines the potential damage of two natural types of poisoning attacks, i.e., the manipulation of \emph{reward} and \emph{action}. We discover that the effect of attacks crucially depend on whether the rewards are bounded or unbounded. In bounded reward settings, we show that only reward manipulation or only action manipulation cannot guarantee a successful attack. However, by combining reward and action manipulation, the adversary can manipulate any order-optimal learning algorithm to follow any targeted policy with $\tildeΘ(\sqrt{T})$ total attack cost, which is order-optimal, without any knowledge of the underlying MDP. In contrast, in unbounded reward settings, we show that reward manipulation attacks are sufficient for an adversary to successfully manipulate any order-optimal learning algorithm to follow any targeted policy using $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ amount of contamination. Our results reveal useful insights about what can or cannot be achieved by poisoning attacks, and are set to spur more works on the design of robust RL algorithms.

Chaoqi Wang, Ziyu Ye, Zhe Feng et al. · utoronto

Standard contextual bandit problem assumes that all the relevant contexts are observed before the algorithm chooses an arm. This modeling paradigm, while useful, often falls short when dealing with problems in which valuable additional context can be observed after arm selection. For example, content recommendation platforms like Youtube, Instagram, Tiktok also observe valuable follow-up information pertinent to the user's reward after recommendation (e.g., how long the user stayed, what is the user's watch speed, etc.). To improve online learning efficiency in these applications, we study a novel contextual bandit problem with post-serving contexts and design a new algorithm, poLinUCB, that achieves tight regret under standard assumptions. Core to our technical proof is a robustified and generalized version of the well-known Elliptical Potential Lemma (EPL), which can accommodate noise in data. Such robustification is necessary for tackling our problem, and we believe it could also be of general interest. Extensive empirical tests on both synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the significant benefit of utilizing post-serving contexts as well as the superior performance of our algorithm over the state-of-the-art approaches.

Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov et al.

Content creators compete for exposure on recommendation platforms, and such strategic behavior leads to a dynamic shift over the content distribution. However, how the creators' competition impacts user welfare and how the relevance-driven recommendation influences the dynamics in the long run are still largely unknown. This work provides theoretical insights into these research questions. We model the creators' competition under the assumptions that: 1) the platform employs an innocuous top-$K$ recommendation policy; 2) user decisions follow the Random Utility model; 3) content creators compete for user engagement and, without knowing their utility function in hindsight, apply arbitrary no-regret learning algorithms to update their strategies. We study the user welfare guarantee through the lens of Price of Anarchy and show that the fraction of user welfare loss due to creator competition is always upper bounded by a small constant depending on $K$ and randomness in user decisions; we also prove the tightness of this bound. Our result discloses an intrinsic merit of the myopic approach to the recommendation, i.e., relevance-driven matching performs reasonably well in the long run, as long as users' decisions involve randomness and the platform provides reasonably many alternatives to its users.

Stephanie Schoch, Haifeng Xu, Yangfeng Ji

Data valuation, or the valuation of individual datum contributions, has seen growing interest in machine learning due to its demonstrable efficacy for tasks such as noisy label detection. In particular, due to the desirable axiomatic properties, several Shapley value approximation methods have been proposed. In these methods, the value function is typically defined as the predictive accuracy over the entire development set. However, this limits the ability to differentiate between training instances that are helpful or harmful to their own classes. Intuitively, instances that harm their own classes may be noisy or mislabeled and should receive a lower valuation than helpful instances. In this work, we propose CS-Shapley, a Shapley value with a new value function that discriminates between training instances' in-class and out-of-class contributions. Our theoretical analysis shows the proposed value function is (essentially) the unique function that satisfies two desirable properties for evaluating data values in classification. Further, our experiments on two benchmark evaluation tasks (data removal and noisy label detection) and four classifiers demonstrate the effectiveness of CS-Shapley over existing methods. Lastly, we evaluate the "transferability" of data values estimated from one classifier to others, and our results suggest Shapley-based data valuation is transferable for application across different models.

Yaolong Yu, Haifeng Xu, Haipeng Chen

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to as Stackelberg game or leader-follower game. In particular, we focus on a Stackelberg game scenario where there are multiple leaders and a single follower, called the Multi-Leader-Single-Follower (MLSF) game. We propose a novel asymmetric equilibrium concept for the MLSF game called Correlated Stackelberg Equilibrium (CSE). We design online learning algorithms that enable the players to interact in a distributed manner, and prove that it can achieve no-external Stackelberg-regret learning. This further translates to the convergence to approximate CSE via a reduction from no-external regret to no-swap regret. At the core of our works, we solve the intricate problem of how to learn equilibrium in leader-follower games with noisy bandit feedback by balancing exploration and exploitation in different learning structures.

Zhepei Wei, Chuanhao Li, Haifeng Xu et al.

Most existing works on federated bandits take it for granted that all clients are altruistic about sharing their data with the server for the collective good whenever needed. Despite their compelling theoretical guarantee on performance and communication efficiency, this assumption is overly idealistic and oftentimes violated in practice, especially when the algorithm is operated over self-interested clients, who are reluctant to share data without explicit benefits. Negligence of such self-interested behaviors can significantly affect the learning efficiency and even the practical operability of federated bandit learning. In light of this, we aim to spark new insights into this under-explored research area by formally introducing an incentivized communication problem for federated bandits, where the server shall motivate clients to share data by providing incentives. Without loss of generality, we instantiate this bandit problem with the contextual linear setting and propose the first incentivized communication protocol, namely, Inc-FedUCB, that achieves near-optimal regret with provable communication and incentive cost guarantees. Extensive empirical experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets further validate the effectiveness of the proposed method across various environments.

Shivakumar Mahesh, Anshuka Rangi, Haifeng Xu et al.

