On the Impossibility of Post-Quantum Black-Box Zero-Knowledge in Constant Rounds
This addresses a key limitation in post-quantum cryptography for secure protocols, with implications for privacy and verification in quantum-resistant systems, though it is incremental in building on prior impossibility results.
The paper tackles the problem of constructing constant-round post-quantum black-box zero-knowledge protocols for NP, showing that such protocols are impossible unless NP is contained in BQP, highlighting a fundamental difference from classical settings.
We investigate the existence of constant-round post-quantum black-box zero-knowledge protocols for $\mathbf{NP}$. As a main result, we show that there is no constant-round post-quantum black-box zero-knowledge argument for $\mathbf{NP}$ unless $\mathbf{NP}\subseteq \mathbf{BQP}$. As constant-round black-box zero-knowledge arguments for $\mathbf{NP}$ exist in the classical setting, our main result points out a fundamental difference between post-quantum and classical zero-knowledge protocols. Combining previous results, we conclude that unless $\mathbf{NP}\subseteq \mathbf{BQP}$, constant-round post-quantum zero-knowledge protocols for $\mathbf{NP}$ exist if and only if we use non-black-box techniques or relax certain security requirements such as relaxing standard zero-knowledge to $ε$-zero-knowledge. Additionally, we also prove that three-round and public-coin constant-round post-quantum black-box $ε$-zero-knowledge arguments for $\mathbf{NP}$ do not exist unless $\mathbf{NP}\subseteq \mathbf{BQP}$.