Lode Lauwaert

Edward Roussel, Lode Lauwaert, Torben Swoboda et al.

This paper uses game theory to argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, a moratorium on Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) can be in a state's self-interest. By formalizing trategic interactions between geopolitical superpowers, we model the trade-off between the benefits of technological supremacy and the catastrophic risks of uncontrolled ASI. The analysis reveals that as the perceived cost of loss of control increases sufficiently relative to other parameters, it becomes in each state's self-interest to impose a moratorium. We further provide empirical evidence suggesting that the global perception of ASI risk is rising, making a stable, rational moratorium increasingly plausible in the current geopolitical landscape.

Torben Swoboda, Lode Lauwaert

The neutrality thesis holds that technology cannot be laden with values. This long-standing view has faced critiques, but much of the argumentation against neutrality has focused on traditional, non-smart technologies like bridges and razors. In contrast, AI is a smart technology increasingly used in high-stakes domains like healthcare, finance, and policing, where its decisions can cause moral harm. In this paper, we argue that artificial intelligence, particularly artificial agents that autonomously make decisions to pursue their goals, challenge the neutrality thesis. Our central claim is that the computational models underlying artificial agents can integrate representations of moral values such as fairness, honesty and avoiding harm. We provide a conceptual framework discussing the neutrality thesis, values, and AI. Moreover, we examine two approaches to designing computational models of morality, artificial conscience and ethical prompting, and present empirical evidence from text-based game environments that artificial agents with such models exhibit more ethical behavior compared to agents without these models. The findings support that AI can embody moral values, which contradicts the claim that all technologies are necessarily value-neutral.

Nynke van Uffelen, Lode Lauwaert, Mark Coeckelbergh et al.

In recent years, much research has been dedicated to uncovering the environmental impact of Artificial Intelligence (AI), showing that training and deploying AI systems require large amounts of energy and resources, and the outcomes of AI may lead to decisions and actions that may negatively impact the environment. This new knowledge raises new ethical questions, such as: When is it (un)justifiable to develop an AI system, and how to make design choices, considering its environmental impact? However, so far, the environmental impact of AI has largely escaped ethical scrutiny, as AI ethics tends to focus strongly on themes such as transparency, privacy, safety, responsibility, and bias. Considering the environmental impact of AI from an ethical perspective expands the scope of AI ethics beyond an anthropocentric focus towards including more-than-human actors such as animals and ecosystems. This paper explores the ethical implications of the environmental impact of AI for designing AI systems by drawing on environmental justice literature, in which three categories of justice are distinguished, referring to three elements that can be unjust: the distribution of benefits and burdens (distributive justice), decision-making procedures (procedural justice), and institutionalized social norms (justice as recognition). Based on these tenets of justice, we outline criteria for developing environmentally just AI systems, given their ecological impact.