Two-sided Competing Matching Recommendation Markets With Quota and Complementary Preferences Constraints
This addresses instability in matching markets like job platforms, offering a novel algorithmic solution with theoretical guarantees, though it is incremental in combining existing techniques.
The paper tackles the problem of two-sided online matching markets with unknown complementary preferences and quota constraints, proposing the MMTS algorithm that achieves stable matching with a Bayesian regret bound of ̃O(Q√K_max T).
In this paper, we propose a new recommendation algorithm for addressing the problem of two-sided online matching markets with complementary preferences and quota constraints, where agents' preferences are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. The presence of mixed quota and complementary preferences constraints can lead to instability in the matching process, making this problem challenging to solve. To overcome this challenge, we formulate the problem as a bandit learning framework and propose the Multi-agent Multi-type Thompson Sampling (MMTS) algorithm. The algorithm combines the strengths of Thompson Sampling for exploration with a new double matching technique to provide a stable matching outcome. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of MMTS as it can achieve stability and has a total $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(Q{\sqrt{K_{\max}T}})$-Bayesian regret with high probability, which exhibits linearity with respect to the total firm's quota $Q$, the square root of the maximum size of available type workers $\sqrt{K_{\max}}$ and time horizon $T$. In addition, simulation studies also demonstrate MMTS's effectiveness in various settings. We provide code used in our experiments \url{https://github.com/Likelyt/Double-Matching}.