There must be encapsulated nonconceptual content in vision
This addresses a philosophical problem in perception theory, but it is incremental as it builds on existing arguments without empirical validation.
The paper argues for Jerry Fodor's thesis that input systems are modular and informationally encapsulated, proposing that a visual module is necessary to explain how sensation becomes meaningful perception, thus supporting the existence of encapsulated nonconceptual content in vision.
In this paper I want to propose an argument to support Jerry Fodor's thesis (Fodor 1983) that input systems are modular and thus informationally encapsulated. The argument starts with the suggestion that there is a "grounding problem" in perception, i. e. that there is a problem in explaining how perception that can yield a visual experience is possible, how sensation can become meaningful perception of something for the subject. Given that visual experience is actually possible, this invites a transcendental argument that explains the conditions of its possibility. I propose that one of these conditions is the existence of a visual module in Fodor's sense that allows the step from sensation to object-identifying perception, thus enabling visual experience. It seems to follow that there is informationally encapsulated nonconceptual content in visual perception.