Which symbol grounding problem should we try to solve?
This work addresses foundational issues in AI and philosophy of mind regarding how symbols acquire meaning, but it is incremental as it critiques and reframes rather than solves the problem.
The paper critiques existing solutions to the symbol grounding problem, arguing that a proposed 'zero semantic commitment' condition is unattainable and that the problem should be reframed around explaining and reproducing meaning in artificial agents based on computational understanding.
Floridi and Taddeo propose a condition of "zero semantic commitment" for solutions to the grounding problem, and a solution to it. I argue briefly that their condition cannot be fulfilled, not even by their own solution. After a look at Luc Steels' very different competing suggestion, I suggest that we need to re-think what the problem is and what role the 'goals' in a system play in formulating the problem. On the basis of a proper understanding of computing, I come to the conclusion that the only sensible grounding problem is how we can explain and re-produce the behavioral ability and function of meaning in artificial computational agents