Mitigating Timing Side Channel in Shared Schedulers
This addresses privacy and security risks in shared systems like routers and cloud services, offering a practical solution for mitigating side-channel attacks.
The paper tackles the problem of information leakage through timing side channels in shared event schedulers, where a malicious process can infer patterns of an innocent process, and proposes two parametrized policies, accumulate and serve and proportional TDMA, to provide a tunable trade-off between privacy and performance.
In this work, we study information leakage in timing side channels that arise in the context of shared event schedulers. Consider two processes, one of them an innocuous process (referred to as Alice) and the other a malicious one (referred to as Bob), using a common scheduler to process their jobs. Based on when his jobs get processed, Bob wishes to learn about the pattern (size and timing) of jobs of Alice. Depending on the context, knowledge of this pattern could have serious implications on Alice's privacy and security. For instance, shared routers can reveal traffic patterns, shared memory access can reveal cloud usage patterns, and suchlike. We present a formal framework to study the information leakage in shared resource schedulers using the pattern estimation error as a performance metric. The first-come-first-serve (FCFS) scheduling policy and time-division-multiple-access (TDMA) are identified as two extreme policies on the privacy metric, FCFS has the least, and TDMA has the highest. However, on performance based metrics, such as throughput and delay, it is well known that FCFS significantly outperforms TDMA. We then derive two parametrized policies, accumulate and serve, and proportional TDMA, which take two different approaches to offer a tunable trade-off between privacy and performance.