Motivated by cognitive radios, stochastic Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandits has been extensively studied in recent years. In this setting, each player pulls an arm, and receives a reward corresponding to the arm if there is no collision, namely the arm was selected by one single player. Otherwise, the player receives no reward if collision occurs. In this paper, we consider the presence of malicious players (or attackers) who obstruct the cooperative players (or defenders) from maximizing their rewards, by deliberately colliding with them. We provide the first decentralized and robust algorithm RESYNC for defenders whose performance deteriorates gracefully as $\tilde{O}(C)$ as the number of collisions $C$ from the attackers increases. We show that this algorithm is order-optimal by proving a lower bound which scales as $Ω(C)$. This algorithm is agnostic to the algorithm used by the attackers and agnostic to the number of collisions $C$ faced from attackers.

Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Zhe Feng, Tianxi Li et al.

Incrementality, which is used to measure the causal effect of showing an ad to a potential customer (e.g. a user in an internet platform) versus not, is a central object for advertisers in online advertising platforms. This paper investigates the problem of how an advertiser can learn to optimize the bidding sequence in an online manner \emph{without} knowing the incrementality parameters in advance. We formulate the offline version of this problem as a specially structured episodic Markov Decision Process (MDP) and then, for its online learning counterpart, propose a novel reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm with regret at most $\widetilde{O}(H^2\sqrt{T})$, which depends on the number of rounds $H$ and number of episodes $T$, but does not depend on the number of actions (i.e., possible bids). A fundamental difference between our learning problem from standard RL problems is that the realized reward feedback from conversion incrementality is \emph{mixed} and \emph{delayed}. To handle this difficulty we propose and analyze a novel pairwise moment-matching algorithm to learn the conversion incrementality, which we believe is of independent of interest.

Haolin Liu, Rajmohan Rajaraman, Ravi Sundaram et al.

Consider public health officials aiming to spread awareness about a new vaccine in a community interconnected by a social network. How can they distribute information with minimal resources, so as to avoid polarization and ensure community-wide convergence of opinion? To tackle such challenges, we initiate the study of sample complexity of opinion convergence in networks. Our framework is built on the recognized opinion formation game, where we regard the opinion of each agent as a data-derived model, unlike previous works that treat opinions as data-independent scalars. The opinion model for every agent is initially learned from its local samples and evolves game-theoretically as all agents communicate with neighbors and revise their models towards an equilibrium. Our focus is on the sample complexity needed to ensure that the opinions converge to an equilibrium such that the final model of every agent has low generalization error. Our paper has two main technical results. First, we present a novel polynomial time optimization framework to quantify the total sample complexity for arbitrary networks, when the underlying learning problem is (generalized) linear regression. Second, we leverage this optimization to study the network gain which measures the improvement of sample complexity when learning over a network compared to that in isolation. Towards this end, we derive network gain bounds for various network classes including cliques, star graphs, and random regular graphs. Additionally, our framework provides a method to study sample distribution within the network, suggesting that it is sufficient to allocate samples inversely to the degree. Empirical results on both synthetic and real-world networks strongly support our theoretical findings.

Thomas Kleine Buening, Aadirupa Saha, Christos Dimitrakakis et al.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}} (\sqrt{KT})$ regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Minbiao Han, Jonathan Light, Steven Xia et al.

Organizations often lack sufficient data to effectively train machine learning (ML) models, while others possess valuable data that remains underutilized. Data markets promise to unlock substantial value by matching data suppliers with demand from ML consumers. However, market design involves addressing intricate challenges, including data pricing, fairness, robustness, and strategic behavior. In this paper, we propose a pragmatic data-augmented AutoML market that seamlessly integrates with existing cloud-based AutoML platforms such as Google's Vertex AI and Amazon's SageMaker. Unlike standard AutoML solutions, our design automatically augments buyer-submitted training data with valuable external datasets, pricing the resulting models based on their measurable performance improvements rather than computational costs as the status quo. Our key innovation is a pricing mechanism grounded in the instrumental value - the marginal model quality improvement - of externally sourced data. This approach bypasses direct dataset pricing complexities, mitigates strategic buyer behavior, and accommodates diverse buyer valuations through menu-based options. By integrating automated data and model discovery, our solution not only enhances ML outcomes but also establishes an economically sustainable framework for monetizing external data.

Jibang Wu, Siyu Chen, Mengdi Wang et al.

The agency problem emerges in today's large scale machine learning tasks, where the learners are unable to direct content creation or enforce data collection. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for aligning economic interests of different stakeholders in the online learning problems through contract design. The problem, termed \emph{contractual reinforcement learning}, naturally arises from the classic model of Markov decision processes, where a learning principal seeks to optimally influence the agent's action policy for their common interests through a set of payment rules contingent on the realization of next state. For the planning problem, we design an efficient dynamic programming algorithm to determine the optimal contracts against the far-sighted agent. For the learning problem, we introduce a generic design of no-regret learning algorithms to untangle the challenges from robust design of contracts to the balance of exploration and exploitation, reducing the complexity analysis to the construction of efficient search algorithms. For several natural classes of problems, we design tailored search algorithms that provably achieve $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret. We also present an algorithm with $\tilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ for the general problem that improves the existing analysis in online contract design with mild technical assumptions.

Krishnamurthy Iyer, Alec Sun, Haifeng Xu et al.

Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of actions that lead to different distributions over outcomes. We focus on a setting in which the seller has the ability to commit to an action and the buyer is free to accept or reject the outcome after seeing its realized quality. We propose a two-stage payment scheme where the seller designs a menu of contracts, each of which specifies an action, an upfront price and a vector of outcome-dependent usage prices. Upon selecting a contract, the buyer pays the upfront price, and after observing the realized outcome, the buyer either accepts and pays the corresponding usage price, or rejects and is exempt from further payment. We show that this two-stage payment structure is necessary to maximize profit: only upfront prices or only usage prices is insufficient. We then study the computational complexity of computing a profit-maximizing menu in our model. While computing the exact maximum seller profit is NP-hard even for two buyer types, we derive a fully-polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the maximum profit for a constant number of buyer types. Finally, we prove that in the single-parameter setting in which buyers' valuations are parametrized by a single real number that seller revenue can be maximized using a menu consisting of a single contract.

