Are we Doomed to an AI Race? Why Self-Interest Could Drive Countries Towards a Moratorium on Superintelligence
For policymakers and international relations scholars, it challenges the assumption that AI development inevitably leads to a race, suggesting a cooperative moratorium may be rational.
This paper uses game theory to show that a moratorium on superintelligent AI can be in a state's self-interest when the perceived risk of loss of control is high, and provides empirical evidence that such risk perception is rising.
This paper uses game theory to argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, a moratorium on Artificial Superintelligence (ASI) can be in a state's self-interest. By formalizing trategic interactions between geopolitical superpowers, we model the trade-off between the benefits of technological supremacy and the catastrophic risks of uncontrolled ASI. The analysis reveals that as the perceived cost of loss of control increases sufficiently relative to other parameters, it becomes in each state's self-interest to impose a moratorium. We further provide empirical evidence suggesting that the global perception of ASI risk is rising, making a stable, rational moratorium increasingly plausible in the current geopolitical landscape.