Vincent C. Müller

Robin Beer, Alexander Feix, Tim Guttzeit et al.

Large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and Copilot, are transforming software development by automating code generation and, arguably, enable rapid prototyping, support education, and boost productivity. Therefore, correctness and quality of the generated code should be on par with manually written code. To assess the current state of LLMs in generating correct code of high quality, we conducted controlled experiments with ChatGPT and Copilot: we let the LLMs generate simple algorithms in Java and Python along with the corresponding unit tests and assessed the correctness and the quality (coverage) of the generated (test) codes. We observed significant differences between the LLMs, between the languages, between algorithm and test codes, and over time. The present paper reports these results together with the experimental methods allowing repeated and comparable assessments for more algorithms, languages, and LLMs over time.

Vincent C. Müller, Nick Bostrom

There is, in some quarters, concern about high-level machine intelligence and superintelligent AI coming up in a few decades, bringing with it significant risks for humanity. In other quarters, these issues are ignored or considered science fiction. We wanted to clarify what the distribution of opinions actually is, what probability the best experts currently assign to high-level machine intelligence coming up within a particular time-frame, which risks they see with that development, and how fast they see these developing. We thus designed a brief questionnaire and distributed it to four groups of experts in 2012/2013. The median estimate of respondents was for a one in two chance that high-level machine intelligence will be developed around 2040-2050, rising to a nine in ten chance by 2075. Experts expect that systems will move on to superintelligence in less than 30 years thereafter. They estimate the chance is about one in three that this development turns out to be 'bad' or 'extremely bad' for humanity.

Vincent C. Müller

This paper investigates the prospects of AI without representation in general, and the proposals of Rodney Brooks in particular. What turns out to be characteristic of Brooks' proposal is the rejection of central control in intelligent agents; his systems has as much or as little representation as traditional AI. The traditional view that representation is necessary for intelligence presupposes that intelligence requires central control. However, much of recent cognitive science suggests that we should dispose of the image of intelligent agents as central representation processors. If this paradigm shift is achieved, Brooks' proposal for non-centralized cognition without representation appears promising for full-blown intelligent agents - though not for conscious agents and thus not for human-like AI.

Antoni Gomila, Vincent C. Müller

The declared goal of this paper is to fill this gap: "... cognitive systems research needs questions or challenges that define progress. The challenges are not (yet more) predictions of the future, but a guideline to what are the aims and what would constitute progress." -- the quotation being from the project description of EUCogII, the project for the European Network for Cognitive Systems within which this formulation of the 'challenges' was originally developed (http://www.eucognition.org). So, we stick out our neck and formulate the challenges for artificial cognitive systems. These challenges are articulated in terms of a definition of what a cognitive system is: a system that learns from experience and uses its acquired knowledge (both declarative and practical) in a flexible manner to achieve its own goals.

Vincent C. Müller

Floridi and Taddeo propose a condition of "zero semantic commitment" for solutions to the grounding problem, and a solution to it. I argue briefly that their condition cannot be fulfilled, not even by their own solution. After a look at Luc Steels' very different competing suggestion, I suggest that we need to re-think what the problem is and what role the 'goals' in a system play in formulating the problem. On the basis of a proper understanding of computing, I come to the conclusion that the only sensible grounding problem is how we can explain and re-produce the behavioral ability and function of meaning in artificial computational agents

Vincent C. Müller

The paper presents a paradoxical feature of computational systems that suggests that computationalism cannot explain symbol grounding. If the mind is a digital computer, as computationalism claims, then it can be computing either over meaningful symbols or over meaningless symbols. If it is computing over meaningful symbols its functioning presupposes the existence of meaningful symbols in the system, i.e. it implies semantic nativism. If the mind is computing over meaningless symbols, no intentional cognitive processes are available prior to symbol grounding. In this case, no symbol grounding could take place since any grounding presupposes intentional cognitive processes. So, whether computing in the mind is over meaningless or over meaningful symbols, computationalism implies semantic nativism.

Vincent C. Müller

In this paper I want to propose an argument to support Jerry Fodor's thesis (Fodor 1983) that input systems are modular and thus informationally encapsulated. The argument starts with the suggestion that there is a "grounding problem" in perception, i. e. that there is a problem in explaining how perception that can yield a visual experience is possible, how sensation can become meaningful perception of something for the subject. Given that visual experience is actually possible, this invites a transcendental argument that explains the conditions of its possibility. I propose that one of these conditions is the existence of a visual module in Fodor's sense that allows the step from sensation to object-identifying perception, thus enabling visual experience. It seems to follow that there is informationally encapsulated nonconceptual content in visual perception.

Athanassios Raftopoulos, Vincent C. Müller

In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experiential concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the referents of such demonstratives. To avoid 'encodingism', that is, relating representations to representations, we postulate that the process of reference fixing must be bottom-up and nonconceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual content and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate causal relation between representations and the world is needed. We claim that this relation is provided by spatial and object-centered attention that leads to the formation of object files through the function of deictic acts. This entire causal process takes place at a pre-conceptual level, meeting the requirement for a solution to the grounding problem. Finally we claim that our account captures fundamental insights in Putnam's and Kripke's work on "new" reference.

Matej Hoffmann, Vincent C. Müller

Tailoring the design of robot bodies for control purposes is implicitly performed by engineers, however, a methodology or set of tools is largely absent and optimization of morphology (shape, material properties of robot bodies, etc.) is lagging behind the development of controllers. This has become even more prominent with the advent of compliant, deformable or "soft" bodies. These carry substantial potential regarding their exploitation for control---sometimes referred to as "morphological computation" in the sense of offloading computation needed for control to the body. Here, we will argue in favor of a dynamical systems rather than computational perspective on the problem. Then, we will look at the pros and cons of simple vs. complex bodies, critically reviewing the attractive notion of "soft" bodies automatically taking over control tasks. We will address another key dimension of the design space---whether model-based control should be used and to what extent it is feasible to develop faithful models for different morphologies.