Manxi Wu

Chinmay Maheshwari, Manxi Wu, Druv Pai et al.

We study a multi-agent reinforcement learning dynamics, and analyze its asymptotic behavior in infinite-horizon discounted Markov potential games. We focus on the independent and decentralized setting, where players do not know the game parameters, and cannot communicate or coordinate. In each stage, players update their estimate of Q-function that evaluates their total contingent payoff based on the realized one-stage reward in an asynchronous manner. Then, players independently update their policies by incorporating an optimal one-stage deviation strategy based on the estimated Q-function. Inspired by the actor-critic algorithm in single-agent reinforcement learning, a key feature of our learning dynamics is that agents update their Q-function estimates at a faster timescale than the policies. Leveraging tools from two-timescale asynchronous stochastic approximation theory, we characterize the convergent set of learning dynamics.

Maxime Bouscary, Manxi Wu, Saurabh Amin

Large language models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for automatic algorithm design (AAD). However, existing pipelines remain inefficient. They operate at the granularity of full algorithms, redundantly rewriting recurring substructures and discarding low-fitness candidates that may contain valuable algorithmic features. We formalize budget-efficient automatic algorithm design, wherein the search policy maximizes realized fitness subject to limited computational cost. We propose a directed acyclic graph representation of algorithms and build a search framework that fully exploits the LLM's output. Instead of querying the LLM for full algorithms, we use it to obtain corrections: compact operators that add, replace, or remove code blocks. Each correction augments the graph, yielding new algorithms that compose with prior corrections. This graph structure decomposes algorithms into sets of corrections, enabling correction-level credit assignment that informs subsequent queries. We complement this framework with theoretical insights into the ideal balance between search depth and breadth at different budget levels. We validate our method empirically on three combinatorial optimization problems, demonstrating consistent superiority of our graph-based search over full-algorithm search at equal token budget. Finally, our experiments suggest that rich contexts help only when the LLM's prior knowledge is shallow, and can hinder performance otherwise.

Chinmay Maheshwari, Manxi Wu, Shankar Sastry

Markov games provide a powerful framework for modeling strategic multi-agent interactions in dynamic environments. Traditionally, convergence properties of decentralized learning algorithms in these settings have been established only for special cases, such as Markov zero-sum and potential games, which do not fully capture real-world interactions. In this paper, we address this gap by studying the asymptotic properties of learning algorithms in general-sum Markov games. In particular, we focus on a decentralized algorithm where each agent adopts an actor-critic learning dynamic with asynchronous step sizes. This decentralized approach enables agents to operate independently, without requiring knowledge of others' strategies or payoffs. We introduce the concept of a Markov Near-Potential Function (MNPF) and demonstrate that it serves as an approximate Lyapunov function for the policy updates in the decentralized learning dynamics, which allows us to characterize the convergent set of strategies. We further strengthen our result under specific regularity conditions and with finite Nash equilibria.

Jim Dai, Manxi Wu, Zhanhao Zhang

Pioneering companies such as Waymo have deployed robo-taxi services in several U.S. cities. These robo-taxis are electric vehicles, and their operations require the joint optimization of ride matching, vehicle repositioning, and charging scheduling in a stochastic environment. We model the operations of the ride-hailing system with robo-taxis as a discrete-time, average-reward Markov Decision Process with an infinite horizon. As the fleet size grows, dispatching becomes challenging, as both the system state space and the fleet dispatching action space grow exponentially with the number of vehicles. To address this, we introduce a scalable deep reinforcement learning algorithm, called Atomic Proximal Policy Optimization (Atomic-PPO), that reduces the action space using atomic action decomposition. We evaluate our algorithm using real-world NYC for-hire vehicle trip records and measure its performance by the long-run average reward achieved by the dispatching policy, relative to a fluid-based upper bound. Our experiments demonstrate the superior performance of Atomic-PPO compared to benchmark methods. Furthermore, we conduct extensive numerical experiments to analyze the efficient allocation of charging facilities and assess the impact of vehicle range and charger speed on system performance.

Xin Guo, Xinyu Li, Chinmay Maheshwari et al.

We propose a new framework of Markov $α$-potential games to study Markov games. We show that any Markov game with finite-state and finite-action is a Markov $α$-potential game, and establish the existence of an associated $α$-potential function. Any optimizer of an $α$-potential function is shown to be an $α$-stationary Nash equilibrium. We study two important classes of practically significant Markov games, Markov congestion games and the perturbed Markov team games, via the framework of Markov $α$-potential games, with explicit characterization of an upper bound for $α$ and its relation to game parameters. Additionally, we provide a semi-infinite linear programming based formulation to obtain an upper bound for $α$ for any Markov game. Furthermore, we study two equilibrium approximation algorithms, namely the projected gradient-ascent algorithm and the sequential maximum improvement algorithm, along with their Nash regret analysis, and corroborate the results with numerical experiments.

Manxi Wu, Saurabh Amin, Asuman Ozdaglar

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players' strategies and realized payoffs using Bayes' rule. Players adjust their strategies by accounting for an equilibrium strategy or a best response strategy based on the updated belief. We prove that beliefs and strategies converge to a fixed point with probability 1. We also provide conditions that guarantee local and global stability of fixed points. Any fixed point belief consistently estimates the payoff distribution given the fixed point strategy profile. However, convergence to a complete information Nash equilibrium is not always guaranteed. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition under which fixed point belief recovers the unknown parameter. We also provide a sufficient condition for convergence to complete information equilibrium even when parameter learning is incomplete.