Gauri Jain, Pradeep Varakantham, Haifeng Xu et al.

Public health practitioners often have the goal of monitoring patients and maximizing patients' time spent in "favorable" or healthy states while being constrained to using limited resources. Restless multi-armed bandits (RMAB) are an effective model to solve this problem as they are helpful to allocate limited resources among many agents under resource constraints, where patients behave differently depending on whether they are intervened on or not. However, RMABs assume the reward function is known. This is unrealistic in many public health settings because patients face unique challenges and it is impossible for a human to know who is most deserving of any intervention at such a large scale. To address this shortcoming, this paper is the first to present the use of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) to learn desired rewards for RMABs, and we demonstrate improved outcomes in a maternal and child health telehealth program. First we allow public health experts to specify their goals at an aggregate or population level and propose an algorithm to design expert trajectories at scale based on those goals. Second, our algorithm WHIRL uses gradient updates to optimize the objective, allowing for efficient and accurate learning of RMAB rewards. Third, we compare with existing baselines and outperform those in terms of run-time and accuracy. Finally, we evaluate and show the usefulness of WHIRL on thousands on beneficiaries from a real-world maternal and child health setting in India. We publicly release our code here: https://github.com/Gjain234/WHIRL.

Jiayao Zhang, Yuran Bi, Mengye Cheng et al.

Data is the new oil of the 21st century. The growing trend of trading data for greater welfare has led to the emergence of data markets. A data market is any mechanism whereby the exchange of data products including datasets and data derivatives takes place as a result of data buyers and data sellers being in contact with one another, either directly or through mediating agents. It serves as a coordinating mechanism by which several functions, including the pricing and the distribution of data as the most important ones, interact to make the value of data fully exploited and enhanced. In this article, we present a comprehensive survey of this important and emerging direction from the aspects of data search, data productization, data transaction, data pricing, revenue allocation as well as privacy, security, and trust issues. We also investigate the government policies and industry status of data markets across different countries and different domains. Finally, we identify the unresolved challenges and discuss possible future directions for the development of data markets.

Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin et al. · harvard, tsinghua

We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and is ubiquitous in computational economics, multi-agent learning, and multi-objective machine learning. The core solution concept here is the Nash equilibrium of senders' signaling policies. Theoretically, we prove that finding an equilibrium in general is PPAD-Hard; in fact, even computing a sender's best response is NP-Hard. Given these intrinsic difficulties, we turn to finding local Nash equilibria. We propose a novel differentiable neural network to approximate this game's non-linear and discontinuous utilities. Complementing this with the extra-gradient algorithm, we discover local equilibria that Pareto dominates full-revelation equilibria and those found by existing neural networks. Broadly, our theoretical and empirical contributions are of interest to a large class of economic problems.

Xiaoyun Qiu, Yang Yu, Haifeng Xu

Benchmark hacking refers to tuning a machine learning model to score highly on certain evaluation criteria without improving true generalization or faithfully solving the intended problem. We study this phenomenon in a generic machine learning contest, where each contestant chooses two types of effort: creative effort that improves model capability as desired by the contest host, and mechanistic effort that only improves the model's fitness to the particular task in contest without contributing to true generalization. We establish the existence of a symmetric monotone pure strategy equilibrium in this competition game. It also provides a natural definition of benchmark hacking in this strategic context by comparing a player's equilibrium effort allocation to that of a single-agent baseline scenario. Under our definition, contestants with types below certain threshold (low types) always engage in benchmark hacking, whereas those above the threshold do not. Furthermore, we show that more skewed reward structures (favoring top-ranked contestants) can elicit more desirable contest outcomes. We also provide empirical evidence to support our theoretical predictions.

Minbiao Han, Michael Albert, Haifeng Xu

We study a ubiquitous learning challenge in online principal-agent problems during which the principal learns the agent's private information from the agent's revealed preferences in historical interactions. This paradigm includes important special cases such as pricing and contract design, which have been widely studied in recent literature. However, existing work considers the case where the principal can only choose a single strategy at every round to interact with the agent and then observe the agent's revealed preference through their actions. In this paper, we extend this line of study to allow the principal to offer a menu of strategies to the agent and learn additionally from observing the agent's selection from the menu. We provide a thorough investigation of several online principal-agent problem settings and characterize their sample complexities, accompanied by the corresponding algorithms we have developed. We instantiate this paradigm to several important design problems $-$ including Stackelberg (security) games, contract design, and information design. Finally, we also explore the connection between our findings and existing results about online learning in Stackelberg games, and we offer a solution that can overcome a key hard instance of Peng et al. (2019).

Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Šimon Schierreich, Nicholas Axel Tanujaya et al.

Coordinating agents through hazardous environments, such as aid-delivering drones navigating conflict zones or field robots traversing deployment areas filled with obstacles, poses fundamental planning challenges. We introduce and analyze the computational complexity of a new multi-agent path planning problem that captures this setting. A group of identical agents begins at a common start location and must navigate a graph-based environment to reach a common target. The graph contains hazards that eliminate agents upon contact but then enter a known cooldown period before reactivating. In this discrete-time, fully-observable, deterministic setting, the planning task is to compute a movement schedule that maximizes the number of agents reaching the target. We first prove that, despite the exponentially large space of feasible plans, optimal plans require only polynomially-many steps, establishing membership in NP. We then show that the problem is NP-hard even when the environment graph is a tree. On the positive side, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for graphs consisting of vertex-disjoint paths from start to target. Our results establish a rich computational landscape for this problem, identifying both intractable and tractable fragments.

Jibang Wu, Chenghao Yang, Yi Wu et al.

