Combining Voting Rules Together
This work addresses the challenge of designing more robust and manipulation-resistant voting systems, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing voting rules.
The paper tackles the problem of improving voting rules by proposing a simple run-off method that combines multiple voting rules, proving that the combination inherits desirable properties like Condorcet consistency from any single base rule and increases computational difficulty for manipulation.
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base voting rules has a desirable property like Condorcet consistency, the combination inherits this property. In addition, we prove that combining voting rules together in this way can make finding a manipulation more computationally difficult. Finally, we study the impact of this combinator on approximation methods that find close to optimal manipulations.