Type theory in human-like learning and inference
This addresses a central issue in cognitive science by providing a formal model for human-like learning and inference, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing ideas in type theory.
The paper tackles the problem of modeling how humans generate reasonable answers to novel queries, proposing that a core component of such reasoning is a type theory, which imposes formal structure on computations and their performance.
Humans can generate reasonable answers to novel queries (Schulz, 2012): if I asked you what kind of food you want to eat for lunch, you would respond with a food, not a time. The thought that one would respond "After 4pm" to "What would you like to eat" is either a joke or a mistake, and seriously entertaining it as a lunch option would likely never happen in the first place. While understanding how people come up with new ideas, thoughts, explanations, and hypotheses that obey the basic constraints of a novel search space is of central importance to cognitive science, there is no agreed-on formal model for this kind of reasoning. We propose that a core component of any such reasoning system is a type theory: a formal imposition of structure on the kinds of computations an agent can perform, and how they're performed. We motivate this proposal with three empirical observations: adaptive constraints on learning and inference (i.e. generating reasonable hypotheses), how people draw distinctions between improbability and impossibility, and people's ability to reason about things at varying levels of abstraction.