This paper develops an agentic framework that employs large language models (LLMs) for grounded persuasive language generation in automated copywriting, with real estate marketing as a focal application. Our method is designed to align the generated content with user preferences while highlighting useful factual attributes. This agent consists of three key modules: (1) Grounding Module, mimicking expert human behavior to predict marketable features; (2) Personalization Module, aligning content with user preferences; (3) Marketing Module, ensuring factual accuracy and the inclusion of localized features. We conduct systematic human-subject experiments in the domain of real estate marketing, with a focus group of potential house buyers. The results demonstrate that marketing descriptions generated by our approach are preferred over those written by human experts by a clear margin while maintaining the same level of factual accuracy. Our findings suggest a promising agentic approach to automate large-scale targeted copywriting while ensuring factuality of content generation.

Lingkai Kong, Haichuan Wang, Yuqi Pan et al.

In green security, defenders must forecast adversarial behavior, such as poaching, illegal logging, and illegal fishing, to plan effective patrols. These behavior are often highly uncertain and complex. Prior work has leveraged game theory to design robust patrol strategies to handle uncertainty, but existing adversarial behavior models primarily rely on Gaussian processes or linear models, which lack the expressiveness needed to capture intricate behavioral patterns. To address this limitation, we propose a conditional diffusion model for adversary behavior modeling, leveraging its strong distribution-fitting capabilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of diffusion models in the green security domain. Integrating diffusion models into game-theoretic optimization, however, presents new challenges, including a constrained mixed strategy space and the need to sample from an unnormalized distribution to estimate utilities. To tackle these challenges, we introduce a mixed strategy of mixed strategies and employ a twisted Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) sampler for accurate sampling. Theoretically, our algorithm is guaranteed to converge to an epsilon equilibrium with high probability using a finite number of iterations and samples. Empirically, we evaluate our approach on both synthetic and real-world poaching datasets, demonstrating its effectiveness.

Rui Ai, Boxiang Lyu, Zhaoran Wang et al.

How much value does a dataset or a data production process have to an agent who wishes to use the data to assist decision-making? This is a fundamental question towards understanding the value of data as well as further pricing of data. This paper develops an approach for capturing the instrumental value of data production processes, which takes two key factors into account: (a) the context of the agent's decision-making problem; (b) prior data or information the agent already possesses. We ''micro-found'' our valuation concepts by showing how they connect to classic notions of information design and signals in information economics. When instantiated in the domain of Bayesian linear regression, our value naturally corresponds to information gain. Based on our designed data value, we then study a basic monopoly pricing setting with a buyer looking to purchase from a seller some labeled data of a certain feature direction in order to improve a Bayesian regression model. We show that when the seller has the ability to fully customize any data request, she can extract the first-best revenue (i.e., full surplus) from any population of buyers, i.e., achieving first-degree price discrimination. If the seller can only sell data that are derived from an existing data pool, this limits her ability to customize, and achieving first-best revenue becomes generally impossible. However, we design a mechanism that achieves seller revenue at most $\log (κ)$ less than the first-best revenue, where $κ$ is the condition number associated with the data matrix. A corollary of this result is that the seller can extract the first-best revenue in the multi-armed bandits special case.

Yuwei Cheng, Fan Yao, Xuefeng Liu et al.

This paper studies Learning from Imperfect Human Feedback (LIHF), addressing the potential irrationality or imperfect perception when learning from comparative human feedback. Building on evidences that human's imperfection decays over time (i.e., humans learn to improve), we cast this problem as a concave-utility continuous-action dueling bandit but under a restricted form of corruption: i.e., the corruption scale is decaying over time as $t^{ρ-1}$ for some "imperfection rate" $ρ\in [0, 1]$. With $T$ as the total number of iterations, we establish a regret lower bound of $ Ω(\max\{\sqrt{T}, T^ρ\}) $ for LIHF, even when $ρ$ is known. For the same setting, we develop the Robustified Stochastic Mirror Descent for Imperfect Dueling (RoSMID) algorithm, which achieves nearly optimal regret $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\max\{\sqrt{T}, T^ρ\})$. Core to our analysis is a novel framework for analyzing gradient-based algorithms for dueling bandit under corruption, and we demonstrate its general applicability by showing how this framework can be easily applied to obtain corruption-robust guarantees for other popular gradient-based dueling bandit algorithms. Our theoretical results are validated by extensive experiments.

Zhepei Wei, Chuanhao Li, Tianze Ren et al.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Suho Shin, Chenghao Yang, Haifeng Xu et al.

We introduce the tokenized linear bandit (TLB) and multi-armed bandit (TMAB), variants of linear and stochastic multi-armed bandit problems inspired by LLM decoding and alignment. In these problems, at each round $t \in [T]$, a user submits a query (context), and the decision maker (DM) sequentially selects a token irrevocably from a token set. Once the sequence is complete, the DM observes a random utility from the user, whose expectation is presented by a sequence function mapping the chosen token sequence to a nonnegative real value that depends on the query. In both problems, we first show that learning is impossible without any structure on the sequence function. We introduce a natural assumption, diminishing distance with more commons (DDMC), and propose algorithms with regret $\tilde{O}(L\sqrt{T})$ and $\tilde{O}(L\sqrt{T^{2/3}})$ for TLB and TMAB, respectively. As a side product, we obtain an (almost) optimality of the greedy decoding for LLM decoding algorithm under DDMC, which justifies the unresaonable effectiveness of greedy decoding in several tasks. This also has an immediate application to decoding-time LLM alignment, when the misaligned utility can be represented as the frozen LLM's utility and a linearly realizable latent function. We finally validate our algorithm's performance empirically as well as verify our assumptions using synthetic and real-world datasets.

Ganghua Wang, Zhaorun Chen, Bo Li et al.

