J.W.T. Dickerson

Alex Stein, Avi Schwarzschild, Michael Curry et al.

Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has been shown that neural networks can be used to approximate optimal mechanisms while satisfying the constraints that an auction be strategyproof and individually rational. We show that despite such auctions maximizing revenue, they do so at the cost of revealing private bidder information. While randomness is often used to build in privacy, in this context it comes with complications if done without care. Specifically, it can violate rationality and feasibility constraints, fundamentally change the incentive structure of the mechanism, and/or harm top-level metrics such as revenue and social welfare. We propose a method that employs stochasticity to improve privacy while meeting the requirements for auction mechanisms with only a modest sacrifice in revenue. We analyze the cost to the auction house that comes with introducing varying degrees of privacy in common auction settings. Our results show that despite current neural auctions' ability to approximate optimal mechanisms, the resulting vulnerability that comes with relying on neural networks must be accounted for.

Avi Schwarzschild, Max Cembalest, Karthik Rao et al.

As neural networks increasingly make critical decisions in high-stakes settings, monitoring and explaining their behavior in an understandable and trustworthy manner is a necessity. One commonly used type of explainer is post hoc feature attribution, a family of methods for giving each feature in an input a score corresponding to its influence on a model's output. A major limitation of this family of explainers in practice is that they can disagree on which features are more important than others. Our contribution in this paper is a method of training models with this disagreement problem in mind. We do this by introducing a Post hoc Explainer Agreement Regularization (PEAR) loss term alongside the standard term corresponding to accuracy, an additional term that measures the difference in feature attribution between a pair of explainers. We observe on three datasets that we can train a model with this loss term to improve explanation consensus on unseen data, and see improved consensus between explainers other than those used in the loss term. We examine the trade-off between improved consensus and model performance. And finally, we study the influence our method has on feature attribution explanations.

John Dickerson, Bistra Dilkina, Yu Ding et al.

This workshop Report Out focuses on the foundational elements of trustworthy AI and OR technology, and how to ensure all AI and OR systems implement these elements in their system designs. Four sessions on various topics within Trustworthy AI were held, these being Fairness, Explainable AI/Causality, Robustness/Privacy, and Human Alignment and Human-Computer Interaction. Following discussions of each of these topics, workshop participants also brainstormed challenge problems which require the collaboration of AI and OR researchers and will result in the integration of basic techniques from both fields to eventually benefit societal needs.

Kweku Kwegyir-Aggrey, A. Feder Cooper, Jessica Dai et al.

We study the problem of post-processing a supervised machine-learned regressor to maximize fair binary classification at all decision thresholds. By decreasing the statistical distance between each group's score distributions, we show that we can increase fair performance across all thresholds at once, and that we can do so without a large decrease in accuracy. To this end, we introduce a formal measure of Distributional Parity, which captures the degree of similarity in the distributions of classifications for different protected groups. Our main result is to put forward a novel post-processing algorithm based on optimal transport, which provably maximizes Distributional Parity, thereby attaining common notions of group fairness like Equalized Odds or Equal Opportunity at all thresholds. We demonstrate on two fairness benchmarks that our technique works well empirically, while also outperforming and generalizing similar techniques from related work.

Saptarashmi Bandyopadhyay, Chenqi Zhu, Philip Daniel et al.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms have been successfully applied to real world situations like illegal smuggling, poaching, deforestation, climate change, airport security, etc. These scenarios can be framed as Stackelberg security games (SSGs) where defenders and attackers compete to control target resources. The algorithm's competency is assessed by which agent is controlling the targets. This review investigates modeling of SSGs in RL with a focus on possible improvements of target representations in RL algorithms.

John Dickerson, Seyed A. Esmaeili, Jamie Morgenstern et al.

Clustering is a fundamental problem in machine learning and operations research. Therefore, given the fact that fairness considerations have become of paramount importance in algorithm design, fairness in clustering has received significant attention from the research community. The literature on fair clustering has resulted in a collection of interesting fairness notions and elaborate algorithms. In this paper, we take a critical view of fair clustering, identifying a collection of ignored issues such as the lack of a clear utility characterization and the difficulty in accounting for the downstream effects of a fair clustering algorithm in machine learning settings. In some cases, we demonstrate examples where the application of a fair clustering algorithm can have significant negative impacts on social welfare. We end by identifying a collection of steps that would lead towards more impactful research in fair clustering.

John Dickerson, Seyed A. Esmaeili, Jamie Morgenstern et al.

