Local Cyber-physical Attack with Leveraging Detection in Smart Grid
For power system security researchers, this introduces a novel attack vector that evades existing detection methods, but the work is incremental as it builds on known attack types.
The paper proposes a new 'combinational attack' strategy for smart grids that masks a line outage at one location while misleading the control center to believe it occurred elsewhere, enabling continuous deception and increasing system risk. Simulations validate the attack's efficiency.
A well-designed attack in the power system can cause an initial failure and then results in large-scale cascade failure. Several works have discussed power system attack through false data injection, line-maintaining attack, and line-removing attack. However, the existing methods need to continuously attack the system for a long time, and, unfortunately, the performance cannot be guaranteed if the system states vary. To overcome this issue, we consider a new type of attack strategy called combinational attack which masks a line-outage at one position but misleads the control center on line outage at another position. Therefore, the topology information in the control center is interfered by our attack. We also offer a procedure of selecting the vulnerable lines of its kind. The proposed method can effectively and continuously deceive the control center in identifying the actual position of line-outage. The system under attack will be exposed to increasing risks as the attack continuously. Simulation results validate the efficiency of the proposed attack strategy.