Mark Bedaywi

Nivasini Ananthakrishnan, Mark Bedaywi, Michael I. Jordan et al.

This paper studies an online variant of the assistance games framework, where an informed agent and an uninformed agent repeatedly interact over $T$ timesteps to optimize a common reward function. While the informed agent (the human) observes a latent state of the world, the uninformed agent (the assistant) observes only the human's actions. We provide the first provably efficient learning algorithms for repeated assistance games. We introduce the notion of assistance regret: the gap between the cumulative utility of interactions and that of the optimal joint policies in hindsight, which map latent states to action pairs. We present decentralized algorithms for both the human and the assistant that achieve a $(1-1/e)$-approximate assistance regret rate of $\widetilde{O}(T^{3/4})$, with runtime polynomial in the size of the action and state spaces. These algorithms are general; in particular, they accommodate any no-regret algorithm for the assistant. We prove that achieving a regret approximation factor better than $(1-1/e)$ is computationally intractable. Furthermore, we demonstrate how these generic no-regret algorithms can be tailored to a pseudo-decentralized setting -- using a shared random string -- to achieve a rate of $\widetilde{O}(T^{1/2})$, optimal up to logarithmic factors.

Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, Rhys Gould et al.

For AI systems to be useful to humans, they must understand and act in accordance with our values and preferences. Since specifying preferences is a hard task, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to develop methods that allow for inferring preferences from observed behavior. However, IRL assumes the human to be approximately optimal. This is a big limitation in cases where the human themselves may be learning to act optimally in an environment. In this paper, we formalize the problem of learning the preferences of a learning agent: a predictor observes a learner acting online and tries to infer the underlying reward function being (initially suboptimally) optimized by the learner. We model the learner as either being no-regret, or as converging to an optimal Boltzmann policy over time. In each of these settings, we establish theoretical guarantees for various preference learning algorithms, or otherwise show that such guarantees are impossible.