Kun Shao

Xidong Feng, Yicheng Luo, Ziyan Wang et al. · cmu

When solving decision-making tasks, humans typically depend on information from two key sources: (1) Historical policy data, which provides interaction replay from the environment, and (2) Analytical insights in natural language form, exposing the invaluable thought process or strategic considerations. Despite this, the majority of preceding research focuses on only one source: they either use historical replay exclusively to directly learn policy or value functions, or engaged in language model training utilizing mere language corpus. In this paper, we argue that a powerful autonomous agent should cover both sources. Thus, we propose ChessGPT, a GPT model bridging policy learning and language modeling by integrating data from these two sources in Chess games. Specifically, we build a large-scale game and language dataset related to chess. Leveraging the dataset, we showcase two model examples ChessCLIP and ChessGPT, integrating policy learning and language modeling. Finally, we propose a full evaluation framework for evaluating language model's chess ability. Experimental results validate our model and dataset's effectiveness. We open source our code, model, and dataset at https://github.com/waterhorse1/ChessGPT.

Hao Chen, Jiaze Wang, Kun Shao et al.

Trajectory prediction has been a crucial task in building a reliable autonomous driving system by anticipating possible dangers. One key issue is to generate consistent trajectory predictions without colliding. To overcome the challenge, we propose an efficient masked autoencoder for trajectory prediction (Traj-MAE) that better represents the complicated behaviors of agents in the driving environment. Specifically, our Traj-MAE employs diverse masking strategies to pre-train the trajectory encoder and map encoder, allowing for the capture of social and temporal information among agents while leveraging the effect of environment from multiple granularities. To address the catastrophic forgetting problem that arises when pre-training the network with multiple masking strategies, we introduce a continual pre-training framework, which can help Traj-MAE learn valuable and diverse information from various strategies efficiently. Our experimental results in both multi-agent and single-agent settings demonstrate that Traj-MAE achieves competitive results with state-of-the-art methods and significantly outperforms our baseline model.

David Mguni, Aivar Sootla, Juliusz Ziomek et al. · oxford

Many real-world settings involve costs for performing actions; transaction costs in financial systems and fuel costs being common examples. In these settings, performing actions at each time step quickly accumulates costs leading to vastly suboptimal outcomes. Additionally, repeatedly acting produces wear and tear and ultimately, damage. Determining \textit{when to act} is crucial for achieving successful outcomes and yet, the challenge of efficiently \textit{learning} to behave optimally when actions incur minimally bounded costs remains unresolved. In this paper, we introduce a reinforcement learning (RL) framework named \textbf{L}earnable \textbf{I}mpulse \textbf{C}ontrol \textbf{R}einforcement \textbf{A}lgorithm (LICRA), for learning to optimally select both when to act and which actions to take when actions incur costs. At the core of LICRA is a nested structure that combines RL and a form of policy known as \textit{impulse control} which learns to maximise objectives when actions incur costs. We prove that LICRA, which seamlessly adopts any RL method, converges to policies that optimally select when to perform actions and their optimal magnitudes. We then augment LICRA to handle problems in which the agent can perform at most $k<\infty$ actions and more generally, faces a budget constraint. We show LICRA learns the optimal value function and ensures budget constraints are satisfied almost surely. We demonstrate empirically LICRA's superior performance against benchmark RL methods in OpenAI gym's \textit{Lunar Lander} and in \textit{Highway} environments and a variant of the Merton portfolio problem within finance.

Taher Jafferjee, Juliusz Ziomek, Tianpei Yang et al. · oxford

Centralised training with decentralised execution (CT-DE) serves as the foundation of many leading multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms. Despite its popularity, it suffers from a critical drawback due to its reliance on learning from a single sample of the joint-action at a given state. As agents explore and update their policies during training, these single samples may poorly represent the actual joint-policy of the system of agents leading to high variance gradient estimates that hinder learning. To address this problem, we propose an enhancement tool that accommodates any actor-critic MARL method. Our framework, Performance Enhancing Reinforcement Learning Apparatus (PERLA), introduces a sampling technique of the agents' joint-policy into the critics while the agents train. This leads to TD updates that closely approximate the true expected value under the current joint-policy rather than estimates from a single sample of the joint-action at a given state. This produces low variance and precise estimates of expected returns, minimising the variance in the critic estimators which typically hinders learning. Moreover, as we demonstrate, by eliminating much of the critic variance from the single sampling of the joint policy, PERLA enables CT-DE methods to scale more efficiently with the number of agents. Theoretically, we prove that PERLA reduces variance in value estimates similar to that of decentralised training while maintaining the benefits of centralised training. Empirically, we demonstrate PERLA's superior performance and ability to reduce estimator variance in a range of benchmarks including Multi-agent Mujoco, and StarCraft II Multi-agent Challenge.

Hanyu Li, Wenhan Huang, Zhijian Duan et al.

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet economics and multi-agent learning. This paper reviews various algorithms computing the Nash equilibrium and its approximation solutions in finite normal-form games from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. For the theoretical part, we classify algorithms in the literature and present basic ideas on algorithm design and analysis. For the empirical part, we present a comprehensive comparison on the algorithms in the literature over different kinds of games. Based on these results, we provide practical suggestions on implementations and uses of these algorithms. Finally, we present a series of open problems from both theoretical and practical considerations.