Degrees of riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness. A neo-Popperian account applicable to probabilistic theories
This work addresses foundational issues in philosophy of science, particularly for probabilistic theories, but is incremental as it builds on existing Popperian frameworks.
The paper tackles the problem of defining and relating Popperian concepts like riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness for probabilistic theories, resulting in a tentative quantitative account of verisimilitude.
In this paper, we take a fresh look at three Popperian concepts: riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness (or verisimilitude) of scientific hypotheses or theories. First, we make explicit the dimensions that underlie the notion of riskiness. Secondly, we examine if and how degrees of falsifiability can be defined, and how they are related to various dimensions of the concept of riskiness as well as the experimental context. Thirdly, we consider the relation of riskiness to (expected degrees of) truthlikeness. Throughout, we pay special attention to probabilistic theories and we offer a tentative, quantitative account of verisimilitude for probabilistic theories.