Chandrajit Bajaj

Aditya Sai Ellendula, Yi Wang, Chandrajit Bajaj

Risk-aware navigation should be selective: a policy should expose evasive degrees of freedom only when the local scene admits a lower-risk feasible maneuver, and suppress them when no safer alternative exists. We show that adding one context-energy term to a port-Hamiltonian navigation policy produces a learned force channel with exactly this falsifiable signature. When the local risk field contains a feasible lower-risk direction, the induced context force activates toward it; when the apparent escape is blocked or not yet available, a route-aware gate suppresses lateral force rather than hallucinating an unsafe maneuver. A CVaR tail-risk objective focuses gradient updates on rare but consequential risk transitions. We validate the selectivity signature across four settings. In the primary delayed-required-escape benchmark, route-aware CVaR reduces premature force activation from 0.950 to 0.180 versus DWA while raising success from 0.480 to 0.810 with zero replans. On real off-road terrain (RELLIS-3D), route-aware enrichment achieves correct activation rate 0.837 and false activation rate 0.114, compared to 0.378/0.752 for scalar risk gradients. On static semantic maps (DFC2018), enrichment reduces catastrophic failure from 0.60 to 0.10 and oscillation by 90.7% while preserving path efficiency. In highway traffic, collisions drop from 100% to 0% when a lane escape is feasible; when no escape exists, the policy suppresses the lateral maneuver. The selectivity property follows from the gradient structure of the context energy rather than from training-time tuning.

Arman Maesumi, Mingkang Zhu, Yi Wang et al.

This paper presents a novel patch-based adversarial attack pipeline that trains adversarial patches on 3D human meshes. We sample triangular faces on a reference human mesh, and create an adversarial texture atlas over those faces. The adversarial texture is transferred to human meshes in various poses, which are rendered onto a collection of real-world background images. Contrary to the traditional patch-based adversarial attacks, where prior work attempts to fool trained object detectors using appended adversarial patches, this new form of attack is mapped into the 3D object world and back-propagated to the texture atlas through differentiable rendering. As such, the adversarial patch is trained under deformation consistent with real-world materials. In addition, and unlike existing adversarial patches, our new 3D adversarial patch is shown to fool state-of-the-art deep object detectors robustly under varying views, potentially leading to an attacking scheme that is persistently strong in the physical world.