Yuma Fujimoto

h-index6
2papers
104citations

2 Papers

1.4LGFeb 19
Linear Convergence in Games with Delayed Feedback via Extra Prediction

Yuma Fujimoto, Kenshi Abe, Kaito Ariu

Feedback delays are inevitable in real-world multi-agent learning. They are known to severely degrade performance, and the convergence rate under delayed feedback is still unclear, even for bilinear games. This paper derives the rate of linear convergence of Weighted Optimistic Gradient Descent-Ascent (WOGDA), which predicts future rewards with extra optimism, in unconstrained bilinear games. To analyze the algorithm, we interpret it as an approximation of the Extra Proximal Point (EPP), which is updated based on farther future rewards than the classical Proximal Point (PP). Our theorems show that standard optimism (predicting the next-step reward) achieves linear convergence to the equilibrium at a rate $\exp(-Θ(t/m^{5}))$ after $t$ iterations for delay $m$. Moreover, employing extra optimism (predicting farther future reward) tolerates a larger step size and significantly accelerates the rate to $\exp(-Θ(t/(m^{2}\log m)))$. Our experiments also show accelerated convergence driven by the extra optimism and are qualitatively consistent with our theorems. In summary, this paper validates that extra optimism is a promising countermeasure against performance degradation caused by feedback delays.

2.3GTMay 19, 2025Code
The Hamiltonian of Poly-matrix Zero-sum Games

Toshihiro Ota, Yuma Fujimoto

Understanding a dynamical system fundamentally relies on establishing an appropriate Hamiltonian function and elucidating its symmetries. By formulating agents' strategies and cumulative payoffs as canonically conjugate variables, we identify the Hamiltonian function that generates the dynamics of poly-matrix zero-sum games. We reveal the symmetries of our Hamiltonian and derive the associated conserved quantities, showing how the conservation of probability and the invariance of the Fenchel coupling are intrinsically encoded within the system. Furthermore, we propose the dissipation FTRL (DFTRL) dynamics by introducing a perturbation that dissipates the Fenchel coupling, proving convergence to the Nash equilibrium and linking DFTRL to last-iterate convergent algorithms. Our results highlight the potential of Hamiltonian dynamics in uncovering the structural properties of learning dynamics in games, and pave the way for broader applications of Hamiltonian dynamics in game theory and machine learning.