As foundation models continue to scale, the size of trained models grows exponentially, presenting significant challenges for their evaluation. Current evaluation practices involve curating increasingly large datasets to assess the performance of large language models (LLMs). However, there is a lack of systematic analysis and guidance on determining the sufficiency of test data or selecting informative samples for evaluation. This paper introduces a certifiable and cost-efficient evaluation framework for LLMs. Our framework adapts to different evaluation objectives and outputs confidence intervals that contain true values with high probability. We use ``test sample complexity'' to quantify the number of test points needed for a certifiable evaluation and derive tight bounds on test sample complexity. Based on the developed theory, we develop a partition-based algorithm, named Cer-Eval, that adaptively selects test points to minimize the cost of LLM evaluation. Real-world experiments demonstrate that Cer-Eval can save 20% to 40% test points across various benchmarks, while maintaining an estimation error level comparable to the current evaluation process and providing a 95% confidence guarantee.

Nir Rosenfeld, Haifeng Xu

Decades of research in machine learning have given us powerful tools for making accurate predictions. This has made such tools appealing for use in social settings and on human inputs. Yet despite a lack of justification for why the generic approach of accuracy maximization can or should improve our collective well-being -- and mounting evidence of likely adverse outcomes -- it remains the widespread default. This position paper asserts that for machine learning to become socially beneficial, it must be embedded within a broader economic framework that explicitly aims to maximize social welfare. The field of welfare economics asks: how should we allocate limited resources among self-interested agents to maximize overall benefits? We contend that this perspective applies to many contemporary applications of machine learning in social contexts, and advocate for its adoption. Rather than disposing of prediction, we propose to leverage this forte of machine learning towards welfare maximization. We demonstrate this idea by portraying a conceptual framework that gradually transitions from accuracy maximization (with awareness to welfare) to welfare maximization (via accurate prediction). We detail applications and use-cases for which this framework can be effective, identify technical challenges and practical opportunities, and highlight future avenues worth pursuing.

Yuwei Cheng, Zifeng Zhao, Haifeng Xu

Online advertising platforms use automated auctions to connect advertisers with potential customers, requiring effective bidding strategies to maximize profits. Accurate ad impact estimation requires considering three key factors: delayed and long-term effects, cumulative ad impacts such as reinforcement or fatigue, and customer heterogeneity. However, these effects are often not jointly addressed in previous studies. To capture these factors, we model ad bidding as a Contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP) with delayed Poisson rewards. For efficient estimation, we propose a two-stage maximum likelihood estimator combined with data-splitting strategies, ensuring controlled estimation error based on the first-stage estimator's (in)accuracy. Building on this, we design a reinforcement learning algorithm to derive efficient personalized bidding strategies. This approach achieves a near-optimal regret bound of $\tilde{O}{(dH^2\sqrt{T})}$, where $d$ is the contextual dimension, $H$ is the number of rounds, and $T$ is the number of customers. Our theoretical findings are validated by simulation experiments.

Qingchuan Yang, Simon Mahns, Sida Li et al.

Forecasting is not only a fundamental intellectual pursuit but also is of significant importance to societal systems such as finance and economics. With the rapid advances of large language models (LLMs) trained on Internet-scale data, it raises the promise of employing LLMs to forecast real-world future events, an emerging paradigm we call "LLM-as-a-Prophet". This paper systematically investigates such predictive intelligence of LLMs. To this end, we build Prophet Arena, a general evaluation benchmark that continuously collects live forecasting tasks and decomposes each task into distinct pipeline stages, in order to support our controlled and large-scale experimentation. Our comprehensive evaluation reveals that many LLMs already exhibit impressive forecasting capabilities, reflected in, e.g., their small calibration errors, consistent prediction confidence and promising market returns. However, we also uncover key bottlenecks towards achieving superior predictive intelligence via LLM-as-a-Prophet, such as LLMs' inaccurate event recalls, misunderstanding of data sources and slower information aggregation compared to markets when resolution nears.

Bingji Yi, Qiyuan Liu, Yuwei Cheng et al.

Synthetic data has been increasingly used to train frontier generative models. However, recent study raises key concerns that iteratively retraining a generative model on its self-generated synthetic data may keep deteriorating model performance, a phenomenon often coined model collapse. In this paper, we investigate ways to modify this synthetic retraining process to avoid model collapse, and even possibly help reverse the trend from collapse to improvement. Our key finding is that by injecting information through an external synthetic data verifier, whether a human or a better model, synthetic retraining will not cause model collapse. To develop principled understandings of the above insight, we situate our analysis in the foundational linear regression setting, showing that iterative retraining with verified synthetic data can yield near-term improvements but ultimately drives the parameter estimate to the verifier's "knowledge center" in the long run. Our theory hence predicts that, unless the verifier is perfectly reliable, the early gains will plateau and may even reverse. Indeed, these theoretical insights are further confirmed by our experiments on both linear regression as well as Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) trained on MNIST data.

Rui Ai, Yuqi Pan, David Simchi-Levi et al.

With the rapid progress of multi-agent large language model (LLM) reasoning, how to effectively aggregate answers from multiple LLMs has emerged as a fundamental challenge. Standard majority voting treats all answers equally, failing to consider latent heterogeneity and correlation across models. In this work, we design two new aggregation algorithms called Optimal Weight (OW) and Inverse Surprising Popularity (ISP), leveraging both first-order and second-order information. Our theoretical analysis shows these methods provably mitigate inherent limitations of majority voting under mild assumptions, leading to more reliable collective decisions. We empirically validate our algorithms on synthetic datasets, popular LLM fine-tuning benchmarks such as UltraFeedback and MMLU, and a real-world healthcare setting ARMMAN. Across all cases, our methods consistently outperform majority voting, offering both practical performance gains and conceptual insights for the design of robust multi-agent LLM pipelines.

Yuanyuan Yang, Ruimin Zhang, Jamie Morgenstern et al.

