Daniel Ngo

Daniel Ngo, Keegan Harris, Anish Agarwal et al.

We consider the setting of synthetic control methods (SCMs), a canonical approach used to estimate the treatment effect on the treated in a panel data setting. We shed light on a frequently overlooked but ubiquitous assumption made in SCMs of "overlap": a treated unit can be written as some combination -- typically, convex or linear combination -- of the units that remain under control. We show that if units select their own interventions, and there is sufficiently large heterogeneity between units that prefer different interventions, overlap will not hold. We address this issue by proposing a framework which incentivizes units with different preferences to take interventions they would not normally consider. Specifically, leveraging tools from information design and online learning, we propose a SCM that incentivizes exploration in panel data settings by providing incentive-compatible intervention recommendations to units. We establish this estimator obtains valid counterfactual estimates without the need for an a priori overlap assumption. We extend our results to the setting of synthetic interventions, where the goal is to produce counterfactual outcomes under all interventions, not just control. Finally, we provide two hypothesis tests for determining whether unit overlap holds for a given panel dataset.

Daniel Ngo, Logan Stapleton, Vasilis Syrgkanis et al.

Randomized experiments can be susceptible to selection bias due to potential non-compliance by the participants. While much of the existing work has studied compliance as a static behavior, we propose a game-theoretic model to study compliance as dynamic behavior that may change over time. In rounds, a social planner interacts with a sequence of heterogeneous agents who arrive with their unobserved private type that determines both their prior preferences across the actions (e.g., control and treatment) and their baseline rewards without taking any treatment. The planner provides each agent with a randomized recommendation that may alter their beliefs and their action selection. We develop a novel recommendation mechanism that views the planner's recommendation as a form of instrumental variable (IV) that only affects an agents' action selection, but not the observed rewards. We construct such IVs by carefully mapping the history -- the interactions between the planner and the previous agents -- to a random recommendation. Even though the initial agents may be completely non-compliant, our mechanism can incentivize compliance over time, thereby enabling the estimation of the treatment effect of each treatment, and minimizing the cumulative regret of the planner whose goal is to identify the optimal treatment.

Keegan Harris, Daniel Ngo, Logan Stapleton et al.

In settings where Machine Learning (ML) algorithms automate or inform consequential decisions about people, individual decision subjects are often incentivized to strategically modify their observable attributes to receive more favorable predictions. As a result, the distribution the assessment rule is trained on may differ from the one it operates on in deployment. While such distribution shifts, in general, can hinder accurate predictions, our work identifies a unique opportunity associated with shifts due to strategic responses: We show that we can use strategic responses effectively to recover causal relationships between the observable features and outcomes we wish to predict, even under the presence of unobserved confounding variables. Specifically, our work establishes a novel connection between strategic responses to ML models and instrumental variable (IV) regression by observing that the sequence of deployed models can be viewed as an instrument that affects agents' observable features but does not directly influence their outcomes. We show that our causal recovery method can be utilized to improve decision-making across several important criteria: individual fairness, agent outcomes, and predictive risk. In particular, we show that if decision subjects differ in their ability to modify non-causal attributes, any decision rule deviating from the causal coefficients can lead to (potentially unbounded) individual-level unfairness.