Victor Lecomte

Wilson Wu, Victor Lecomte, Michael Winer et al.

By far the most common way to estimate an expected loss in machine learning is to draw samples, compute the loss on each one, and take the empirical average. However, sampling is not necessarily optimal. Given an MLP at initialization, we show how to estimate its expected output over Gaussian inputs without running samples through the network at all. Instead, we produce approximate representations of the distributions of activations at each layer, leveraging tools such as cumulants and Hermite expansions. We show both theoretically and empirically that for sufficiently wide networks, our estimator achieves a target mean squared error using substantially fewer FLOPs than Monte Carlo sampling. We find moreover that our methods perform particularly well at estimating the probabilities of rare events, and additionally demonstrate how they can be used for model training. Together, these findings suggest a path to producing models with a greatly reduced probability of catastrophic tail risks.

Paul Christiano, Jacob Hilton, Victor Lecomte et al.

We introduce a formal notion of defendability against backdoors using a game between an attacker and a defender. In this game, the attacker modifies a function to behave differently on a particular input known as the "trigger", while behaving the same almost everywhere else. The defender then attempts to detect the trigger at evaluation time. If the defender succeeds with high enough probability, then the function class is said to be defendable. The key constraint on the attacker that makes defense possible is that the attacker's strategy must work for a randomly-chosen trigger. Our definition is simple and does not explicitly mention learning, yet we demonstrate that it is closely connected to learnability. In the computationally unbounded setting, we use a voting algorithm of Hanneke et al. (2022) to show that defendability is essentially determined by the VC dimension of the function class, in much the same way as PAC learnability. In the computationally bounded setting, we use a similar argument to show that efficient PAC learnability implies efficient defendability, but not conversely. On the other hand, we use indistinguishability obfuscation to show that the class of polynomial size circuits is not efficiently defendable. Finally, we present polynomial size decision trees as a natural example for which defense is strictly easier than learning. Thus, we identify efficient defendability as a notable intermediate concept in between efficient learnability and obfuscation.