As machine learning models continue to grow in size and complexity, efficient serving faces increasingly broad trade-offs spanning accuracy, latency, resource usage, and other objectives. Multi-model serving further complicates these trade-offs; for example, in cascaded models, each early-exit decision balances latency reduction against potential accuracy loss. Despite the pervasiveness and importance of such trade-offs, current strategies remain largely heuristic and case-specific, limiting both their theoretical guarantees and general applicability. We present a general framework, T-Tamer, which formalizes this setting as a multi-stage decision process, where the objective is to determine both when to exit and which model to consult. Our main result shows that recall (i.e., the ability to revisit earlier models) is both necessary and sufficient for achieving provable performance guarantees. In particular, we prove that strategies without recall cannot obtain any constant-factor approximation to the optimal trade-off, whereas recall-based strategies provably attain the optimal trade-off in polynomial time. We validate our analysis through experiments on synthetic datasets and early-exit workloads for vision and NLP benchmarks. The results show that recall-based strategies consistently yield efficient accuracy-latency trade-offs. We hope this work provides a principled foundation for bridging heuristic practice with theoretical guarantees in the design of early-exit and cascaded models.

Saba Ahmadi, Avrim Blum, Haifeng Xu et al.

User-generated content (UGC) on social media platforms is vulnerable to incitements and manipulations, necessitating effective regulations. To address these challenges, those platforms often deploy automated content moderators tasked with evaluating the harmfulness of UGC and filtering out content that violates established guidelines. However, such moderation inevitably gives rise to strategic responses from users, who strive to express themselves within the confines of guidelines. Such phenomena call for a careful balance between: 1. ensuring freedom of speech -- by minimizing the restriction of expression; and 2. reducing social distortion -- measured by the total amount of content manipulation. We tackle the problem of optimizing this balance through the lens of mechanism design, aiming at optimizing the trade-off between minimizing social distortion and maximizing free speech. Although determining the optimal trade-off is NP-hard, we propose practical methods to approximate the optimal solution. Additionally, we provide generalization guarantees determining the amount of finite offline data required to approximate the optimal moderator effectively.

Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Davin Choo, Niclas Boehmer et al.

We propose and study a planning problem we call Sequential Fault-Intolerant Process Planning (SFIPP). SFIPP captures a reward structure common in many sequential multi-stage decision problems where the planning is deemed successful only if all stages succeed. Such reward structures are different from classic additive reward structures and arise in important applications such as drug/material discovery, security, and quality-critical product design. We design provably tight online algorithms for settings in which we need to pick between different actions with unknown success chances at each stage. We do so both for the foundational case in which the behavior of actions is deterministic, and the case of probabilistic action outcomes, where we effectively balance exploration for learning and exploitation for planning through the usage of multi-armed bandit algorithms. In our empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that the specialized algorithms we develop, which leverage additional information about the structure of the SFIPP instance, outperform our more general algorithm.

Seyed A. Esmaeili, Kevin Lim, Kshipra Bhawalkar et al.

Generative AI (GenAI) will have significant impact on content creation platforms. In this paper, we study the dynamic competition between a GenAI and a human contributor. Unlike the human, the GenAI's content only improves when more contents are created by the human over time; however, GenAI has the advantage of generating content at a lower cost. We study the algorithmic problem in this dynamic competition model about how the human contributor can maximize her utility when competing against the GenAI for content generation over a set of topics. In time-sensitive content domains (e.g., news or pop music creation) where contents' value diminishes over time, we show that there is no polynomial time algorithm for finding the human's optimal (dynamic) strategy, unless the randomized exponential time hypothesis is false. Fortunately, we are able to design a polynomial time algorithm that naturally cycles between myopically optimizing over a short time window and pausing and provably guarantees an approximation ratio of $\frac{1}{2}$. We then turn to time-insensitive content domains where contents do not lose their value (e.g., contents on history facts). Interestingly, we show that this setting permits a polynomial time algorithm that maximizes the human's utility in the long run. Finally, we conduct simulations that demonstrate the advantage of our algorithms in comparison to a collection of baselines.

Thomas Kleine Buening, Aadirupa Saha, Christos Dimitrakakis et al.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Jibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng et al.

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of sequential information design, namely the Markov persuasion processes (MPPs), where a sender, with informational advantage, seeks to persuade a stream of myopic receivers to take actions that maximizes the sender's cumulative utilities in a finite horizon Markovian environment with varying prior and utility functions. Planning in MPPs thus faces the unique challenge in finding a signaling policy that is simultaneously persuasive to the myopic receivers and inducing the optimal long-term cumulative utilities of the sender. Nevertheless, in the population level where the model is known, it turns out that we can efficiently determine the optimal (resp. $ε$-optimal) policy with finite (resp. infinite) states and outcomes, through a modified formulation of the Bellman equation. Our main technical contribution is to study the MPP under the online reinforcement learning (RL) setting, where the goal is to learn the optimal signaling policy by interacting with with the underlying MPP, without the knowledge of the sender's utility functions, prior distributions, and the Markov transition kernels. We design a provably efficient no-regret learning algorithm, the Optimism-Pessimism Principle for Persuasion Process (OP4), which features a novel combination of both optimism and pessimism principles. Our algorithm enjoys sample efficiency by achieving a sublinear $\sqrt{T}$-regret upper bound. Furthermore, both our algorithm and theory can be applied to MPPs with large space of outcomes and states via function approximation, and we showcase such a success under the linear setting.

Yiding Feng, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu

We introduce and study the online Bayesian recommendation problem for a platform, who can observe a utility-relevant state of a product, repeatedly interacting with a population of myopic users through an online recommendation mechanism. This paradigm is common in a wide range of scenarios in the current Internet economy. For each user with her own private preference and belief, the platform commits to a recommendation strategy to utilize his information advantage on the product state to persuade the self-interested user to follow the recommendation. The platform does not know user's preferences and beliefs, and has to use an adaptive recommendation strategy to persuade with gradually learning user's preferences and beliefs in the process. We aim to design online learning policies with no Stackelberg regret for the platform, i.e., against the optimum policy in hindsight under the assumption that users will correspondingly adapt their behaviors to the benchmark policy. Our first result is an online policy that achieves double logarithm regret dependence on the number of rounds. We then present a hardness result showing that no adaptive online policy can achieve regret with better dependency on the number of rounds. Finally, by formulating the platform's problem as optimizing a linear program with membership oracle access, we present our second online policy that achieves regret with polynomial dependence on the number of states but logarithm dependence on the number of rounds.

Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov et al.

In real-world recommendation problems, especially those with a formidably large item space, users have to gradually learn to estimate the utility of any fresh recommendations from their experience about previously consumed items. This in turn affects their interaction dynamics with the system and can invalidate previous algorithms built on the omniscient user assumption. In this paper, we formalize a model to capture such "learning users" and design an efficient system-side learning solution, coined Noise-Robust Active Ellipsoid Search (RAES), to confront the challenges brought by the non-stationary feedback from such a learning user. Interestingly, we prove that the regret of RAES deteriorates gracefully as the convergence rate of user learning becomes worse, until reaching linear regret when the user's learning fails to converge. Experiments on synthetic datasets demonstrate the strength of RAES for such a contemporaneous system-user learning problem. Our study provides a novel perspective on modeling the feedback loop in recommendation problems.

Jibang Wu, Haifeng Xu, Fan Yao

Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability, a key solution concept in epistemic game theory that relaxes the stringent belief assumptions in both Nash and correlated equilibrium. This learning task naturally generalizes best arm identification problems, due to the intrinsic connections between rationalizable action profiles and the elimination of iteratively dominated actions. Despite a seemingly simple task, our first main result is a surprisingly negative one; that is, a large and natural class of no regret algorithms, including the entire family of Dual Averaging algorithms, provably take exponentially many rounds to reach rationalizability. Moreover, algorithms with the stronger no swap regret also suffer similar exponential inefficiency. To overcome these barriers, we develop a new algorithm that adjusts Exp3 with Diminishing Historical rewards (termed Exp3-DH); Exp3-DH gradually forgets history at carefully tailored rates. We prove that when all agents run Exp3-DH (a.k.a., self-play in multi-agent learning), all iteratively dominated actions can be eliminated within polynomially many rounds. Our experimental results further demonstrate the efficiency of Exp3-DH, and that state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, even those developed specifically for learning in games, fail to reach rationalizability efficiently.

Chengshuai Shi, Haifeng Xu, Wei Xiong et al.

Incentivized exploration in multi-armed bandits (MAB) has witnessed increasing interests and many progresses in recent years, where a principal offers bonuses to agents to do explorations on her behalf. However, almost all existing studies are confined to temporary myopic agents. In this work, we break this barrier and study incentivized exploration with multiple and long-term strategic agents, who have more complicated behaviors that often appear in real-world applications. An important observation of this work is that strategic agents' intrinsic needs of learning benefit (instead of harming) the principal's explorations by providing "free pulls". Moreover, it turns out that increasing the population of agents significantly lowers the principal's burden of incentivizing. The key and somewhat surprising insight revealed from our results is that when there are sufficiently many learning agents involved, the exploration process of the principal can be (almost) free. Our main results are built upon three novel components which may be of independent interest: (1) a simple yet provably effective incentive-provision strategy; (2) a carefully crafted best arm identification algorithm for rewards aggregated under unequal confidences; (3) a high-probability finite-time lower bound of UCB algorithms. Experimental results are provided to complement the theoretical analysis.

Sijun Tan, Jibang Wu, Xiaohui Bei et al.

Peer review systems such as conference paper review often suffer from the issue of miscalibration. Previous works on peer review calibration usually only use the ordinal information or assume simplistic reviewer scoring functions such as linear functions. In practice, applications like academic conferences often rely on manual methods, such as open discussions, to mitigate miscalibration. It remains an important question to develop algorithms that can handle different types of miscalibrations based on available prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose a flexible framework, namely least square calibration (LSC), for selecting top candidates from peer ratings. Our framework provably performs perfect calibration from noiseless linear scoring functions under mild assumptions, yet also provides competitive calibration results when the scoring function is from broader classes beyond linear functions and with arbitrary noise. On our synthetic dataset, we empirically demonstrate that our algorithm consistently outperforms the baseline which select top papers based on the highest average ratings.

Huazheng Wang, Haifeng Xu, Hongning Wang

We study adversarial attacks on linear stochastic bandits: by manipulating the rewards, an adversary aims to control the behaviour of the bandit algorithm. Perhaps surprisingly, we first show that some attack goals can never be achieved. This is in sharp contrast to context-free stochastic bandits, and is intrinsically due to the correlation among arms in linear stochastic bandits. Motivated by this finding, this paper studies the attackability of a $k$-armed linear bandit environment. We first provide a complete necessity and sufficiency characterization of attackability based on the geometry of the arms' context vectors. We then propose a two-stage attack method against LinUCB and Robust Phase Elimination. The method first asserts whether the given environment is attackable; and if yes, it poisons the rewards to force the algorithm to pull a target arm linear times using only a sublinear cost. Numerical experiments further validate the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the proposed attack method.

Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov et al.

We propose a new problem setting to study the sequential interactions between a recommender system and a user. Instead of assuming the user is omniscient, static, and explicit, as the classical practice does, we sketch a more realistic user behavior model, under which the user: 1) rejects recommendations if they are clearly worse than others; 2) updates her utility estimation based on rewards from her accepted recommendations; 3) withholds realized rewards from the system. We formulate the interactions between the system and such an explorative user in a $K$-armed bandit framework and study the problem of learning the optimal recommendation on the system side. We show that efficient system learning is still possible but is more difficult. In particular, the system can identify the best arm with probability at least $1-δ$ within $O(1/δ)$ interactions, and we prove this is tight. Our finding contrasts the result for the problem of best arm identification with fixed confidence, in which the best arm can be identified with probability $1-δ$ within $O(\log(1/δ))$ interactions. This gap illustrates the inevitable cost the system has to pay when it learns from an explorative user's revealed preferences on its recommendations rather than from the realized rewards.