The remarkable attention which fair clustering has received in the last few years has resulted in a significant number of different notions of fairness. Despite the fact that these notions are well-justified, they are often motivated and studied in a disjoint manner where one fairness desideratum is considered exclusively in isolation from the others. This leaves the understanding of the relations between different fairness notions as an important open problem in fair clustering. In this paper, we take the first step in this direction. Specifically, we consider the two most prominent demographic representation fairness notions in clustering: (1) Group Fairness (GF), where the different demographic groups are supposed to have close to population-level representation in each cluster and (2) Diversity in Center Selection (DS), where the selected centers are supposed to have close to population-level representation of each group. We show that given a constant approximation algorithm for one constraint (GF or DS only) we can obtain a constant approximation solution that satisfies both constraints simultaneously. Interestingly, we prove that any given solution that satisfies the GF constraint can always be post-processed at a bounded degradation to the clustering cost to additionally satisfy the DS constraint while the reverse is not true. Furthermore, we show that both GF and DS are incompatible (having an empty feasibility set in the worst case) with a collection of other distance-based fairness notions. Finally, we carry experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John Dickerson

A recent approach to automated mechanism design, differentiable economics, represents auctions by rich function approximators and optimizes their performance by gradient descent. The ideal auction architecture for differentiable economics would be perfectly strategyproof, support multiple bidders and items, and be rich enough to represent the optimal (i.e. revenue-maximizing) mechanism. So far, such an architecture does not exist. There are single-bidder approaches (MenuNet, RochetNet) which are always strategyproof and can represent optimal mechanisms. RegretNet is multi-bidder and can approximate any mechanism, but is only approximately strategyproof. We present an architecture that supports multiple bidders and is perfectly strategyproof, but cannot necessarily represent the optimal mechanism. This architecture is the classic affine maximizer auction (AMA), modified to offer lotteries. By using the gradient-based optimization tools of differentiable economics, we can now train lottery AMAs, competing with or outperforming prior approaches in revenue.

Naveen Raman, Sanket Shah, John Dickerson

Rideshare and ride-pooling platforms use artificial intelligence-based matching algorithms to pair riders and drivers. However, these platforms can induce inequality either through an unequal income distribution or disparate treatment of riders. We investigate two methods to reduce forms of inequality in ride-pooling platforms: (1) incorporating fairness constraints into the objective function and (2) redistributing income to drivers to reduce income fluctuation and inequality. To evaluate our solutions, we use the New York City taxi data set. For the first method, we find that optimizing for driver-side fairness outperforms state-of-the-art models on the number of riders serviced, both in the worst-off neighborhood and overall, showing that optimizing for fairness can assist profitability in certain circumstances. For the second method, we explore income redistribution as a way to combat income inequality by having drivers keep an $r$ fraction of their income, and contributing the rest to a redistribution pool. For certain values of $r$, most drivers earn near their Shapley value, while still incentivizing drivers to maximize value, thereby avoiding the free-rider problem and reducing income variability. The first method can be extended to many definitions of fairness and the second method provably improves fairness without affecting profitability.

Phebe Vayanos, Yingxiao Ye, Duncan McElfresh et al.

We study the problem of eliciting the preferences of a decision-maker through a moderate number of pairwise comparison queries to make them a high quality recommendation for a specific problem. We are motivated by applications in high stakes domains, such as when choosing a policy for allocating scarce resources to satisfy basic needs (e.g., kidneys for transplantation or housing for those experiencing homelessness) where a consequential recommendation needs to be made from the (partially) elicited preferences. We model uncertainty in the preferences as being set based and} investigate two settings: a) an offline elicitation setting, where all queries are made at once, and b) an online elicitation setting, where queries are selected sequentially over time in an adaptive fashion. We propose robust optimization formulations of these problems which integrate the preference elicitation and recommendation phases with aim to either maximize worst-case utility or minimize worst-case regret, and study their complexity. For the offline case, where active preference elicitation takes the form of a two and half stage robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery, we provide an equivalent reformulation in the form of a mixed-binary linear program which we solve via column-and-constraint generation. For the online setting, where active preference learning takes the form of a multi-stage robust optimization problem with decision-dependent information discovery, we propose a conservative solution approach. Numerical studies on synthetic data demonstrate that our methods outperform state-of-the art approaches from the literature in terms of worst-case rank, regret, and utility. We showcase how our methodology can be used to assist a homeless services agency in choosing a policy for allocating scarce housing resources of different types to people experiencing homelessness.