Two-sided Competing Matching Recommendation Markets With Quota and Complementary Preferences ConstraintsYuantong Li, Guang Cheng, Xiaowu Dai
In this paper, we propose a new recommendation algorithm for addressing the problem of two-sided online matching markets with complementary preferences and quota constraints, where agents' preferences are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. The presence of mixed quota and complementary preferences constraints can lead to instability in the matching process, making this problem challenging to solve. To overcome this challenge, we formulate the problem as a bandit learning framework and propose the Multi-agent Multi-type Thompson Sampling (MMTS) algorithm. The algorithm combines the strengths of Thompson Sampling for exploration with a new double matching technique to provide a stable matching outcome. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of MMTS as it can achieve stability and has a total $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(Q{\sqrt{K_{\max}T}})$-Bayesian regret with high probability, which exhibits linearity with respect to the total firm's quota $Q$, the square root of the maximum size of available type workers $\sqrt{K_{\max}}$ and time horizon $T$. In addition, simulation studies also demonstrate MMTS's effectiveness in various settings. We provide code used in our experiments \url{https://github.com/Likelyt/Double-Matching}.
Incentive-Aware Recommender Systems in Two-Sided MarketsXiaowu Dai, Wenlu Xu, Yuan Qi et al.
Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit by choosing the optimal arm based on current information, rather than exploring various alternatives to gather information that benefits the collective. We propose a novel recommender system that aligns with agents' incentives while achieving asymptotically optimal performance, as measured by regret in repeated interactions. Our framework models this incentive-aware system as a multi-agent bandit problem in two-sided markets, where the interactions of agents and arms are facilitated by recommender systems on online platforms. This model incorporates incentive constraints induced by agents' opportunity costs. In scenarios where opportunity costs are known to the platform, we show the existence of an incentive-compatible recommendation algorithm. This algorithm pools recommendations between a genuinely good arm and an unknown arm using a randomized and adaptive strategy. Moreover, when these opportunity costs are unknown, we introduce an algorithm that randomly pools recommendations across all arms, utilizing the cumulative loss from each arm as feedback for strategic exploration. We demonstrate that both algorithms satisfy an ex-post fairness criterion, which protects agents from over-exploitation. All code for using the proposed algorithms and reproducing results is made available on GitHub.
3.8LGFeb 20, 2023
An ODE Model for Dynamic Matching in Heterogeneous NetworksXiaowu Dai, Hengzhi He
We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents and multiple types of hard-to-match agents, each subject to its own compatibility constraints. Such a setting arises in many real-world applications, including kidney exchange programs and carpooling platforms. We introduce a novel approach to modeling dynamic matching by establishing the ordinary differential equation (ODE) model, which offers a new perspective for evaluating various matching algorithms. We study two algorithms, namely the Greedy and Patient Algorithms, where both algorithms prioritize matching compatible hard-to-match agents over easy-to-match agents in heterogeneous networks. Our results demonstrate the trade-off between the conflicting goals of matching agents quickly and optimally, offering insights into the design of real-world dynamic matching systems. We provide simulations and a real-world case study using data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network to validate theoretical predictions.
Incentivizing Truthful Language Models via Peer Elicitation GamesBaiting Chen, Tong Zhu, Jiale Han et al.
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong generative capabilities but remain prone to inconsistencies and hallucinations. We introduce Peer Elicitation Games (PEG), a training-free, game-theoretic framework for aligning LLMs through a peer elicitation mechanism involving a generator and multiple discriminators instantiated from distinct base models. Discriminators interact in a peer evaluation setting, where utilities are computed using a determinant-based mutual information score that provably incentivizes truthful reporting without requiring ground-truth labels. We establish theoretical guarantees showing that each agent, via online learning, achieves sublinear regret in the sense their cumulative performance approaches that of the best fixed truthful strategy in hindsight. Moreover, we prove last-iterate convergence to a truthful Nash equilibrium, ensuring that the actual policies used by agents converge to stable and truthful behavior over time. Empirical evaluations across multiple benchmarks demonstrate significant improvements in factual accuracy. These results position PEG as a practical approach for eliciting truthful behavior from LLMs without supervision or fine-tuning.
4.1LGSep 19, 2025
Auto-bidding under Return-on-Spend Constraints with Uncertainty QuantificationJiale Han, Chun Gan, Chengcheng Zhang et al.
Auto-bidding systems are widely used in advertising to automatically determine bid values under constraints such as total budget and Return-on-Spend (RoS) targets. Existing works often assume that the value of an ad impression, such as the conversion rate, is known. This paper considers the more realistic scenario where the true value is unknown. We propose a novel method that uses conformal prediction to quantify the uncertainty of these values based on machine learning methods trained on historical bidding data with contextual features, without assuming the data are i.i.d. This approach is compatible with current industry systems that use machine learning to predict values. Building on prediction intervals, we introduce an adjusted value estimator derived from machine learning predictions, and show that it provides performance guarantees without requiring knowledge of the true value. We apply this method to enhance existing auto-bidding algorithms with budget and RoS constraints, and establish theoretical guarantees for achieving high reward while keeping RoS violations low. Empirical results on both simulated and real-world industrial datasets demonstrate that our approach improves performance while maintaining computational efficiency.
4.0IRJun 4, 2024
Dynamic Online Recommendation for Two-Sided Market with Bayesian Incentive CompatibilityYuantong Li, Guang Cheng, Xiaowu Dai
Recommender systems play a crucial role in internet economies by connecting users with relevant products or services. However, designing effective recommender systems faces two key challenges: (1) the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in balancing new product exploration against exploiting known preferences, and (2) dynamic incentive compatibility in accounting for users' self-interested behaviors and heterogeneous preferences. This paper formalizes these challenges into a Dynamic Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Recommendation Protocol (DBICRP). To address the DBICRP, we propose a two-stage algorithm (RCB) that integrates incentivized exploration with an efficient offline learning component for exploitation. In the first stage, our algorithm explores available products while maintaining dynamic incentive compatibility to determine sufficient sample sizes. The second stage employs inverse proportional gap sampling integrated with an arbitrary machine learning method to ensure sublinear regret. Theoretically, we prove that RCB achieves $O(\sqrt{KdT})$ regret and satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) under a Gaussian prior assumption. Empirically, we validate RCB's strong incentive gain, sublinear regret, and robustness through simulations and a real-world application on personalized warfarin dosing. Our work provides a principled approach for incentive-aware recommendation in online preference learning settings.
3.3MEMar 12, 2021
Orthogonalized Kernel Debiased Machine Learning for Multimodal Data AnalysisXiaowu Dai, Lexin Li
Multimodal imaging has transformed neuroscience research. While it presents unprecedented opportunities, it also imposes serious challenges. Particularly, it is difficult to combine the merits of the interpretability attributed to a simple association model with the flexibility achieved by a highly adaptive nonlinear model. In this article, we propose an orthogonalized kernel debiased machine learning approach, which is built upon the Neyman orthogonality and a form of decomposition orthogonality, for multimodal data analysis. We target the setting that naturally arises in almost all multimodal studies, where there is a primary modality of interest, plus additional auxiliary modalities. We establish the root-$N$-consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimated primary parameter, the semi-parametric estimation efficiency, and the asymptotic validity of the confidence band of the predicted primary modality effect. Our proposal enjoys, to a good extent, both model interpretability and model flexibility. It is also considerably different from the existing statistical methods for multimodal data integration, as well as the orthogonality-based methods for high-dimensional inferences. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method through both simulations and an application to a multimodal neuroimaging study of Alzheimer's disease.