Chenghan Zhou, Thanh H. Nguyen, Haifeng Xu

Most algorithmic studies on multi-agent information design so far have focused on the restricted situation with no inter-agent externalities; a few exceptions investigated truly strategic games such as zero-sum games and second-price auctions but have all focused only on optimal public signaling. This paper initiates the algorithmic information design of both \emph{public} and \emph{private} signaling in a fundamental class of games with negative externalities, i.e., singleton congestion games, with wide application in today's digital economy, machine scheduling, routing, etc. For both public and private signaling, we show that the optimal information design can be efficiently computed when the number of resources is a constant. To our knowledge, this is the first set of efficient \emph{exact} algorithms for information design in succinctly representable many-player games. Our results hinge on novel techniques such as developing certain "reduced forms" to compactly characterize equilibria in public signaling or to represent players' marginal beliefs in private signaling. When there are many resources, we show computational intractability results. To overcome the issue of multiple equilibria, here we introduce a new notion of equilibrium-\emph{oblivious} hardness, which rules out any possibility of computing a good signaling scheme, irrespective of the equilibrium selection rule.

Quinlan Dawkins, Tianxi Li, Haifeng Xu

Diffusion source identification on networks is a problem of fundamental importance in a broad class of applications, including rumor controlling and virus identification. Though this problem has received significant recent attention, most studies have focused only on very restrictive settings and lack theoretical guarantees for more realistic networks. We introduce a statistical framework for the study of diffusion source identification and develop a confidence set inference approach inspired by hypothesis testing. Our method efficiently produces a small subset of nodes, which provably covers the source node with any pre-specified confidence level without restrictive assumptions on network structures. Moreover, we propose multiple Monte Carlo strategies for the inference procedure based on network topology and the probabilistic properties that significantly improve the scalability. To our knowledge, this is the first diffusion source identification method with a practically useful theoretical guarantee on general networks. We demonstrate our approach via extensive synthetic experiments on well-known random network models and a mobility network between cities concerning the COVID-19 spreading.

Huazheng Wang, Haifeng Xu, Chuanhao Li et al.

We study the problem of incentivizing exploration for myopic users in linear bandits, where the users tend to exploit arm with the highest predicted reward instead of exploring. In order to maximize the long-term reward, the system offers compensation to incentivize the users to pull the exploratory arms, with the goal of balancing the trade-off among exploitation, exploration and compensation. We consider a new and practically motivated setting where the context features observed by the user are more informative than those used by the system, e.g., features based on users' private information are not accessible by the system. We propose a new method to incentivize exploration under such information gap, and prove that the method achieves both sublinear regret and sublinear compensation. We theoretical and empirically analyze the added compensation due to the information gap, compared with the case that the system has access to the same context features as the user, i.e., without information gap. We also provide a compensation lower bound of our problem.

You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu

Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relevant state drawn independently and identically from an unknown distribution, and shares state information with the receivers who each choose an action. The sender seeks to persuade the receivers into taking actions aligned with the sender's preference by selectively sharing state information. However, in contrast to the standard models, neither the sender nor the receivers know the distribution, and the sender has to persuade while learning the distribution on the fly. We study the sender's learning problem of making persuasive action recommendations to achieve low regret against the optimal persuasion mechanism with the knowledge of the distribution. To do this, we first propose and motivate a persuasiveness criterion for the unknown distribution setting that centers robustness as a requirement in the face of uncertainty. Our main result is an algorithm that, with high probability, is robustly-persuasive and achieves $O(\sqrt{T\log T})$ regret, where $T$ is the horizon length. Intuitively, at each time our algorithm maintains a set of candidate distributions, and chooses a signaling mechanism that is simultaneously persuasive for all of them. Core to our proof is a tight analysis about the cost of robust persuasion, which may be of independent interest. We further prove that this regret order is optimal (up to logarithmic terms) by showing that no algorithm can achieve regret better than $Ω(\sqrt{T})$.

Anshuka Rangi, Long Tran-Thanh, Haifeng Xu et al.

We study bandit algorithms under data poisoning attacks in a bounded reward setting. We consider a strong attacker model in which the attacker can observe both the selected actions and their corresponding rewards and can contaminate the rewards with additive noise. We show that any bandit algorithm with regret $O(\log T)$ can be forced to suffer a regret $Ω(T)$ with an expected amount of contamination $O(\log T)$. This amount of contamination is also necessary, as we prove that there exists an $O(\log T)$ regret bandit algorithm, specifically the classical UCB, that requires $Ω(\log T)$ amount of contamination to suffer regret $Ω(T)$. To combat such attacks, our second main contribution is to propose verification based mechanisms, which use limited verification to access a limited number of uncontaminated rewards. In particular, for the case of unlimited verifications, we show that with $O(\log T)$ expected number of verifications, a simple modified version of the ETC type bandit algorithm can restore the order optimal $O(\log T)$ regret irrespective of the amount of contamination used by the attacker. We also provide a UCB-like verification scheme, called Secure-UCB, that also enjoys full recovery from any attacks, also with $O(\log T)$ expected number of verifications. To derive a matching lower bound on the number of verifications, we prove that for any order-optimal bandit algorithm, this number of verifications $Ω(\log T)$ is necessary to recover the order-optimal regret. On the other hand, when the number of verifications is bounded above by a budget $B$, we propose a novel algorithm, Secure-BARBAR, which provably achieves $O(\min\{C,T/\sqrt{B} \})$ regret with high probability against weak attackers where $C$ is the total amount of contamination by the attacker, which breaks the known $Ω(C)$ lower bound of the non-verified setting if $C$ is large.