Sprobes: Enforcing Kernel Code Integrity on the TrustZone Architecture
This addresses security for smartphone users by enabling effective introspection without virtualization, though it is incremental as it builds on existing TrustZone hardware.
The paper tackles the problem of rootkit attacks on smartphone operating systems by introducing SPROBES, a primitive that enables kernel code integrity enforcement using ARM TrustZone hardware, demonstrating that only 12 SPROBES are needed to enforce invariants in Linux kernel 2.6.38.
Many smartphones now deploy conventional operating systems, so the rootkit attacks so prevalent on desktop and server systems are now a threat to smartphones. While researchers have advocated using virtualization to detect and prevent attacks on operating systems (e.g., VM introspection and trusted virtual domains), virtualization is not practical on smartphone systems due to the lack of virtualization support and/or the expense of virtualization. Current smartphone processors do have hardware support for running a protected environment, such as the ARM TrustZone extensions, but such hardware does not control the operating system operations sufficiently to enable VM introspection. In particular, a conventional operating system running with TrustZone still retains full control of memory management, which a rootkit can use to prevent traps on sensitive instructions or memory accesses necessary for effective introspection. In this paper, we present SPROBES, a novel primitive that enables introspection of operating systems running on ARM TrustZone hardware. Using SPROBES, an introspection mechanism protected by TrustZone can instrument individual operating system instructions of its choice, receiving an unforgeable trap whenever any SPROBE is executed. The key challenge in designing SPROBES is preventing the rootkit from removing them, but we identify a set of five invariants whose enforcement is sufficient to restrict rootkits to execute only approved, SPROBE-injected kernel code. We implemented a proof-of-concept version of SPROBES for the ARM Fast Models emulator, demonstrating that in Linux kernel 2.6.38, only 12 SPROBES are sufficient to enforce all five of these invariants. With SPROBES we show that it is possible to leverage the limited TrustZone extensions to limit conventional kernel execution to approved code comprehensively.