He He

Jane Pan, He He, Samuel R. Bowman et al.

Language models are capable of iteratively improving their outputs based on natural language feedback, thus enabling in-context optimization of user preference. In place of human users, a second language model can be used as an evaluator, providing feedback along with numerical ratings which the generator attempts to optimize. However, because the evaluator is an imperfect proxy of user preference, this optimization can lead to reward hacking, where the evaluator's ratings improve while the generation quality remains stagnant or even decreases as judged by actual user preference. The concern of reward hacking is heightened in iterative self-refinement where the generator and the evaluator use the same underlying language model, in which case the optimization pressure can drive them to exploit shared vulnerabilities. Using an essay editing task, we show that iterative self-refinement leads to deviation between the language model evaluator and human judgment, demonstrating that reward hacking can occur spontaneously in-context with the use of iterative self-refinement. In addition, we study conditions under which reward hacking occurs and observe two factors that affect reward hacking severity: model size and context sharing between the generator and the evaluator.

Jiaxin Wen, Vivek Hebbar, Caleb Larson et al.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Xinpeng Wang, Nitish Joshi, Barbara Plank et al.

Reward hacking, where a reasoning model exploits loopholes in a reward function to achieve high rewards without solving the intended task, poses a significant threat. This behavior may be explicit, i.e. verbalized in the model's chain-of-thought (CoT), or implicit, where the CoT appears benign thus bypasses CoT monitors. To detect implicit reward hacking, we propose TRACE (Truncated Reasoning AUC Evaluation). Our key observation is that hacking occurs when exploiting the loophole is easier than solving the actual task. This means that the model is using less 'effort' than required to achieve high reward. TRACE quantifies effort by measuring how early a model's reasoning becomes sufficient to obtain the reward. We progressively truncate a model's CoT at various lengths, force the model to answer, and estimate the expected reward at each cutoff. A hacking model, which takes a shortcut, will achieve a high expected reward with only a small fraction of its CoT, yielding a large area under the accuracy-vs-length curve. TRACE achieves over 65% gains over our strongest 72B CoT monitor in math reasoning, and over 30% gains over a 32B monitor in coding. We further show that TRACE can discover unknown loopholes during training. Overall, TRACE offers a scalable unsupervised approach for oversight where current monitoring methods prove ineffective.